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Foreword

This manual is the second edition of that published in 1998 by the Museums and Galleries Security Group under the auspices of the Museums and Galleries Commission. That publication was well received in the sector and considered a valuable guide to the complex task of providing security for collections and to ensure that they are both safe but accessible to the public. This edition has been expanded to embrace libraries and archives in line with Resource’s remit as the strategic body for museums, archives and libraries.

The Museums and Galleries Security Group meets regularly under the chairmanship of the National Security Adviser from Resource. The Group brings together those charged with providing security to over 70 museums, libraries and archives across the country. It provides a forum for the exchange of security information, advice, expertise and experiences for the mutual benefit of the Group. The information contained in this Manual is a compilation of that experience and contains contributions of best practice from many members.

It is intended that this Manual be used as a general guide to the large number of subjects of which the security manager must have some knowledge. It provides basic information and some guidance as to where more detailed information on each topic can be found. It can also be used as a general guide to assist when preparing contracts, choosing equipment and establishing procedures.

It is hoped that this Manual will be useful in assisting security managers in performing their complex tasks and fill a gap in this specialised area.

Iain K. Slessor
National Security Adviser
Security is an essential part of life today, whether we like it or not. Most organisations see the need to allocate resources to security to protect their assets, customers and employees. Museums, galleries, libraries and archives have the added duty and responsibility of protecting the nation's cultural assets.

Resource believes that security should be provided in a structured and effective manner that represents best value. This publication is intended to support and guide the implementation of this principle and act as a valuable, practical tool for operational managers across the sector.

Security in Museums, Archives and Libraries is largely concerned with protecting collections, whether they are works of art, historic books or archives. At the same time, it recognises that security management within the sector is complex and wide-ranging. More detailed guidance has been included in Part 3, therefore, which can be dipped into as necessary. A quick glance at the numbered Contents should help with easy reference. Additional security fact sheets are also available on the Resource website at www.resource.gov.uk
1.1 Threat of Criminal Activity and Fire

Works of art, antiquities and books are still being stolen from museums, galleries and reference institutions in this country and abroad. Given the existence of established markets for stolen items and the fact that such objects usually retain their value, thefts will continue to take place. In common with other public buildings, the possibility of fire is also a constant threat.

Resource’s Security Advisers have many years’ experience of the type and methods of criminal activity against museums, galleries and historic libraries, and this has been used to determine the measures needed to protect these and archives.

Compared to domestic and some commercial situations, historic institutions are at a great disadvantage by virtue of the nature of their business. Publicity material draws criminals as well as audiences to material on display. During open hours this can lead to a smash and grab style attack, but more often advantage is taken of inadequate protection arrangements to lever open display cases or remove items from open displays.

In libraries and archives, theft is often committed by those who take advantage of having ‘hands on’ access to the collections.

During closed hours it is not uncommon for the criminal, having spotted an intruder detection system and knowing the precise whereabouts of the items he seeks and physical security weaknesses, to make a rapid attack and escape well before the police arrive in response to the alarm system. Increasingly these attacks take place through upper floors and roofs following improvements made over the years.

In any institution, the thief might be a member of staff, a contractor or plausible researcher removing small items on repeated visits to build up a collection of their own. While extraordinary events will draw intensive media attention, it should not be forgotten that day to day criminal activity, which attracts far less publicity, is a more common threat.

Objects are also at risk when in transit between venues. While every effort is made to protect objects in their normal home, equal care has to be taken to ensure that they benefit from a comparable level of protection while being moved to another location.

Although arson is a steadily increasing threat in the UK, most fires happen as the result of carelessness. Contractors’
negligence in Hot Work or the overloading of electrical sockets with multiple devices are just two examples. Fire is perhaps the greatest threat, as it can easily destroy or damage a whole collection, whereas thieves are usually limited in their activity by the time available or by other factors.

1.2 Assessing the Level of Criminal Threat

It is important for individual institutions to identify the potential scale of the criminal threat before defining policies and procedures. The nature of the threat is very much influenced by the attractiveness, value and portability of the collection, although the institution’s surroundings and any history of crime will also play a part.

Rarity and renown do not always protect objects from theft or attack, for example, the Cézanne painting stolen from the Ashmolean Museum in Oxford, the Constable sketches from a store at the Victoria and Albert Museum and the shotgun attack on the ‘Leonardo Cartoon’ in the National Gallery.

Because circumstances will vary so widely the application of some form of scale is not easy, but by taking the above factors into account it should be possible to say in broad terms whether the threat is high, medium or low. An institution that has suffered a burglary or robbery with the loss of some masterpieces from a collection that has other similar works must consider the potential level of threat to be high. In such circumstances the success of the criminal has demonstrated to others that there are rich pickings to be had and there are weaknesses in the security. For a comparable institution with a similar collection, but possibly not with the same bitter experience or security weaknesses, it would be right if it put itself in the medium category. The institution with a far more modest collection, but possibly with the good fortune of having a particularly strong building with a good investment in security over the years could put itself in the low category.

1.3 Risk Assessment for the Threat of Crime

Each historic institution should have a risk assessment from time to time. This might happen in a number of different ways depending on their circumstances. Having an in house security manager available to do the job is an ideal that many institutions do not have, but the services of the Resource Security Adviser are available. Otherwise it is a matter of self-help, taking account of the advice in this publication and the fact sheets on the Resource website.
In assessing risk the Resource Security Adviser will take account, as relevant, of:

- the perimeters;
- the shell of the building and its apertures;
- zoned areas (including temporary exhibition galleries and stores), internal doors and the need for access control;
- any presence of security staff for 24 hours;
- any staff in residence;
- the requirements for an intruder detection system;
- how CCTV can be effectively applied;
- how security lighting might be used;
- the method of display;
- arrangements for readers;
- invigilation levels;
- arrangements for key management and operating procedures;
- the impact of commercial functions or any mixed use.

1.4 Risk Assessment for the Threat of Fire

As places of public resort all premises should have been the subject of professional assessment, but so often the advice is not followed, as should be the case. Self-assessment can take the form of checking that the points previously advised by the Fire Officer or set out in any fire certificate. These will include the maintenance of fire extinguishers, keeping exit routes clear, keeping fire doors closed as well as identifying any risks arising from smoking, old wiring, electrical installations of unknown standard and the unnecessary or unprotected storage of inflammable materials.

1.5 Countering the Threats

By paying attention to the areas listed above in the same way as the Security Adviser and the Fire Officer, there is much that can be done to reduce the risk of theft or fire. Competitive insurance premiums for museums compared to commercial activity and the steadily reducing incidence of crime and fire over the years are indications of success, but it would be very wrong to be complacent about ongoing risks.

The aim should be to have:

- buildings with strong physical security;
- a means of detecting any unauthorised intrusions;
- secure arrangements for displays and exhibitions;
- monitoring of the collection during open hours;
- a means of detecting the presence of fire;
• a proper means of extinguishing fire;
• properly certificated electrical installations;
• eliminated possible causes of fire or provided a means of protection;
• correct fire safety practices;
• well-defined fire and security procedures;
• proper arrangements for transporting objects.

It may not always be possible to achieve the ideal for all of these elements. For example, the listing of the building as being of architectural merit may inhibit the type of physical security measures that can be provided. In such cases compensation will have to be sought in other elements of the security equation.

1.6 Government Indemnity and Loans from Nationals

Institutions wishing to take advantage of the Government Indemnity Scheme and to borrow from the national collection will need to meet the general conditions laid down by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). The application of these conditions by the Resource Security Adviser will vary, as each application for indemnity has to be considered individually on its own merits, taking into account the nature, value, portability and disposability of the material to be exhibited. In the case of high-risk exhibitions, it may be necessary to impose additional stringent conditions on methods of display and to adopt 24-hour guarding.
2.1 Physical Defences

Perimeters

A well-designed and well-maintained perimeter fence or wall provides a first line of defence. It can also serve as warning of approach to the premises, especially if monitored by alarms and CCTV. The presence of bright security lighting, particularly if is triggered by PIR detectors, provides a cost-effective deterrent in defined areas.

Building Protection

An efficient intruder detection system will quickly identify an intrusion and cause a message to be passed to the police to respond, but it provides no form of resistance to the intruder. This can only be done by physical means, which can deter and often defeat the intruder, or at least buy time for police to attend in response to the alarm.

For this reason the provision of physical defences forms the cornerstone of Resource security advice.

The nature of the collection, its value and its portability will influence the degree of protection provided, but the shell of the building must always be of substantial construction. Brick, stone or concrete materials generally provide the best resistance to forcible attack. Openings in the shell, such as doors, windows and skylights, must be reduced to the absolute minimum and those remaining strengthened to deter and delay entry.

New Buildings

Basic security measures can be designed into new buildings. While the architect should not be unduly inhibited in the building’s design, they are entitled to an explicit brief on security matters in the early stages. Security advice taken at this stage may avoid the need for additional measures later on that might spoil the building’s appearance, as well as ensuring that further costs are not incurred once the building has been occupied.

The Design Stage

Including security features in the original design makes it easier to maintain separate security of different elements of the building, as well as limiting features that might help intruders to gain access.
Recommendations

- As the shell of the building is usually regarded as the security perimeter, the number of openings should be limited to those necessary for access and to meet statutory requirements for human health and comfort.
- Provision needs to be made to ensure that different types of areas, including stores and temporary exhibition spaces, can be kept in a separate secure alarmed state while other parts of the building are in use.
- Separation is also necessary where varied use is made of areas, such as conference or entertainment, to provide protection for the collection and to limit the demands for staffing, especially during normal closed hours.
- Doors, windows and skylights must be protected to reduce the risk of large-volume loss during the night. They need to be able to resist a determined physical attack and allow enough time for the response forces to attend.
- The presence of pipes, ledges and buttresses can make windows, skylights and doors accessible to intruders.
- Access/exit can also be made easier through emergency escape routes, if they are not secured internally during closed hours or sufficiently protected during open hours.
- Good design can also reduce the possibility of thieves concealing themselves on premises during open hours, to break out after closing time. By avoiding unused spaces, dead ends and insecure ducts, the opportunity for someone to hide is reduced.
- Careful design of the exterior can prevent areas being created for concealment by the inappropriate provision of shrubbery, porches, deeply recessed doors and adjacent buildings.
- The risk of attack from an attached building that is not defended to the same degree may not be immediately apparent, but can require the party walls to be of stronger construction than normal. Materials such as breezeblock foamed concrete, aluminium sheeting, plasterboard, hardboard and bitumen-bonded substances are used extensively in the construction of buildings, but they cannot offer the same degree of resistance as the more traditional materials. These materials may also not be chemically stable from a conservation viewpoint and may present additional risk to collections as well as to human life in the event of fire.

Existing Buildings

A wide variety of premises are used to house collections. Many were not built for the purpose and security requirements may have played very little part in their design and construction. The
listing of a museum as a building of special architectural or historical interest also restricts alterations or additions, unless building consent can be obtained.

- Unused doors and windows should be bricked up to the same constructional strength as the surrounds wherever possible. By leaving a door or window in place and confining the infill to the interior of the building, it is possible to retain the external appearance. It is also desirable, for environmental control purposes, to create an infill with as high a thermal mass as possible.
- Skylights should also be eliminated if not required, although it is recognised that in top-lit galleries this may be impracticable. There is also the environmental control argument in favour of this, both from the point of view of controlling light as well as reducing the risk of condensation.
- Some strengthening can be achieved with the advice of planning authorities, especially by taking advantage of maintenance and repair programmes. For example, a roof constructed of slate or tile to unlined battens, can be considerably strengthened if the slates are re-laid to a close-boarded timber covering and/or an expanded metal layer added beneath the external roof cladding. The opportunity should also be taken to add insulation and vapour barriers, where appropriate, in order to stabilise the environment.

Alternatively

The inherent design of many existing buildings can make it a substantial and expensive task to secure all the apertures to the shell. The financial and listing implications can make implementation difficult, if not impossible, even if the work can be spread over a number of years. The best approach in such circumstances may be to define an initial scheme, which excludes some part of the building from the primary security perimeter. By defining a smaller security perimeter drawn around the high-risk items, the remaining area can become an alarmed buffer zone able to signal the presence and progress of an intruder towards the protected area. Collection areas that do not feature outside walls and are above ground floor level are less easy to penetrate and may therefore be more suited for this purpose.

Door Defences

A variety of different degrees of protection can be provided to doors and their openings.
An exterior door must at least be made from solid hardwood or of solid hardcore construction. Further strength to meet higher risk can be provided by using steel doors of varying thickness or ones with a steel sheet insert. All metal doors should include a layer of insulation and a thermal break between leafs to reduce the transmission of heat and cold air through the door.

A door frame must always be capable of carrying its door and be of at least equal strength. Security doors and frames are available in their own purpose-made sets.

Glazed doors to the exterior must always be regarded as weak, and therefore must be supported by a secondary system such as steel roller shutters, expanding steel gates or high quality laminated security doors fitted inside the primary door. If designed and installed with care, these can be cost-effective and aesthetically acceptable.

**Locks**

The weak point of any door is often the locking mechanism, so care must be taken over the choice of system, in consultation with a master locksmith in the case of high-risk premises. Locks come in many different types, sizes and qualities – careful consideration should identify a suitable system. Traditional mortice locks need to conform to BS 3621. European standards will soon provide for a whole range of security levels and include barrel type locks that are particularly suitable for lock suiting.

Hinge bolts will help to hold the door in its frame during an attack and are essential for outward opening doors where hinge pins are exposed to attack.

**Emergency Exits**

While public escape routes are essential, it is important that emergency exits do not make it too easy for a thief to make a rapid escape. Interpretation of the legal requirements for escape routes varies greatly from area to area, making it difficult to offer a simple solution to any perceived conflict between security and public safety. Very often it is a matter for local negotiation with the Fire Officer and Building Control Officer.

Over the years, there have been a number of cases in museums during open hours where it has been possible for a thief to snatch or smash and grab and flee through a nearby exit. The thief can be thwarted if the door is additionally secured by an electromagnetic lock that is connected to the fire alarm system, only to release if that system is activated. Alternatively, a
a solenoid switch incorporated into the release equipment can delay the release for a predetermined period, such as 10 seconds.

At night, when the premises are not staffed, some form of deadlocking can be used, but it is essential that it is unlocked when the building is occupied. Staff responsible for opening up the building can be reminded of this by linking to the intruder detection system, which will indicate the locked state visually and audibly until the key is turned in the lock.

**Window Defences**

Windows and rooflights can often present major security problems. Sometimes even very high windows can be reached from adjacent roofs or ledges.

**Recommendations**

- Glass bricks set in steel or concrete frames
- Windows with a locked or sealed sash, including a thermal break to avoid condensation, with panes no more than 23cm x 15cm
- Narrow windows with effective openings of no more than 15cm
- Attack-resistant security glazing

Although it might be possible to treat some windows in this way, the real defence of windows and rooflights may have to rely on secondary security measures such as:

- steel roller shutters;
- iron or steel bars;
- sliding collapsible gates;
- secondary security glazing that can bring environmental benefits;
- lining existing internal shutters with steel.

### 2.2 Intruder Alarms

**Alarm Systems**

Experience shows that the value of an intruder alarm system is limited if entry to and escape from the building can be effected before the responding authority arrives on the scene. This is why the need for strong physical security has been emphasised. An intruder alarm system can then be used effectively by giving an early signal of an attack as the burglar attempts to defeat the building's physical defences. When combined together these
features give the appropriate authorities the best opportunity to respond.

It is imperative that the signal is safely transmitted to a monitoring agency. Reliance cannot be put on systems that cause an external sounder to activate in the hope that the thief will be frightened off. Even if a member of the public should alert the police, they are unlikely to respond unless there is some other indication that a burglary is taking place. An automatic system using a monitored telephone line (e.g. BT RedCare) to an alarm-receiving centre, which in turn alerts the police, is essential. An automatic system is now so crucial where valuable collections are involved, that if the system is temporarily lost for any reason then a human presence must be provided in its place.

Balanced and reliable systems that meet users’ needs will only be achieved if all relevant parties are involved in the planning process. These might include the architect, the person responsible for the building’s management, the insurance company, any security consultant and the local police crime prevention officer.

Most intruder systems have a combination of perimeter and trap protection. This combination is usually the most effective way of providing the required standard of security.

Perimeter protection is generally understood to include devices activated by intrusion, or by forcible attack on the security perimeter. All the openings in the fabric of the building such as doors, windows, rooflights and ventilation shafts (including those giving access from adjacent accommodation to the area to be protected) need to be covered. The alarm company will take environmental factors into account, but where possible the earliest notification of an attack to the perimeter should be signalled. If the system only detects once the perimeter has been breached, valuable time will have been lost.

Trap detection covers such devices activated once the intruder has penetrated into the premises and relies on the identification of movement and/or body heat. Modern dual technology detectors rely on the identification of both before an alarm is signalled. Although these units are more expensive, they are more reliable and given to fewer false activations.

The Police Response

For many years the police service has been struggling to manage the ever-increasing number of false calls generated by
automatic intruder alarm systems. Less than 10 per cent of the calls relayed to the police actually result from a criminal act.

The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has therefore devised a policy for England and Wales for the management of alarm systems, to reduce the waste of valuable police resources. Most forces have adopted the policy, with similar policies likely to follow in Scotland.

In the main the policy requires the system, alarm companies’ receiving centres and their practices to accord with the industry’s standards set by the National Approval Council for Security Systems (NACOSS). If all the standards are met, the police will undertake to provide what they have defined as a Level 1 or Immediate Response. If there is a false call rate of more than two calls in a rolling 12-month period, then the response is likely to be downgraded to Level 2 (as and when police resources against demands permit). If the problem continues then police are likely to withdraw all together.

Users must insist that their alarm companies identify the cause of any false activation at a very early stage and insist on getting the quality of service specified in their contract.

This is an exceptionally important aspect of security. More detailed guidance is given in Part Four, but this is likely to date over the years. Please also refer to the information on the Resource website at www.resource.gov.uk

2.3 Fire Prevention and Detection

Many collections have been destroyed by fire, often when housed in buildings constructed when far less was known about fire prevention and detection than is the case today. Undetected, a fire in an unoccupied building can lead to large-scale loss.

Reducing Risk by Design

Buildings should be designed or adapted to minimise the risk of fire and to prevent its spread. The Building Control Officer and the local Fire Officer should be invited to inspect premises regularly, independently of their statutory responsibilities. The Building Control Officer will advise on the selection of materials to be used in displays and stores. These should usually be fire retardant, but care will also need to be taken to assess the chemical stability of materials from a conservation point of view. It should be noted that the effectiveness of fire retardants wears off in time.
A formal application for building regulation approval is normally required for any structural work. Modification of historic buildings may also require listed building or other consents.

Recommendations

- Areas housing collections should be rigorously insulated to a high standard (for not less than half an hour, but preferably one hour) against fire spread from areas of high risk, such as workshops, laboratories, kitchens, boilers, plant room or chemical stores. Such risk should be located as far as possible away from collection areas.
- The degree of risk from these areas must be reduced as much as possible, for example by having an external chemical store and any kitchens, workshops and laboratories equipped to professional standards.
- Fireproof cabinets are available which are designed to protect their contents for a minimum period, normally one hour.
- Backup copies of computer disks should be stored off site.

Power Sources

All electrical wiring and equipment must be installed in accordance with the appropriate British Standard and statutory regulations. These regulations also require electrical installations to be maintained and checked regularly by a competent person.

Gas, oil and mechanical equipment must also be installed in accordance with the appropriate British Standard and statutory regulations. A register of each piece of equipment needs to be established to include maintenance records and inspection certificates. A detailed plan of all installations needs to be kept in a convenient place for passing to the emergency services on their arrival at an incident.

Fire Alarms and Sprinkler Systems

The incidence of fires in large buildings has steadily reduced over recent years. This is due to statutory building controls and the widespread use of modern detection systems. At the same time it should be noted that there is concern over the increasing number of cases of arson in the UK.

Fire Precautions

Reducing the risk of fire by good housekeeping, as promoted by fire prevention officers in their training schemes, can bring major benefits. Regular cleaning and removal of waste products and
an inspection system to check that the building is safe when locked up at night are essential. Many fires are caused by the misuse of electrical appliances such as heaters and the careless disposal of cigarette ends. Such potential threats can be easily eliminated if daily inspections are instituted as part of a good housekeeping regime.

Contractors

The presence of contractors can bring additional hazards. See Part Four, under Contractors and the publication *Working with Contractors: Guidelines on Environmental and Security Protection during Construction Work in Museums* (published by the MGC, available free from Resource). Specialist advice should be sought before dangerous work (e.g. with hot materials) is undertaken to ensure the safety of personnel and property is taken into account.

Fire Detection

Without early detection, entire collections and buildings can be lost. It is therefore essential to have an automatic fire detection system that will give an early indication of the presence of fire. These systems that detect smoke and/or heat will cause a local audible alarm to sound to prompt an evacuation, but can also cause an activation to be sent over the telephone line to an alarm receiving centre, and in some cases to the local fire brigade to initiate a response.

Dousing

Sprinklers

The proven benefits and increased reliability of these systems have led to an increase in use, especially as the cost of night guards has escalated. However, reservations still exist in some UK museums, galleries and libraries where there is concern at the potentially destructive consequences of accidental discharge.

Such concerns can be addressed by installing a ‘dry’ or ‘pre-action’ system in which the pipework is normally charged with air and will only fill with water in response either to a sprinkler head opening or to the activation of an automatic fire detector. While this reduces the threat of accidental discharge, it has to be balanced against the fact that the system will not activate as quickly in the event of a real fire. Specialist advice should be sought on this subject prior to installation. It should be noted with regard to all sprinkler systems – whether ‘wet’ or ‘dry’ – that each head operates entirely independently of every other
head and the idea that all heads throughout a large area will operate simultaneously is fallacious.

As far as the risk to books and manuscripts from water discharge is concerned, conservation attitudes and techniques have changed in recent years and water damage (although still of great concern) is generally regarded as less potentially damaging than fire damage. Water-damaged books and manuscripts can now be removed and stored in blast freezers or cold stores where they can be preserved without deterioration until conservators are able to repair them.

Other concerns regarding sprinkler systems will centre on the upheaval and expense of providing them and the damage likely to be caused to historic structures by their installation. Costs will still be high in the case of a new building, but the opportunity to safeguard valuable collections is greater and should be given careful consideration.

Gaseous Systems

These are normally used for protection of specific enclosed areas of a building in which water would be an unsuitable medium. Commonly used in computer suites and electrical plant rooms, gaseous systems can also be used to protect very rare or fragile cultural artefacts including books and manuscripts. They work by reducing the oxygen level within an enclosed area and thus extinguishing the fire.

The main gas used in recent years has been Halon; however, this is now being phased out because of its destructive impact on the ozone layer. Carbon dioxide (CO₂) is an alternative, but its toxic nature may give rise to safety concerns. Several safer gases have been developed in recent years. These include halocarbon agents such as FM200, inert gases such as Inergen (which the British Library uses in its collection strong rooms) and Argonite, which is used in Hereford Cathedral’s famous chained library.

Both halocarbons and inert gases have advantages and disadvantages. Halocarbon agents are ‘greenhouse gases’ and possibly subject to future environmental control, while inert gases require a much higher concentration to be effective and greater storage space for the gas cylinders. Specialist advice should be sought and an option appraisal carried out.

Other concerns will centre on the upheaval and expense of providing a dousing system and the damage likely to be caused
to historic structures by its installation. Costs will still be high in the case of a new building, but the opportunity to safeguard valuable collections is greater and should be given careful consideration.

**Hand-held Fire Extinguishers**

The local Fire Prevention Officer will advise on the appropriate types of hand-held fire extinguishers for areas where different types of fire are likely to occur.

### 2.4 Displays and Exhibitions

#### Internal Layouts and Visitor Flows

The layout of exhibitions and circulation routes needs to be arranged to provide the best security without limiting the presentation of the collection. Particular attention must be given to sightlines, to ensure that any invigilators have the best possible view and that hidden corners are not created where a criminal can work undetected. In the interests of public safety, these layouts must be able to deal with the flow of visitors in both normal and abnormal conditions.

While it is important to separate public areas from those used solely by staff, routing staff through galleries can increase security. Their very presence will act as a deterrent – the more pairs of watchful eyes the better. Much of the building’s physical and electronic protection cannot operate during open hours when members of the public are admitted. Security will then depend very heavily on the institution’s staff.

It is important to display material in such a way as to prevent easy removal by opportunist or determined thieves. Many premises have displays or room settings where exhibits are directly accessible to visitors. Wherever possible, paintings, drawings and similar objects should be secured to the walls by mirror plates and security screws, or similar approved methods. Objects that can be easily carried away should not be displayed close to doors. Highly valuable pictures, especially smaller ones, may be further protected by security alarms.

#### Display Cases

These are the last line of defence for exhibits, but they are often also needed to provide a controlled microenvironment. Varying degrees of protection can be provided, from that designed to reduce the risk of accidental damage through to protection for
small, attractive or fragile objects that need to be housed in strong, attack-resistant cases. Sufficiently strong cases can often compensate for limitations in other security elements e.g. the availability of attendants.

The four main display case considerations are:

1. Locks – these need to be of a good standard and resistant to picking and direct physical attack; ideally they should be hidden from view.
2. Hinges – need to be of a similar standard, being well secured to the case.
3. Framing – construction of the frame should be such that an attack will not affect the overall integrity of the case. The most common types of material used for display case framing are wood, aluminium extrusions and steel. Without a frame, the case’s resistance to attack is reduced as edges of glazed sections are vulnerable to attack and the resisting qualities are undermined. Hardwood frames will provide a good level of protection, particularly from attack by a blunt instrument. Aluminium extrusions are common, but aluminium is a soft metal that can be easily distorted. Steel is the strongest metal – it is highly resistant to attack from anything other than specialist cutting equipment and is recommended for exhibits of very high values. When selecting display case materials that will be exposed to the interior of the case, take care to assess their chemical stability from a conservation point of view.
4. Glazing – the most vulnerable part of the case, glazing needs to be laminated and set well into the frame. A high proportion of existing cases incorporate glass that has little resistance to violent attack, although it can still be adequate to prevent casual handling and to assist in maintaining appropriate environmental conditions. Where there is a serious risk of theft, ‘anti-bandit’ materials have to be used to meet the higher standards set by Resource.

**Accounting for Collections**

If items are removed from display, a method of recording their removal should be used. The simplest way is to put a label in the object’s place, with the date, time and reason for the removal with the signature of the appropriate member of staff. A similar recording system is needed for the movement of objects to and from stores. A manual or computerised register should also be used to record the movement of objects to and from displays and stores, both within the institution and for loans to and from other institutions.
2.5 Security in the Reading/Search Room

**Introduction**

The public are generally not allowed ‘hands on’ access to the majority of the collections in museums and galleries, to prevent damage and theft. Archives and libraries, by virtue of their function, have to adopt a different approach and allow their customers to take temporary possession of collection items. The two main security threats they face as a result are theft or mutilation of collection material. Cutting or razoring out pages, plates or maps from books or bound items also constitutes theft and there have been a number of cases of this in recent years.

Identifying suitable security measures may at first seem daunting, but there is a range of deterrents that can be applied to increase security in these areas.

**Reader Identification**

Museum and gallery visitors are usually anonymous, but in the reading/search room it is a good idea to ask that readers produce evidence of identity and residence. Some institutions are reluctant to take a firm line, preferring to operate on trust. But such procedures are fully justified by virtue of: the institutions’ responsibility for safeguarding the material; the need to ensure that it will continue to be available to others and the great privilege being granted in return for being able to have close access to rare and valuable documents. Passports and driving licences are ideal in combination with a service bill (e.g. electricity) for this purpose. This means that the institution will then know who is accessing the material and where s/he lives, which is a powerful deterrent to committing crime.

A reader ticket system for repeat visits is acceptable if its issue is subject to the same requirements and it includes a photograph for reader identification.

**Reading/Search Room Rules**

Most institutions have rules that exclude bags, coats, food and drink and harmful substances such as ink. It is important that a right to search is also included. The reader should be required to agree formally in writing to these rules as that has a deterrent effect, but also makes access conditional, which then becomes easier to enforce. The Conditions of Use for the British Library Reading Rooms are set out in Part 3 and we are grateful for permission to include this more detailed guidance.
Control of Entry

As turnstile arrangement to control entry makes it easier to apply these rules. Unfortunately, it is also necessary to provide secure lockers for the reader coats and bags, but this can be done with a self-help coin operated system. It is essential to have a record system that clearly indicates what material has been issued to that reader, together with the relevant date and times.

Weighing of Unbound Documents

The issue of unbound documents or manuscripts to readers poses a security problem in that individual folios can be surreptitiously removed by the reader.

Weighing machines involve weighing the document or manuscript before issue and recording its weight, then weighing it again on return. The reader should be asked to stay while this is being done. Weighing machines manufactured for this purpose are extremely sensitive and a difference in weight of 5gms can normally be tolerated without need for further investigation. For any greater discrepancy, the document should be checked thoroughly. The fact that a check has been made should be recorded and the librarian should investigate any missing folios.

There are two drawbacks to the use of weighing machines. Firstly, documents or manuscripts can gain weight in being moved from a controlled storage environment to the less controlled environment of a reading room. Trials carried out by the Public Records Office at Kew have shown that a box of documents can increase in weight by up to 5 per cent in these circumstances which would help to conceal the fact that folios have been removed. Secondly, weighing machines will not necessarily pick up the fact that a folio has been substituted with a sheet of paper.

Some institutions may prefer to rely on invigilation and careful checking of documents on return. If it is considered practicable to use weighing machines, then the question arises as to whether they should be used in view or out of view of the reader. The argument in favour of the former approach is that it acts as a deterrent to reduce the likelihood of theft of folios. The argument against is that it may suggest to the reader the idea of using substitution which he calculates will not be picked up by the weighing machine. One way of deterring this would be to have regular spot-checks of returned documents.
Alternatively, issue unbound documents to readers in trays with the rule that they should not be taken out of the tray, thus preventing readers mixing folios with their own papers; or insist that they are read at desks that are within clear view of library staff or are monitored by CCTV.

**Tagging**

This security measure uses electronic detection systems developed specifically for libraries. In principle, these are similar to the EAS (Electronic Article Surveillance) systems used in retail outlets throughout the world. Gates containing antennae are placed at the exit from the reading room and tags or bar codes are affixed to the books. An audible alarm is triggered if a tagged item is taken through the gates.

If electronic detection systems are used, it is important that a member of the security or library staff can respond quickly to any alarm activation. It is important to site the gates clearly within staff view as it may be possible to defeat the signal by holding the book above or on the outside of the gates.

Tagging systems are used widely in public libraries, but pose problems for large academic libraries. Firstly, there is the expense of tagging books, which will obviously depend on the size of the collection, but could be considerable. Secondly, there are bound to be both preservation concerns about affixing tags to rare and valuable books (difficult to do without causing damage) and scholarly reservations that tagging affects the integrity of unique items.

If tagging is used, it can be a useful control measure in deterring the casual or opportunist thief but there are ways in which such systems can be defeated. The tags can be torn or cut out of the book, for example, and even if the tags are concealed, experienced thieves usually know where to find them.

In view of these concerns, it may be considered that tagging is most valuable if targeted at particular sections of the collection that are considered to be vulnerable, but where there are no preservation concerns. The British Library, for example, tags much of its business stock including the expensive market research reports that are on open access shelving.

**Invigilation**

The original round reading room at the British Library, with the readers’ desks radiating from a central point like the spokes of a
wheel, had much to commend it. Exposing readers to view made it difficult for criminal elements to operate. By creating a similar situation with clear sight lines, an absence of cover from cabinets or other obstructions, and by limiting the number of documents on desks at any one time, security will be significantly improved.

Other methods of improving reader invigilation are to ensure that particularly rare and important material is read at designated tables within the clear view of the Issue Desk. If staff resources permit, one-to-one invigilation of readers consulting very rare material is advisable. Staff 'patrols' of reading rooms are also recommended, preferably at irregular intervals.

Readers can themselves be useful allies in monitoring suspect behaviour and breaches of rules by other readers. Their concerns should always be acknowledged and they should be formally thanked if their information leads to the prevention of theft or damage.

**Monitoring and Recorded CCTV**

There are obvious limitations to the amount of time that staff can devote to reader invigilation and therefore it is recommended that this is supplemented by the use of closed circuit television (CCTV), a proven means of deterring and preventing crime.

**Ideal Template for CCTV in Reading Rooms**

- A fixed camera facing the reading room entrance recording visual details of all those who enter.
- A monitor at or near the entrance that readers can see as they enter (brings to their notice that they are under observation).
- A monitor at the Issue/Enquiry Desk for staff to observe.
- Fixed or pan, tilt and zoom (PTZ) cameras within the reading room (depending on its shape and size) sited to cover all the desks.
- All cameras to be recorded so that all incidents can be viewed retrospectively.

PTZ cameras have a flexible zoom facility that closely observes any readers acting suspiciously. However, users should take two factors into account. Firstly, they should be housed in opaque or 'smoked' domes so that readers cannot tell whether they are being observed by camera or not at any given time. Secondly, PTZ domes incorporate motors that enable cameras to move that can make a noise that is disturbing for readers. It is
essential to insist that the supplier demonstrates the PTZ camera movement in the quiet environment of the reading room before it is installed. It is possible for adjustments to be made to reduce the noise to an absolute minimum.

CCTV by its overt presence deters crime, but if the images are recorded its value is increased considerably because of the ability to view incidents retrospectively. However, if these benefits are to be achieved it is essential to have a high quality multiplex recording system. Digital recording systems are now the ideal for this purpose. They allow CCTV to be linked to any existing computer network, thus avoiding separate (and often expensive) cabling systems. They also enable cameras to be monitored through computers from any point in the network and allow the images to be stored on a computer database rather than on tape.

However CCTV systems can be highly complex and technical and while suppliers will undertake surveys and produce recommendations, it is worth seeking advice from an independent and suitably qualified technical consultant, if resources permit.

Returned Items

It is important to ensure that all material is returned, complete and undamaged, using a weighing machine if necessary. A controlled exit with a means of identifying any electronic tags, adds the final hurdle for the criminal to negotiate. An alternative is for staff or security officers to search through readers’ bags or belongings when they leave the room.

2.6 Security Staffing and CCTV

Guarding the Collection

Access to collections can take many forms from the display of high value items in attack resisting display cases in museums through to direct handling in the archive or library situation. The key to protecting a collection from vandalism or theft lies in getting the right balance between access and security. In large institutions this means employing a team of guards or attendants to deter and detect the actions of the criminally inclined. No system has yet been found that will completely replace a loyal and well-trained team of attendants.

The size of the institution and resources available will dictate what level of security can be provided. For example, very small
museums, including those managed by volunteers, will not be able to employ a team of full-time security guards. However, by following the principles set out here and observing some fundamental rules of security, much can be done to protect collections.

When assessing the number of attendants necessary to safeguard a collection, consider the following:

- the nature and use of the building;
- the value, quality and type of objects in the collection;
- the number, size and layout of the galleries;
- the number of visitors and the facilities provided;
- duties related to other staff and behind the scenes in offices and stores.

All staff should be identifiable to visitors. The wearing of a uniform of some sort, bearing the institution's logo, or at the very least an identifying badge, assists the public when seeking help and advice.

Many attendants are required to perform tasks that are not strictly related to security. Cleaning, portering, carrying out small repairs, assisting with visiting groups and working at the reception or sales desk may fall within the job description. In some institutions the title ‘attendant’ has been replaced by that of ‘assistant’ in recognition of the wider range of duties. This multi-tasking adds variety to the working day, helps to maintain alertness and enhances the feeling of belonging to the organisation. Duties should, however, be clearly described and set out in a job description issued to each employee, making clear what the priorities are. When on duty during the public hours, the security attendant must be in no doubt that the primary duty is the protection of the visitors and the collection. Undue distractions from this primary role must be avoided as they allow opportunity for theft.

Night Guarding

During closed hours most buildings protected in accordance with Resource advice can be maintained on a lock and leave basis. However the scale of the institution and its collection, together with the resistance of the building to resist penetration, the ability of alarm systems to detect intrusion or fire and the lapse of time likely before a response by the emergency services may mean that 24-hour manned guarding is essential. Even when a night guard is employed, modern practice is to monitor the building electronically and by close circuit television rather than by regular patrol alone.
Head of Security or Security Adviser

In the case of a large, complex and busy establishment with a sizeable attendant workforce, consideration must be given to employing a full time professional with the right training, background and experience. Such an individual can also have other areas of responsibility, such as visitor services and safety. A busy director must be able to delegate authority for protection services to a properly qualified individual. This person needs to be consulted on all matters that influence security – displays, temporary exhibitions, building works, admission of researchers and any other changes that affect the use of the building. S/he must be able to draw up plans to cope with emergencies and ensure that staff are trained in all procedures. In smaller institutions where this is not possible, a member of staff must still have direct responsibility for security.

Training

Proper training is essential. Courses are offered from time to time by Area Museum Councils and are available in the private sector. The Cultural Heritage National Training Organisation (CHNTO) offers guidance on NVQ and SVQ requirements. Regular briefings of attendants and other staff by those having professional responsibilities for the collection, for example, prior to an important temporary exhibition, will enhance their knowledge and help them appreciate the exhibits’ qualities and identify their role in the overall purpose of the establishment.

Staff Selection

Security staff often have extensive unsupervised access to many parts of the building. It is therefore essential that personnel recruiting procedures are rigorously applied.

Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

CCTV is now commonplace in building open to the public and has been highly successful in reducing crime.

Benefits of CCTV

- It acts as a deterrent.
- It can enable attendants to be deployed more effectively.
- Recordings can assist in post incident investigation.
- It can be used to assist with entry control arrangements into non-public areas.
- It can provide more general information to assist in the management of the premises.
Where the premises are guarded out of hours it is a valuable aid for site monitoring.

This is an exceptionally important aspect of security. More detailed guidance is given in Part 3, but this will tend to date over time and therefore reference should also be made to the information to be found on the Resource website at www.resource.gov.uk

2.7 Operating Procedures

Access to Non-public Areas

Care needs to be taken over access to non-public areas. Visitors, researchers and workers coming into such areas should be met and accompanied. Many institutions now provide a badge or sticker to identify visitors, which is particularly useful in the larger institutions. Unaccompanied researchers and students should also be required to identify themselves and make an entry in the visitors’ book.

Providing cloakroom facilities where visitors can leave coats and bags reduces the potential for objects being concealed and carried out of the building. Separating the specimens or objects required for study from the remainder of the collection, physically denying further access, constant supervision and a process for the checking and return of objects, reduces the possibility of loss. Such routines give a clear message to those who go ‘behind the scenes’ that the institution has good security management.

Access Control

Recent technology advances have brought about various means of controlling the access of visitors, staff and others to buildings and internal parts of the building. Methods can include an ‘airlock’ type facility, whereby the caller is prevented from progressing further into the building until credentials are confirmed.

Most will be familiar with access controls on doors that are operated digitally and/or with the use of a plastic card in a reader. This is a basic form of control, as it cannot prevent staff making codes known to others or lending their access cards. There is also potential for others to slip in behind the authorised individual unless the situation is monitored very closely. Where considered appropriate, this problem can be addressed by using rotating doors or turnstiles. More advanced electronic
technology, such as fingerprint, eye retina and voice identification is available where unattended high levels of control are desired.

**Computer Security**

In the main these guidelines are concerned with measures to protect artefacts. However, the extensive use of computers for display purposes and record-keeping brings its own threat of crime. Computers will benefit in the same way as artefacts from good building security and invigilation, but there are also housing and other devices on the market that will physically secure computers.

**Contractors**

Selection of contractors needs to be undertaken with care, not only for their skills and experience, but also to ensure that they are established organisations working to approved standards. Before a contractor is allowed on the premises, a contract or other written agreement must be issued to cover all aspects of the work to be undertaken. This should include regular maintenance and other routine functions.

The introduction of random checks on all contract personnel, together with their vehicles, will help prevent collections or other material being illegally removed. A contractual right of search will support this procedure. See *Working with Contractors* for further information (MGC, 1998, available from Resource).

**Deliveries**

The receipt and despatch of collection material needs close attention. A closed and secure loading bay, separated from the street and the rest of the building, provides a high degree of security. Where no such facilities exist, the timing of arrival, ensuring that the vehicle is quickly loaded or unloaded and never left unattended are important factors, but it is also wise to restrict information about dates and times to those who genuinely need to know.

**Key Control**

There needs to be a strict policy for the issue, possession and storage of keys. Too often the possession of keys is based on status or convenience, when the deciding factors ought to be real need and accountability.
All keys (including safe keys), other than the external door keys in the possession of nominated keyholders, must remain in the building in a secure cabinet or safe. They must be identified by a coding system – not with a tag indicating their purpose, e.g., ‘silver store’. The issue system should operate in a secure area, ideally a security control room.

Some system of authority for the allocation of keys should be drawn up strictly based on need and accountability. Keys should only be issued against a record kept for the purpose. Extreme care needs to be taken when issuing keys to contractors and outside agencies and the issue should not permit unsupervised access to collections. A proper system will enable a visual inspection at the end of the day to confirm that all keys have been returned.

Opening and closing times can be vulnerable ones for the lone keyholder, especially if called to the premises at unusual times and therefore procedures should take this into account. Allowing a single member of staff, such as a cleaner, to be the first to arrive and the last to leave should certainly be avoided.

Local police and security/fire alarm companies (as appropriate) must always have full and current details of keyholders to the premises.

Key Suiting

A common problem affecting key control is the often large number of keys in circulation, particularly if there is a multiplicity of different locks in a building. One way to address this is to introduce a master key suited system (see section 3.15).

Private Functions

In the heritage sector many institutions offer facilities for private and commercial functions, either during or after normal public opening times, and put on their own receptions for the launch of special exhibitions. It is important that these events are carefully supervised. The security and environmental conditions laid down for functions where there is Government Indemnity have to be fully adhered to if damage to the collection is to be avoided.

Thefts and Security Incidents

Thefts from heritage buildings should be reported to the police. In addition, it is good practice to report each incident to the Resource Security Adviser from whom forms can be obtained. It may also be helpful to warn other similar institutions in the
area. Such information contributes to the overall picture of crime in relation to heritage institutions and enables patterns to be identified, as well as giving others the opportunity to learn from another’s experience.

All institutions should record incidents that constitute an actual or potential breach of security and should keep statistics of such incidents, possibly under different headings such as Theft, Criminal Damage, Loss of Keys etc. This information enables action to be taken to prevent recurrence. It also records the value of having security staff and security procedures and assists with investigations which are to be carried out either by security management or by the police. Over a period of time, incident statistics can contribute to security risk assessments and decisions on security resourcing.

Further guidance can be found in section 3.21, Reporting of Incidents by Security Staff.

2.8 Transportation and Couriers

Conditions

Suitable packing is required to protect material during movement and trustworthy agents are needed to carry the materials between venues. Vehicles need to be appropriate to the task and suitably equipped with security and fire-fighting facilities. Special environmental control measures may also need to be taken, such as the use of vehicles with climate control and suspension, and should be considered at the same time. Specific conditions are set out by DCMS where artefacts are to be covered under the Government Indemnity Scheme.

Bear in mind that transport may involve road, rail, sea or air and that careful co-ordination between venues is essential. Control of movement of material within city boundaries is as important as moving between counties.

Agreed Procedures

Procedures have been the agreed and established at most major seaports, airports and Channel Tunnel. Major specialist art transport companies have knowledge of these procedures.

The Courier’s Role

The role of the courier in supervising the movement of valuable material from one location to another, by road, rail, sea or air, is highly important.
Couriers must be conversant with the nature and value of the material, as well as understand the method of transport to be used and relevant procedures such as those used by Customs at seaports and airports.

Requirements

Common sense, level-headedness and appropriate training are essential qualities for good couriers, especially in the event of emergency. They should be fully briefed on how material has been prepared and packed for movement, together with how to deal with any problems or procedures such as the use of X-rays and non-compliance with stipulated environmental conditions. They should have the authority to act in the event of such occurrences.

Careful planning of routes and confidentiality of all movements is essential, especially if the material is particularly rare or valuable. Once at the final destination, both in the UK and abroad, the courier will need to ensure that the artefacts have arrived safely, environmental conditions and security conditions are acceptable and that the unpacking, mounting and display of material under their care is properly supervised.

Safety

Ensuring the safety of museum objects is important, from the moment an object is removed from display or storage and continuing right through until it returns to its usual place of safe keeping. Conservation, documentation, photography, packing and storage are all important elements in monitoring this process. Each step should be recorded.

Condition Reports

Reports on the condition of loans are now a standard requirement for many lending institutions. They should cover all relevant points relating to the vulnerability of individual objects and can prove to be crucial in the event of damage or if claims are made against the borrowing institution. The completion of these reports may sometimes fall to an escorting courier.

More detailed information is set out in the V&A Courier Guidelines in Part 3. Resource is most grateful to the V&A for giving its permission to publish this extremely helpful publication.
2.9 Personal Security

Introduction

Resource's Security Advisers often receive enquiries about the safety of lone workers and students. As individual circumstances vary, it is difficult to offer all embracing advice, but the following principles should prove useful.

Lone Workers

Building opening and closing times and when lone workers act as keyholders in response to alarm activations give particular cause for concern. Obviously lone workers should not be put in danger and therefore should be accompanied at all times, which raises questions about employers’ duty of care. Unfortunately implementation of this principle can often involve additional staffing costs, but these can be minimised.

Recommendations

• Change cleaners’ hours of work.
• Prevent staff from remaining on premises beyond normal closure times.
• Adjust times of employment and the increased use of part-time or job share employment, which lead to more flexible staffing arrangements.
• Change the hours that the institution opens and/or closes.
• Widen involvement of other staff in opening or closing of the building.
• Pay close attention to unreliable alarm systems, which might involve an audit by a technical consultant independent from the alarm company.

The following measures can also improve the management of potentially dangerous or difficult situations:

• the use of a security company as first-line keyholders;
• provision of personal attack buttons connected to the intruder detection system, which will bring a police response;
• asking police to attend at the same time as the keyholder when responding to alarm activations;
• close liaison with Town Centre CCTV Scheme control rooms, where available, which can sometimes overlook opening, closing and keyholder attendance;
• the use of strong lighting in danger areas, especially if it can be triggered by passive infra-red (PIR) detectors. This will automatically respond to the presence of the member of staff and will also assist in identifying the presence of others;
encourage staff to survey potentially dangerous areas before entering them.

Measures to reduce risks for lone students might include:

- the use of access control systems on buildings;
- entry phones and remote door release systems;
- denying casual access to buildings out of hours;
- raising awareness through a publicity campaign;
- encouraging students to be mutually supportive;
- taking advice from Police Crime Prevention Officers on personal safety that should take account of local experience;
- where there are extensive problems, the employment of a security company to provide patrols;
- the use of CCTV;
- improved lighting;
- gating and fencing of dangerous areas;
- audible personal attack alarms;
- attendance at self-defence classes (often actively promoted by local police).

2.10 Children and Vulnerable Adults

Introduction

Every year many thousands of children, young people and to a lesser degree, vulnerable adults, visit museums, libraries and archives. Many of them visit as part of organised groups or with family and friends. Whilst the primary responsibility for their welfare rests with the supervising adult, heritage institutions will wish to ensure that they are safe and protected from harm during their visit and therefore that appropriate policies and procedures are in place.

There is a general public concern about children’s safety, which has been expressed fiercely through the media, especially following high profile cases of abuse.

Government has been working for some time on measures to prevent child abusers from having the opportunity to work with children. In 1999 Government published a report by an Interdepartmental Working Group that identified a number of measures that needed to be taken. The Group’s report is available on the Home Office website at www.homeoffice.gov.uk
Criminal Records Bureau (CRB)

From 1 March 2002 the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) made available two levels of Disclosure. Standard Disclosures are for positions that make regular contact with those aged under 18, or people of all ages who may be vulnerable for other reasons. Enhanced Disclosures are for posts involving greater contact with children or vulnerable adults. The CRB says that such work might involve regularly caring for, training, supervising or being in sole charge of such people. Employers and organisations wishing to take advantage of the Disclosure service have to register in advance. Further details are available on the CRB website at www.crb.gov.uk

In 1999 the Ulster Folk and Transport Museum published Child Protection Policy Procedures, an internal paper which set out their policies and covered numerous useful issues and practical directions, which included: procedures for staff selection, training and supervision; code of behaviour for staff; procedures in cases of suspected or alleged abuse; and procedures for lost children. Please contact Resource’s Security Adviser for copies of this paper.
3 Detailed Guidance and Operational Procedures

3.1 Alarms Procedure

Every alarm that is initiated must be investigated. Instant verification can be achieved from a control room, CCTV and/or by an audio linked alarm system. If the alarm is set off at a remote site or building, then it must always be physically checked.

Alarm systems can vary from the small burglar alarm system controlled from a digital panel through to computer-based and radio-based alarm systems. These can operate a range of detection devices, the most common being passive infra red detectors or microwave detectors, or a combination of the two known as ‘dual techs’. These systems can also manage the specialist alarm devices used for display cases, pictures, windows, doors, roof voids, and external perimeter intruder detection devices. These systems can also automatically inform the police or an Alarm Receiving Station.

The best type of alarm system for a museum, gallery, library or archive will be dependent on:

- the size of the institution;
- the type of item that is to be alarmed;
- if there is a control room;
- the type of room or building to be alarmed;
- the content of the room;
- the environmental conditions.

**Digital Dialer**

This sends a message from the building, via the telephone line, that the alarm has been activated. The message will indicate if it is a Fire, Intruder or Personal Attack.

**Alarm Receiving Station**

This means the alarm has been linked to a receiving station, which may for example, be by BT RedCare or PAKNET (a radio system). In the event of an alarm, the monitoring station will phone the office and tell you that an alarm has been activated. For prestige buildings and by special arrangement, they will also notify the police. When calling the monitoring station, have your contract code to hand.

**Control Panel**

This provides an immediate audit trail of the alarm activated. It is important that a number of nominated people are familiar...
with all functions of the alarm to maximise its effectiveness and control the input of current user codes.

**User Codes**

Cleaners, security and temporary staff can have their own code which allows them to switch off authorised zones of the building and undertake their duties. In combined alarm reporting and access control systems the user codes system is automatically built in. An additional advantage is that there is an accurate record in the alarm and access log of individuals’ activities.

**Reset Code**

In the event of a false alarm or reset being required, a reference code is used to inform the relevant receiving station. The police or Fire Service control room should also be informed straightaway.

**False and Nuisance Alarms**

A nuisance alarm is one that is triggered by an act or incident that is not an ‘intruder’ or an equipment fault. They can be often caused by environmental conditions, animals and insects. They are not false alarms (although the police will regard them as such) as the equipment has reacted properly. Duty Security personnel should first confirm that it is a false alarm, or nuisance alarm. Deploy a mobile patrol or Security Officer to check and report back. In unmanned cases, procedures need to be established to cater for nuisance alarms and false alarms. If it is a real alarm call the police straightaway.

Where the building is not controlled by security, call one of the users or duty key holder to check the cause and reset the alarm. If there is a dialler in use, the premises must be checked and if necessary call user or key holder to reset. Remember that an alarm system will only sound for 20 minutes after which it will shut the sounder off but the alarm strobe light will continue to flash until the alarm system has been reset. Be aware that criminals have been known to set off alarms intentionally to test reactions.

### 3.2 Bag Searching

**Policy to Counter Terrorist Activity**

Following terrorist activities in the 1970s and early 1980s, national museums and galleries routinely searched visitors’ bags on entry. In 1983 this policy was reviewed and as a result routine searching was abandoned at many sites.
The Policy

The new flexible policy adopted was to retain the right to search any bag or receptacle carried by visitors by exhibiting notices that a search may be required as a condition of entry. Action under the new policy was then confined to:

- searching any bag that for some reason was considered suspicious, and
- reinstating the routine search of all bags following a fresh terrorist incident or on receipt of a warning from government sources of possible terrorist activity.

It is difficult to lay down hard and fast rules about what might be considered ‘suspicious’. The bag itself may be suspect by reason of size or appearance or, indeed, suspicion might be aroused by the appearance or demeanour of the person carrying it. Much depends on circumstances but it is a useful measure that can be adopted flexibly.

To defeat a dedicated terrorist there is no doubt that searching will only be fully effective if it is extended to examining the body. Modern explosives can easily be carried in sufficient quantity in pockets or about the body. In the absence of such a detailed and full search it is felt that routine bag searching is less than foolproof.

Advantages to bag searching:

- it acts as a deterrent;
- it reminds visitors that there is a threat to safety;
- it heightens their awareness and will hopefully cause them to report any suspicious behaviour or parcels left on the premises;
- it might detect a terrorist who has not taken into account the flexible policy.

Policy in Relation to Preventing Criminal Damage

The shotgun attack on the Leonardo Cartoon at the National Gallery on 17 July 1987 drew attention to the risk of damage to exhibits on display in museums and galleries. Whilst some protective measures can be adopted to prevent or minimise damage, it is clear that a great deal of material must be displayed in a free and unobstructed manner for maximum appreciation. The Leonardo Cartoon was in fact displayed behind a laminated glass shield, but the violence of the gunshot impacted the shield onto the surface of the drawing.
Unfortunately, minor damage to paintings on display in major galleries is common, either by graffiti on the frame or the picture, or by visitors touching the pictures. However this can usually be quickly repaired at limited cost.

Major damage of the type inflicted upon the Leonardo Cartoon is much more serious and costly, yet relatively uncommon. The very rarity of incidents poses a problem for the gallery directors, as they are understandably reluctant to risk alienating the genuine visitors by imposing extreme security measures in an effort to identify the few ill-intentioned. Both searching and providing a supervised depository for bags are labour intensive operations which are not cost-effective if they do not prevent the implements used being taken into the premises.

Even the installation of an airport style metal detector cannot identify all instruments capable of being used to commit damage. The current policy of deploying uniformed attendants in the galleries, together with the searching of bags or parcels when there is an indication that a search is necessary, is a flexible response to a problem that is of manageable proportion at the moment.

Achieving the right balance between protecting the pictures and providing the right atmosphere for the public to enjoy them is not always easy. The Head of Security should keep this under continual review and should consult with his colleagues and the Resource’s Security Adviser if necessary.

3.3 Bomb Warnings, Cordons and Evacuation

General

Terrorists/bombers frequently give warnings by telephone, as do hoaxers. Any member of staff might receive a warning and so everyone needs to be prepared. (See also Suspect Packages Received by Post.)

If you receive a warning:

• keep calm;
• keep the caller talking;
• try and obtain as much information as possible;
• note the exact time and duration of call (calls can be traced to the exchange by the police) – use the form attached as a guide;
• note any background noise, accent etc.
Try and find out:

• where is the bomb?
• what time will it go off?
• what does it look like (bag, parcel)?
• what kind of bomb is it (letter or parcel bomb, incendiary, car bomb)?
• why are you doing this?
• how can we be sure this is true?
• did you place the bomb or did one of your colleagues?
• what is it made of?

After the call, notify Duty Manager, Security and Police (999) and:

• make notes of detail of call, using the guide attached;
• note exact wording of threat or warning;
• note caller's voice and tone (accent, calm, angry, swearing, drunk?)
• sex and approximate age of caller;
• any background noise (mobile phone?);
• Security Office to commence an event log and co-ordinate arrival of emergency services.

**Action Plan**

An action plan should be devised based on the information received:

• where possible the Security Manager should verify the alarm call;
• conduct a partial evacuation if the threat is specific and contained e.g. a letter bomb
• conduct a full evacuation if the threat is significant e.g. a car bomb or large device.

**Evacuation Procedure**

**Priorities**

• Evacuate
• Search
• Cordon
• Control the vicinity
• Maintain authority and professional approach
### TELEPHONE BOMB THREAT

**Important**
- Summon assistance to trace the call
- Let the caller pass the message without interruption
- Keep the caller on the line for as long as possible
- Do not hang up after the call

#### Note during the call

**Wording of the threat**
Try to record the exact words/use recording equipment if possible

#### Note after the call (tick off applicable boxes)

**Caller’s voice**
- Calm
- Crying
- Deep
- Angry
- Normal
- Ragged
- Excited
- Distinct
- Cleared throat
- Slow
- Slurred
- Deep breathing
- Rapid
- Nasal
- Cracking voice
- Soft
- Stutter
- Disguised
- Loud
- Lisp
- Familiar
- Laughter
- Raspy
- Accent

If this voice if familiar, who did it sound like?

If the voice has an accent, specify what type

#### Background sounds

- Street noises
- Motor
- Static
- Crockery
- Local
- Office machinery
- Voices
- Children
- Long distance
- PA System
- Booth
- Factory machinery
- Music
- Aircraft
- Animal noise
- House noise
- Clear
- Railway station
- Other

#### Threat language

- Well spoken
- Irrational
- Taped
- Foul
- Incoherent
- Message read by caller

#### Remarks

#### Details of person receiving the call

Number at which the call was received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Name

Position

Phone number

#### Details of person receiving the call

Report the call immediately to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supervisor</th>
<th>Local manager</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone number</td>
<td>Phone number</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Police

Control

Phone number

#### DO NOT HANG UP AFTER THE CALL
Partial Evacuation

Evacuate all public and staff to nearest safe assembly point, using megaphone if required.

Maintain security through observation at a safe distance, try not to lock doors which will impede search.

Prevent any more public entering the area by controlling access.

Gather any witnesses or people affected by the incident in a pre-determined location.

Search Area – you are looking for anything that is out of place, look in all areas that afford easy access, confirm with any nearby staff, performers or public personal belongings that they can identify such as bags, equipment etc.

Check all areas, especially:

- litter bins;
- behind tents;
- toilets, including cisterns;
- under tables.

Cordon off the area – Staff to be positioned at all approaches to area to divert public away from threat. Any vehicles inside cordon area should remain.

Do not touch any object – tell anyone in the vicinity to move away.

Mark any suspicious devices and make finder available to brief Police and Army Bomb Disposal.

Establish Control Point at a safe distance, out of direct line of sight of device and at least 100 metres, preferably 300 metres if possible.

A number of Incident Control Points (ICPs) should be pre-selected and recorded. These ICPs should have two or three access routes, telephones and shelter nearby.

Marshalls or controlling staff to wear yellow waistcoats and staffing to be kept to a minimum.
Full Evacuation Procedure

The procedure for full evacuation is the same as above, except that you should evacuate the entire area and establish the Control Point at a rendezvous point, further away from the threat.

Do not allow anyone to move vehicles. The only moving vehicles will be duty vehicles and Emergency Services. All movement is to be on foot.

Direct all public to an Assembly Point or suitable designated shelter.

Consider occupying alternative areas if the situation becomes protracted.

If the threat is in the vicinity of Assembly Point, have pre-planned alternatives to fall back on.

Gates should be manned to divert traffic away.

Security should stay in control room throughout to monitor CCTV. They will only evacuate if absolutely necessary, in which case the premises should be secured on departure. In this instance Security will set up in nominated alternative location with appropriate communications.

3.4 Cash Handling

There may be several sources within an organisation that generate cash, with the result that the handling and movement of cash can become a regular and predictable occurrence. The following general points should be implemented to protect cash:

General Points

- Move cash surplus from cash points on an irregular basis.
- Consider a mobile or floor safe with a chute for remote or isolated cash points.
- Vary collection times and routes.
- Use a vehicle if practical to move cash, even for short distances.
- Use sealed or lockable bags from point of collection, to be opened only by accounting personnel.
- Reconcile cash, petty cash and cash floats on a regular basis.
- Consider CCTV coverage of cash handling areas.
- Keep collection areas as anonymous as possible, physically protected against forceful attack and equipped with personal
attack button linked to the intruder detection system. Cash handling to be out of general view.

**Movement by Personnel**

- Minimum of two
- The cash carrier should walk on inside of walkway, facing oncoming pedestrians and traffic.
- The escort should be slightly behind and to one side.
- If possible use a waistcoat or money belt under clothing.
- If a bag is used, consider one that will release a dye/smoke or sound an alarm.
- Do not fasten bag to person unless with a link that breaks to trigger an alarm.
- Secure cash in a safe or safe room as soon as practical.

**Movement by Vehicle**

- Secure all doors at all times.
- Make full use of mirrors to observe, if necessary add wing mirrors.
- Always park vehicle facing the way you are going next, with a clear exit.
- In traffic queues, leave enough space in front so you can pull out quickly.
- Consider carrying a portable alarm, radio and mobile phone.
- Take extra care at arrival and departure points.
- Conceal all cash related items within vehicle.

### 3.5 CCTV in Museums, Archives and Libraries

CCTV is now commonplace in most public buildings, including supermarkets, airport terminals, railway stations and town centres, where it has been successful in reducing crime.

**Benefits of using CCTV within the Sector**

1. **Deterrence**

   This is the greatest benefit of CCTV, although it is possible that some criminals are beginning to adapt their methods to take account of the presence of cameras. To achieve the maximum deterrent effect, the system has to be overt and well planned.

2. **Aid to Invigilation**

   It is often suggested that CCTV can be used to replace staff or that its very presence will eliminate the threat of crime at a
stroke. Neither suggestion is true, but if its application is planned carefully, then staff can be deployed more effectively (which might lead to savings) and CCTV can improve the quality of invigilation considerably.

**Monitoring**

The two most common positions selected for monitoring in museums and galleries are (a) the reception area and (b) in a central control room. These can be the best positions, dictated by availability of resources, but they are not necessarily the only options available.

Very often for the small museum with few staff available, placing the monitor in the reception area can seem to be the only option. Seen by the visitors, it has a deterrent value, but the receptionist is often the one who also takes any admission fees and runs the shop. In this situation it can be worth considering the provision of another monitor elsewhere; with the curator or other responsible person, or in the staff room. Viewing of this second monitor might be fairly casual, but its very existence increases the chances of criminal behaviour being detected.

In the larger museum, monitors might best be located solely in the control room, which is seen as the command and control centre with ready access to all means of communication.

Sometimes secondary or even primary monitors can be used as a direct aid for the invigilator on the ground. Invigilators rarely have a completely clear view of their areas of responsibility, but monitor(s) can provide the means to view these areas and track visitors’ movements. Given a good communications system, invigilators can enlist the help of others and ‘pass’ the visitors on to other invigilated areas.

Another way of supporting the staff is to monitor them when they are dealing with difficult people, especially during the ‘sweep out’ of visitors at the end of the day.

**Position of Cameras**

The best use of cameras can be achieved through positioning them:

- in blind or remote areas;
- in those areas where particularly valuable or vulnerable artefacts are displayed;
3. Recording for Post-Incident Investigation

This is the benefit that police officers have uppermost in their minds when advising on CCTV; although when it comes to using recordings for this purpose the results can be disappointing. Very often the quality of the picture is poor and does not help identify criminals. It is therefore essential that everything is done to provide the best pictures in the planning and maintaining of the system. This benefit will be limited unless all cameras are recorded on a multiplex system which will record all the selected cameras, not just the one displayed on the monitor.

Positioning

It is unlikely that cameras will get a sufficiently good facial image for identification. But there is often a good strategic position with adequate light where a camera can be positioned for this purpose. This might be in the reception area or at some other point through which visitors must pass.

Video Tapes

The best available tapes should be used. It is often the case that previous suspicious behaviour needs to be viewed in addition to that at the time of the incident. The following is an extract from the Home Office guide, Looking Out for You:

“Recordings must be kept under lock and key in an appropriate cabinet … A clear record of the location of each tape must be maintained.

Not only will explicit arrangements for the secure storage of recorded tapes be necessary, but so too will be those for ‘cleaning’ the tapes prior to repeated use. Simply recording over old material is not satisfactory, not least because this will compromise a tape’s acceptability for evidential purposes.

Video tapes do not have an indefinite shelf life. Arrangements should be put in place to monitor how many times each has been used and a maximum number of recordings should be specified. It may be unwise to set this figure at above 12. All recordings should have the date and time superimposed on the image. Tapes should normally be recycled every 31 days.
Periodic spot checks of tapes to ensure that the CCTV system is being actively used for its intended purposes are essential. These need to be linked to clear disciplinary procedures in case of breaches.

Playback should be possible without closing down any part of the system.”

**Maintenance**

Regular maintenance of the system is essential, paying particular attention to recording heads and picture quality. Budgets should take into account replacement of the cameras when necessary as well as maintenance costs.

4. **Entry Control**

This is a good use of CCTV to aid those responsible for permitting access in non-public areas, e.g. staff entrances and loading bays. It is particularly useful where a door release is being operated remotely from the point of access.

5. **Aid to Management**

Earlier in this section we suggested that secondary monitors can be positioned in management’s accommodation. Such provision enables the manager not only to play a part in preventing a crime taking place, but it can also give him valuable information to assist with the management of his institution.

6. **Site Monitoring Out of Hours**

Many advantages and limitations of CCTV are equally relevant out of hours, but this is where it is best used in a control room as part of a multiple monitoring situation. It then gives the Security Officer the means to investigate visually from a secure control room information received from alarm activations, information from colleagues, noises, unusual lights, historical events and intelligence.

7. **Conclusion**

There are two final points to make on the use of CCTV in the sector. Firstly, colour is the better option, if it can be afforded. Secondly, before awarding a contract, it is advisable to ask the potential company to carry out demonstrations on site to ensure that the system will meet the requirement. Site trials should feature different positions, equipment and lenses.
3.6 **CCTV – Data Protection and Systems Management**

**Introduction**

Despite the extensive use of the CCTV in the sector, there has been little statutory regulation until the Data Protection Act of 1998. This Act extended data legislation to cover CCTV and required registration of CCTV systems used for surveillance purposes with the Data Protection Registrar.

To ensure that the full benefit of CCTV is achieved in support of prosecutions through the criminal courts it is essential that properly defined procedures are in place. To this end it is recommended that a Code of Practice governs each system and that a Procedural Manual regulates the use of the equipment. Not all CCTV systems in heritage institutions need to cover all aspects, but each institution will need to consider carefully which is appropriate to its own circumstances.

Further information on the Data Protection Registrar and registration can be found at: [www.dpr.gov.uk](http://www.dpr.gov.uk)

**CCTV Users Group**

This organisation has extensive experience of the management of CCTV systems, mainly town centre schemes. It has produced the *Model Code of Practice and a Model Procedural Manual* that is available to associate members. Further details are available on the Group’s website at [www.cctvusersgroup.com](http://www.cctvusersgroup.com)

3.7 **Contractors**

**General**

Contractors should not be allowed the same freedom of movement as regular staff, no matter how well known. Prior notification is required to minimise disruption to routine and operations. Details of arrival, departure and task duration are essential and must be disseminated to all departments concerned or affected. Security staff who invigilate contractors have the lead responsibility.

**Considerations**

- Are the collections in any danger?
- Could any artefacts near the work be protected, moved or covered?
- Are visitors or staff in any danger?
• Do contractors appear professional, or are they in a rush and likely to cause damage with tools, cables or plant?
• Are workmen working overhead or require access to another area that you are not aware of?
• Are any scaffolding, ladders or long poles being used in a reckless manner?
• Are objects being moved and carried in accordance with regulations?
• Be prepared to halt the work should there be a breach of procedures.

Isolation of Fire Detection/Suppression Equipment

Where it is necessary for a contractor or member of staff to isolate fire detection/suppression equipment, a procedure is required that ensures that the risk is covered by other means. A permit should be required for all isolations of fire detection or automatic fire suppression equipment, such as sprinklers, etc, which may become necessary during maintenance or other works. This may be occasioned by work on the equipment itself, such as re-siting detectors, or building work which may be going on in the vicinity and is liable to produce false alarms, such as demolition or other dust producing works. An example of a permit is shown at the end of this section.

Hot Work

This is where a contractor is required to use flame or heat producing apparatus i.e. cutting, welding, burning, brazing, grinding, hot-air gun, blow lamps, portable heaters.

Where Hot Work is expected to be carried out, the building Works Manager or supervising surveyor should inform the Security Office of the details. A Hot Work permit must be completed and issued to the Fire Watchman appointed. Fire extinguishers will be made available for the contractors.

If required then the Fire Alarm will be deactivated and smoke detectors masked to prevent the ingress of dust. This is known as isolation and must be properly recorded. On completion of the work all alarms must be fully reactivated and recorded again.

On the completion of the work, at least one hour before the contractors depart, the area will be inspected for damage and to ensure nothing is left smouldering and the site is safe. Inspections may continue on an hourly basis for as long as necessary through the evening. Everything must be restored to normal as soon as possible after the Hot Work Permit has been countersigned. Any de-activated Fire Alarms can then be reset.
PERMIT FOR ISOLATION OF FIRE DETECTION/SUPPRESSION EQUIPMENT

Part A

Name of Manager requesting isolation

Office telephone number

Department/Site address

Room or area of work

Precise nature of the work

Date of proposed work

Equipment to be isolated

Please allow ............ working days for the return of the authorised permit.

A permit cannot be valid for more than one week.

Start date ............ and time .......... Finish date ............ and time ..........

If the permit is to run for more than one working day, have arrangements been made for isolation to be discontinued at the end of each shift?

Name of Contractor/Operative carrying out the isolation
The Operative must be able to demonstrate competence in the type of work to be undertaken. What patrol routine will be in place whilst the isolation is in force?

I have read the Fire Equipment Isolations Guidance Note, and certify that isolation is necessary for the operation detailed above. I also certify that all the fire precautions listed in the guidance note, and any special precautions listed below, will be adhered to.

Signature of Requesting Manager

I authorise the isolation detailed above, following the Requesting Manager’s signed assurance of the precautions to be taken and subject to any special conditions detailed below.

Authorised Signature (Fire Safety Adviser)

Special Conditions

PERMIT NO. ........................................

PART B

To be completed by the Requesting Manager when the fire equipment has been re-instated.

I certify that all previously isolated equipment has now been reinstated, or replaced by new equipment as necessary.

Signature of Manager

The signed and completed original permit is to be returned to the Fire Safety Adviser as soon as the isolated equipment has been reinstated.
HOT WORK PERMIT

PERMIT NUMBER ............... 

PART A

Manager, requesting the work

Site address

Room/Area of work

Precise nature of work

Date of proposed work .....................

Start time ............................

Please allow ............... working days for the return of the authorised permit. A permit cannot be valid for more than one day.

Finish time (planned) ....................... (actual) .........................

Signature .................................

Hot Work must cease two hours prior to the Fire Watcher leaving the site.

Name of Contractor/Operative carrying out the work

Name of trained Fire Watcher to be present

Fire Watcher must carry a copy of their training certificates and syllabus, a photo-identity card and an authorised copy of the Hot Work Permit, and wear a reflective jerkin suitably marked.
I have read the Hot Work Guidance Notes, and certify that no alternative method of working is practicable for the operation described above. I also certify that all the fire precautions listed in the guidance note, and any special precautions listed below, will be adhered to.

Requesting Manager ………………………… (Signature)

I authorise the work detailed above, following the Requesting Managers signed assurances of the precautions to be taken, and special conditions detailed below.

Fire, Health and Safety Officer ………………………… (Signature)

Special Conditions:

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

PART B

To be completed by the Fire Watcher before commencement of Hot Work.

I certify that:

I have examined the area where the work is to be carried out and I am satisfied that it is safe to commence the Hot Work.

All hose reels, fire mains, detection systems and other fire equipment provided are working in a satisfactory condition.

I have in my possession a permit for all isolations of the fire equipment which is required to complete the operation.

I have inspected and placed portable fire fighting equipment adjacent to the work site.

The Hot Work operative confirms that his heat-producing equipment is in good order and has been regularly serviced.

The following precautions have been taken within 15 metres of the work site.

YES ☐ NO ☐

Floors have been swept clean of dust and combustible material.

Combustible walls, floors and ceilings have been protected by sheets of non-combustible material.

All gaps in walls/floors through which sparks could pass have been adequately fire-stopped with non-combustible material.
Where work is above floor level, non-combustible containment has been erected to collect sparks and hot debris.
Combustibles have been moved away from any metal work likely to conduct heat from the work site (where beams are being worked on which extend through walls or partitions, precautions must be taken on both sides of the wall).
Where Hot Work is being undertaken on enclosed equipment (tanks, containers, ducts, dust collectors etc) the equipment has been properly cleaned and is free of flammable vapours.

Signature of Fire Watcher .................................

PART C

To be completed two hours after completion of all Hot Work.

I certify that I have made a thorough inspection of the work site and the surrounding area, including adjacent rooms and spaces and that all appears cool. I have ensured that all isolated fire equipment has been returned to full working order.

Signature of Fire Watcher .................................

Time .................................

The fully completed original certificate must now be returned to the Fire Adviser.
Advice is available from the Fire Adviser.

Tel No: .................................
3.8 Control Room Procedures

Introduction

The control room is the focal point of security operations. In large organisations it will be a continually manned, high-security, technical facility. In the case of smaller institutions it is not possible to justify such a dedicated asset due to cost. However general principles should be adopted. The following suggestions may assist in designing procedures to provide a control room focal point for security operations.

Siting

The control room should be centrally located and have restrictions on general access. Where this is not possible and it has to be combined with other functions the location should be selected with care as it needs to be able to function as a management focal point in an emergency or incident without the distractions of the public. The control room itself must always be completely secure.

Where it is not possible to set up a control room due to staffing constraints and 24-hour guarding is not in effect, then a 'Duty Officer' should be nominated. This person can be on call on a roster basis and should be equipped with a mobile phone or pager and in possession of all the necessary documentation to manage an incident or emergency. The Duty Officer must be contactable round the clock with his/her duty folder within arm's reach.

By contrast a high-security control room may be in a basement or back room so to be well protected, not overlooked, with access control for authorised visitors only, so outsiders cannot assess its function easily. Wherever it is located it should not be in the centre of an institution's main activity. If at all possible it should be able to approach the control room from a number of different controlled approaches.

The control room function can be summarised as:

- The central point for 24-hour communications, both operational and for emergency services.
- The monitoring point for all alarm systems, fire systems, surveillance and environmental systems. (Control rooms should have the capability to deliberately operate a personal attack button connected to an alarm receiving centre.)
- The location of all contingency plans, call-out lists, emergency contacts.
• The location and monitoring point for all keys (in secure cabinets) and access control system.
• The location of up-to-date staff contact lists.
• The issue point for passes, ID cards and permits to work.
• The information holding point for all records, patrol reports, CCTV tapes, incidents and visitors.
• The immediate access point for information on any emergency stores for disaster recovery/abatement, fire fighting equipment, and first aid equipment.

If these duties were covered by a Duty Officer then the mobile phone number would be the first called by an Alarm Receiving Centre, or automatic speech dialler should an alarm be activated.

Where CCTV systems are employed they should be recorded so that they can be reviewed by the Duty Officer as part of the response as well as for later use by staff and the police.

**Information**

The following is a suggested list of information requirements. Critical information should be on wall boards for instant reference.

• Emergency Contact Lists:
  – Managers and all staff
  – Contractors – plumber, electrician, carpenter, local professional specialist support, effluent and rubbish disposal
  – Alarm and CCTV engineers – include contract numbers and ID codes
  – Emergency services to include local police details, fire prevention, local doctor etc.
  – Relevant local authorities facilities
  – Neighbourhood Watch or similar
• Incident Books – daily log of all incidents and action points such as broken lights or observation of safety hazards seen on patrol.
• Disaster and emergency plans, location high-risk areas e.g. fuel and gas storage, stored artefacts.
• Copies of all schedules, business and routine activity taking place.
• Contractors’ schedules.
• Accident books, staff and visitors.
• Location details of fuse boxes, hydrants, water stop cocks, snow shovels, pumps, tools, spare bulbs, manholes, roof access etc.
• Patrol schedule and log sheets.
• Detailed Site Procedures Manual for reference.
• Alarm system details – but not pin numbers.
• Key lists and with authority for issue.
• Visitors’ lists and pass system.
• Law manual and limits of authority, to include search policy.
• Local Byelaws and Establishment Rules, including smoking policy.
• Health and Safety Policy.
• Bomb Threat Procedure, by phone and discovery of device.
• White dry marker board for short-term information.
• Maps, Ordnance Survey and site plans.
• Lost and Found Property record.
• If relevant, traffic plans and detail of traffic light operation and keys in case Police or Traffic Wardens attending are not familiar with local area.

Communications

Telephones

Any internal telephone should be in the control room and if possible an emergency internal telephone that is reserved as an internal Emergency number and not used for routine matters. Ideally have two outside lines; one for incoming calls only with a call waiting facility and the other for outgoing calls only. This limits the amount of time the phone is engaged. The incoming line’s (RedCARE) prime function is for alarm calls from monitoring stations and auto speech diallers.

Adopt a professional approach to answering the telephone, it may be the only impression that the caller will ever get of your work place.

• Answer within four rings.
• Have a pen and paper handy.
• Project a courteous image e.g. ‘Good Afternoon, Security Control Room, can I help you?’
• Take any message and deal with it promptly.

An answer machine is good for taking messages when the control room is unoccupied for any period, but also good for recording any suspicious calls.

Radios

Spare radios and charged batteries should be held in the control room. Any base station or talk through system must have a battery back up. Effective use of screening can subdue the constant crackle of a busy radio net if others are busy with paperwork or on the telephone.
Local Pager System

An economical alternative to mobile phones and radios which can be programmed for multiple or group call outs. A megaphone can be extremely useful if all else fails.

CCTV Tapes

A log should be kept of tapes used and each time they were changed daily. Tapes must be changed for new tapes every 12 months so the quality remains good as multiplexers do wear tapes more than a normal VCR.

Examples of CCTV log:

CCTV Daily Log 28 Day/28 Tape) Change 1900 daily

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Week 1</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time changed</th>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Remarks/Incident</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

Facilities

- There needs to be adequate toilet and rest facilities, away from the main work area.
- A small kitchen or facility should also be provided.
- The rest area can double as a briefing area.
- Separate changing facility and secure stores areas are also recommended.
- Vehicles should be parked facing in the direction ready to proceed without reversing. Spare vehicle keys should be kept handy.
- Emergency lighting and power should be available within 60 seconds.
3.9 **Courier Guidelines – Victoria and Albert Museum**

These guidelines are intended to provide the prospective courier with information about their duties and to answer the most commonly asked questions. It is based on experience sending our couriers to a wide range of venues; from the nearby Royal College of Art to Sao Paulo, Brazil. Nevertheless, it is not exhaustive and those seeking further information are recommended to read Courierspeak by Cordelia Rose, copies of which may be obtained from the Registrar’s Section.

**The Courier’s Role**

“A courier is able to make condition reports, photograph, handle, pack and unpack objects, oversee transport and stay with the shipment to its final destination. When selecting couriers, an institution should consider the candidate’s availability in terms of workload and whether they are already under stress. A courier must be mentally prepared for unseen delays. Couriers should be selected for their unabrasive personality and for their sensitivity to the customs and beliefs of other cultures, which may be radically opposed to their own. Couriering trips should never be given to unqualified people as a reward or favour. Quite apart from the risk to the objects, the borrower should not have to pay the expenses of couriers who are more intent on having fun than on fulfilling their couriering responsibilities.”

Cordelia Rose, *Courierspeak*

**The Victoria and Albert’s (V&A) Courier Policy**

1. The decision to courier object(s) on loan will be made before the Loan Agreement is sent to the borrower. The need for a courier should be decided by the Chief Curator of the lending collection(s) and should be based on the following considerations:

   - the rarity, significance and fragility of the object;
   - special handling or installation requirements of the object;
   - the need to protect against exposure to careless handling, excessive movement, changing and/or extreme temperatures, and other human and/or natural hazards during transportation;
   - the value of the consignment;
   - complex travel routes;
   - requests made by the borrowing institution;
   - the anticipated professionalism of staff at the venue.
2. The choice of courier will be based on the same considerations. Where one factor outweighs the others, the choice of courier will reflect this (e.g. a conservator should be sent if the work is fragile or requires special installation techniques).

3. In an attempt to reduce spiralling exhibition costs, the Registrar may request that loans from different collections be consolidated under one courier where this can be done without increasing risk to the object(s).

4. A courier's responsibilities should be placed above all other professional or personal agendas. The courier must have no conflicting obligations for couriering the object. The courier’s family/friends must not travel with the couriered shipment; and the courier must not visit other locations for personal or museum matters before the object is safely delivered. The schedule of shipment of the object must not be amended to meet appointments or to ease the courier’s trip at the expense of the object.

5. Couriering should ideally be limited to those full-time staff who handle works of art during the course of their normal duties.

6. The courier must be briefed on the condition of the object and its special requirements, must be familiar with the packing method, trained in object handling and condition reporting, and experienced in transport procedure. Couriers must enjoy the complete confidence of the Museum in carrying out their duties.

7. The courier will be made aware of and understand the responsibilities entrusted to them and all anticipated hazards which may be encountered. The courier will always observe the object as it is packed. The courier will have read and understood the Loan Agreement governing the loan.

8. The Museum will inform the borrower in the Loan Agreement of the need for a courier and will agree the length of stay, subsistence and arrangements in advance. The Museum will require the Borrower to make every effort to ensure that objects are not unpacked while in transit.

9. Objects will only be hand-carried where their size does not make the case unwieldy and where the value of fragility of the object may dictate that hand-carryon is appropriate. The courier should have the physical strength to carry the case without risk to the object. The courier will be restricted to one case of personal hand-luggage and will not check in any luggage. (See section What to Take)

10. Where an agreement has been made to allow a courier from another museum to accompany a V&A object, or for a V&A courier to accompany another museum’s object, the two parties will agree in advance the extent of each other’s responsibilities.

11. No arrangements should be made by the courier that would cause unnecessary risks, complicated timetables or extra expense. It should be recalled at all times that the courier’s primary purpose is to oversee the transport, unpacking,
condition reporting and installation of the object(s) in his/her care, and that any other appointments or activities are secondary to this. The courier must not take alcohol or medication that might in any way impair their ability to carry out their duties.

12. The courier, acting as the agent of the Museum, has full authority to act in protection of the object until the object is officially released to the borrower.

**Requirements of a Good Courier**

A courier needs to possess certain qualities: firmness, patience, stamina and the ability to make sound, intelligent and professional decisions under stress. You are likely to enter situations where the V&A loans are not the only priority and where working methods may differ from ours.

An essential attribute is self assurance – i.e. knowing when to be flexible and when to put your foot down. Understanding the risks to which objects may be exposed during transport, unpacking, installation and display is essential so that you can decide whether the proposed activity or method of working is acceptable. It is important not to be unreasonably cautious.

You should understand how to handle art objects, be able to hand-carry where necessary, possess packing skills, be able to make condition reports and have the practical ability to assist where necessary. You should be familiar with shippers, customs, airport and airline procedures.

Availability is an important aspect of being a courier. Couriers are appointed so that they can oversee objects at all stages of packing and transport and cope with the unforeseen. Be prepared, therefore, for changes of plan (even travel date) and long working hours, plus great periods of inactivity. (You may be expected to travel overland by truck/van and these journeys are normally non-stop).

Do not make lots of business appointments during your courier period – if you need to do some research, you should be able to negotiate an extra day at the V&A’s expense in advance.

The ability to speak the relevant language is helpful, although not essential.

Remember, as a courier you are responsible for protecting and expediting the movement of the object and providing a continuous chain of accountability for the object, from the hands of the lender to those of the borrower.
The Procedure

Before Departure

The Registrar's Section will brief you on the practical arrangements for your trip. However, other preparation is necessary:

**Familiarise yourself with the objects and their requirements.** The most important thing is to get to know the objects by actually seeing them. Check on the environmental and display requirements. If they are not objects in your own collection, discuss any potential problems of display and handling with the staff responsible for those objects. If possible, witness the condition reporting on the objects or at least compare each object with its condition report and discuss them with the Conservation Officer as necessary.

**Witness the packing.** You must also know how the objects were packed and witness the packing, even though the packers will provide unpacking and packing instructions. Complex packing arrangements will be explained by photographs or simple diagrams which will accompany the shipment.

**Read courier reports.** If you are the return courier, try to read the outgoing courier’s report so that you are aware of any potential problems.

**Prepare equipment.** You should also make sure that you have the correct equipment for checking light and humidity levels, and that you know how to use it.

**Read Loan Agreement and Conditions.** Make sure you have read the Loan Agreement and understand the Museum’s Conditions of Loan.

What to Take

**Do not take anything other than hand luggage when accompanying objects.** If you were taking a hand-carry and checked luggage, the object would be at risk while you wait for checked luggage on the carousel and it would be difficult to manage along with the hand carry. If you are accompanying freight, it is even more important not to check any luggage, particularly if a freight transfer is part of the schedule. A last-minute problem with loading a pallet onto the plane or an error in paperwork may mean that the objects are delayed, but you will have to fly anyway because your luggage is already on the plane.
It is preferable that couriers do not take both hand-carry and freight, but this will sometimes be necessary and the additional demands on the courier must be allowed for.

**Remember to take:**
- plane ticket;
- credit card and cash (foreign exchange);
- passport, visa etc with a photocopy in case you lose it;
- courier pack including:
  - gloves for handling
  - mirror plates
  - tape for picture glass
  - notebook, pencil, pen
  - ICOM card
  - vital medicines, spectacles, aspirin, prescriptions etc
  - chocolate for long journeys
  - comfortable but neat clothes
  - camera
  - phonecard
  - V&A pass and/or business cards

**Departure from the Museum**

The Agent will, where possible, pick you up from home, if you are leaving very early or very late. Otherwise, make your own way to the Registrar’s Section (using a taxi if very early or very late in the day) where you will be met by a member of the Registrar’s team and helped to supervise the loading of the lorry. If taking a taxi, remember to ask for a receipt.

**Road Transport**

The Museum’s *Conditions of Loan* state that lorries in which objects are transported should be air-ride vehicles with temperature and humidity control and a tail-lift. In practice, this is not always provided, but you should certainly check that the van is roadworthy and that its interior is clean. There should not be windows in the back.

There should be two drivers, radio control/mobile phone, and a fire extinguisher. The van should also be alarmed and locked once loaded. If there is more than one truck, the courier should travel in the first or last vehicle. All trucks should stay together in convoy and should be in radio control with each other. All vehicles must be in the courier’s sight at all times.

Make sure the crates are not left in rain or direct sunlight while they are waiting to be loaded.
When the crates are loaded onto the van, make sure they are moved carefully and smoothly. Crates should not be piled on top of each other. The drivers should secure the crates to the raves of the van with straps. Make sure the cases are kept the right way up and count them in. Discuss the loading of the van with the Agent to reduce unnecessary shuffling of crates.

During the journey, make sure the ride is at moderate speed and is smooth. Someone should stay in the van at all times, for example, during rest or lunch breaks. This also applies in the case of a breakdown.

Where possible, the Registrar’s Section will have arranged for the journey to be direct. If this is impossible, overnight stops should be arranged so that the van is in a secure compound, e.g. in a police station yard. Otherwise, the Registrar’s Section should have arranged for the object crates to be stored in an appropriate warehouse. Sometimes it is possible for the loaded van to be driven inside a loading bay.

**Freight Loans – the Cargo Warehouse**

Air freight from the UK is officially required to be at the airport five hours before flight departure. You should therefore be prepared for an early start if your flight is at midday.

On arrival at the cargo warehouse, the Agent will unload the lorry. Discuss any restrictions with the agent before the crates are moved, e.g. crates which must be kept upright. You are then in the hands of customs and the cargo handlers. In practice you must rely almost totally on the Agent to charm the objects through quickly and to request the handlers to be careful with their fork-lift trucks. You will have very little influence and will be confined behind a yellow line. You may have to wait several hours.

The Agent will see the paperwork through customs, after which the crates can be loaded. They will be manoeuvred onto a pallet (often a flat sheet of metal) and arranged until they form exactly the right dimensions. Where possible, everything will go onto one pallet and will not be mixed with other freight, but this cannot be guaranteed. Use your discretion here, for example avoid chemicals or liquids being loaded onto the same pallet. Fork-lift truck drivers will drive around alarmingly but are very experienced and also have to be treated with great respect. Leave it to the Agent to intercede on your behalf if necessary.

It is important to monitor the movement of crates. Should one drop from a fork-lift truck, the courier should be able to identify it and ensure careful checking on unpacking.
The crates will be strapped together and then a large net thrown over them, which will be lashed to the pallet. By this time, movement between crates on the pallet should be impossible.

If a container is used rather than a pallet, the process is very similar. However, crates must be either palletised or containerised – do not allow the airline to side-load them loose.

It is no longer possible to witness the pallet or container being loaded onto the aeroplane – you will not be allowed onto the tarmac. You may be able to see through the boarding gate window and if you’ve got good eyesight read the container number. However, you should make a note of the pallet number(s) which will be on the airway bill.

You will be delivered to the passenger terminal where you should proceed to the departure gate in good time. Check with the airline staff at the gate (the ‘redcaps’) whether your pallet(s) have actually been loaded. You may have to be quite firm and explain that you cannot travel unless you are assured that the pallet is really on board. They will ring through to check for you.

The Agent should remain at the airport until the plane has taken off with you and the freight aboard. If there is a problem, contact him/her on the mobile phone number provided.

**Freight Transfer**

If the freight is transferred as part of the schedule, you will be met by the appointed Agent at the airport. You will need to check the airway bill to confirm the transfer has taken place as you will probably not have access to the cargo handling area.

**Hand-carry**

Check-in the usual way. The Agent will accompany you up to the second gate. The Agent will have notified the Head of Airport Security of the courier and flight details and Registrar’s Section will provide you with a security declaration to show. Conservation do not consider X-rays harmful to objects, so objects can pass through the machines. You should explain the fragile nature of your package and ask that security personnel handle it with care. Use your judgement to decide if avoiding a trip through the X-ray machinery is desirable. Try not to call undue attention to yourself or the object however. If Security feels the accompanying paperwork is sufficient, they will hand the package to you around the metal detector.
Ask to pre-board to allow time for securing your hand-carry before the other passengers get on. Once you have boarded the plane, make sure that the case is secured onto the seat beside you or on the floor between that seat and the one in front. It is a good idea to talk to the air steward; indeed on some airlines the staff may insist on strapping down the case themselves. The Museum will have checked to make sure that the case dimensions are permitted, but occasionally the pilot may insist that the object is secured elsewhere. An overhead locker is not acceptable.

Because hand-carry cases necessarily are lighter and smaller than freight cases, they have poorer protection against heat and vibration. Make sure that the aircraft window blind is down if the sun is shining on the object.

**On the Plane**

It is absolutely not permissible to drink alcoholic beverages on the plane when accompanying objects. You are on duty, even if your object is in the hold. You must have your wits about you on arrival, when you will probably be tired anyway. You will be met by Agents and representatives of the borrowers who will not be impressed by alcoholic fumes.

If you have a hand-carry, try to parry questions about what is in it – just say that you haven’t been told, but that you know it’s fragile. If you are worried about your object and need to go to the toilet, ask the air steward to keep an eye on it for you.

**On Arrival**

Your itinerary should specify where you are going to meet the Agent. This depends on whether you have a hand-carry or freight, and whether you are travelling within the EU.

If you do not have a hand-carry, go through the green channel and meet the Agent’s representative in the Arrivals Hall.

If you have a hand-carry and are flying to another EU country, you will usually be able to go straight through the blue channel to the hall. If you are flying to a destination outside the EU meet the representative in the red channel where you will have to clear customs.

**Depalletisation**

You will be taken to the cargo shed to witness depalletisation of your crates. Again, you will be very much in the hands of the
Agent. There may be long delays while cargo handlers disappear for tea breaks and paperwork may take hours. In any case, attention will be paid to coffins, fresh food and live animals before works of art.

After depalletisation you will supervise the loading of the van or lorry (see Road Transport above) and drive to your destination.

On Arrival at the Venue

Unless the lorry can be secured within a loading bay overnight, you should supervise the unloading of the crates into a locked store or the exhibition gallery, if it can be secured. Likewise a hand-carry or smaller crate should be locked into a secure store or a display case if immediate installation is impossible.

The Registrar’s Section may have arranged for crates to acclimatise for up to 48 hours. Ideally this should take place in the exhibition space itself, but obviously a store is acceptable if it has the same environment and is secure, etc. Establish a firm day and time to return for installation and ask to see the display case and area.

You should be given your expenses on arrival, but this cannot be guaranteed; some organisations have difficulty in managing this through their accounts departments. Be sure to have a credit card or spare cash for emergencies.

Unpacking and Condition Checking

Make sure that the exhibition organisers have set aside a suitable place in which to unpack and condition check the objects. This should be away from thoroughfares, in a clean and environmentally suitable area. It should be near to the display cases so that unpacked objects are not moved too far without protection. Any table used should be firm and clean, and preferably covered with a pad. There should be suitable baskets, pads, tissue and gloves to protect unpacked objects during movement and installation.

Try to be near to objects which are being unpacked so that you can tactfully pass on handling recommendations to handlers and installers.

During the condition checking, lead by example. Keep your hands clean and adopt a careful manner. Do not let the organisers rush ahead and install unless you are absolutely certain that they are capable. You may have to agree a different
approach or method of working to avoid everything happening at once. However, do remember that you are not the only courier, and that ours may not be the only objects. You may, for example, decide that you can share some duties with another courier.

The original condition statement and condition check made on unpacking should be left with the borrower. Return a copy to the Registrar’s Section. If anything has changed or happened to the object(s), also make a note in the courier report and inform conservation and curators at the V&A.

**Installation**

Before objects are unpacked and installed, check that the exhibition space is ready. If construction has not finished, paint is still wet or too much is going on for safety, ask for installation to be delayed. You may be able to agree to put objects in a case prior to final installation. In extremes, you may need to threaten to take the objects away again or to have them locked away and return later.

Pay particular attention to security during installation. Do not allow too many cases to be opened, and check that staff and other couriers have security passes or are checked in and out. There should be a warder on the door to the exhibition space.

You do not need to insist on handling all the objects yourself unless you are unhappy with their handling methods. You are simply required to supervise installation. However, help if it seems appropriate.

Check that each object is firmly and securely installed. V&A objects should be amongst the last into any case. You may need to insist on being present to observe if other objects or labels are added later. If the venue is careful, the objects not at risk, or you consider another courier present to be a reliable observer, however, you may not need to insist on being present. Use your discretion.

At the end of the day, check by personal inspection that every case with V&A objects has been locked and that all uncased objects are secure on the walls. Objects which have not been installed should be packed into a secure, environmentally-controlled store unless they are so large that they cannot be stolen. The same applies to unlocked crates. You may also wish to have your light and humidity meters and camera locked up securely overnight.
Check temperature, humidity and lux levels at various stages during the day to ensure that there are no fluctuations.

**Dealing with Problems**

Your role as a courier is to assess the level of risk to which objects are exposed and to act accordingly. You need to judge when to ‘stick to your guns’ and when to compromise or to let things happen their way.

Try to foresee, discuss and resolve any problems rather than dictate, and use other couriers for advice and support. Remain calm but firm – show them the conditions of loan that they have agreed to and, if necessary, ask to see someone more senior, such as the Director. Do not automatically phone the Museum – as a courier, the Museum has placed its trust in you to act on its behalf as you think fit at the time.

If the problem cannot be resolved immediately, consider putting the objects in one of their stores and coming back later. If it is still unresolved and you genuinely feel that the objects are at risk, threaten to withdraw them or consider extending your stay.

Examples of typical problems and suggestions on how to deal with them are provided at the end of this document (see Problems).

**On Departure**

**Before Leaving the Venue**

Get the Registrar or other responsible person to sign both the receipts for the objects and bring one back to the Museum (if you are not going back immediately, ask for it to be faxed).

Ask for copies of the condition statement and subject condition check. The original should remain with the objects at the venue.

Check that packing cases, fittings and all materials have been placed into a secure, clean, air conditioned store.

Check that the V&A is acknowledged correctly. This should be on each label, but in some instances there may be a panel at the beginning of the exhibition instead.

The loan agreement requires the borrower to provide the V&A with copies of any exhibition catalogue produced. You are not expected to lug multiple copies of the exhibition catalogue home, however – ask if they can be posted instead.
Destination and Packing

If you are a return courier, you will need to make your own way to the airport and will not necessarily be met at the other end. You must check that you know how to get to your hotel and to the venue, and that you know what time you are expected to report.

Deinstallation and condition checking needs to occur in the same clean, safe environment as installation, and the same warnings about security, amount of work going on around you etc apply. Carefully work through each condition report with the borrower’s register or conservator and either pack the object yourself or supervise their staff.

You may be asked to sign a receipt from the venue before you leave.

Arrival in London

If you are accompanying freight, go through the green channel and meet the Agent’s representative in the Arrivals Hall. You will then be taken to the cargo shed.

If you are with a hand-carry and your flight originated within the EU, you should usually go through the blue channel and meet the Agent in the Hall.

If you are with a hand-carry and started from outside the EU, meet the representative in the red channel to clear customs.

Depalletisation (if appropriate) and transport to the Museum takes place as before.

Return to the V&A

Objects should be placed in the Transit Room under the guidance of a Registrar’s Section Officer, after which you are free to leave. If it is late, you will either be given a lift by the Agent or can get a taxi, for which you will be reimbursed (keep a receipt).

After the Return of the Object(s)

Ideally, you should be present when the objects are unpacked. There may need to be a period of acclimatisation before this happens. Transit Room will warn the appropriate department when objects are ready.
Once the objects are unpacked, complete a final condition check and in consultation with relevant curators, inform the V&A Registrar if there is any damage. The condition report should be filed in conservation.

If you have expenses, these must be forwarded promptly to the appropriate Registrar’s Section Officer so that the Agent can clear them. It is very hard to do anything if the courier makes a claim after the Agent has sent his account to the borrowing institution.

There is no official arrangement for taking time-in-lieu for extra hours worked, and it is not V&A policy to charge borrowers for overtime as it is accepted that couriers must be flexible in the hours that they work. However, consult your line manager if you feel that you need time-in-lieu or time to recover from jet lag.

Courier Report

Complete and return the Courier Report form, included in your courier pack, on which you will provide details of your courier trip. The report should be given to Registrar’s Section within two days of your return. Please note especially any problems during your trip that could have resulted in damage to the object(s) or any problems that arose that would be helpful to future couriers.

Problems

Examples of typical problems are listed below, with suggestions of how to deal with them.

- **Too little time to see all the objects installed**

  You must make every effort to ensure that you supervise the installation of the works in your care. Try to anticipate any difficulties that may cause the installation to be delayed. If problems arise which are likely to delay the safe installation of your objects, it may be necessary to negotiate an extension to your stay with the exhibition organisers or Registrar. If it is impossible for you to remain, you may be able to ask another courier to supervise the installation, however, you should only do this if you consider them suitably experienced and able to oversee your objects as well as their own. Alternatively, you should specify that the Registrar or exhibition equivalent should supervise the installation and then be asked to fax the V&A Registrar to confirm successful installation.

  Always remember that the objects are in your care and assess all risks. You should endeavour to get everything completed
under your supervision as this is the role you were selected to perform. If you are unsure, contact the V&A Registrar for advice.

- **Damage to object**

  Complete a damage report form or make an immediate note and take a photograph if possible – if necessary, get other witnesses to agree it. Update the Condition Report in agreement with borrower’s representative. Can the object be exhibited? Should you bring it back?

  Agree emergency conservation in writing between V&A conservation, their conservation and V&A curators. Keep the V&A Registrar informed.

- **Insecure cases**

  Even if the case design is not exactly as specified by the V&A, it may still be perfectly secure. If not, discuss how it could be better sealed, for example, by extra screws, glue or mastic. Weights such as sandbags can be used to stabilise a case or a false wall. You may have to ask the venue to rearrange the objects so that yours is in a superior case if it is particularly valuable or vulnerable. It is best to insist on staying to see this achieved even if it means extending your stay.

- **Poor environment**

  If you suspect that there is a problem with the environment, ask whether it can be monitored before the object is unpacked and installed. Leave the object in its case to acclimatise. Note that fluctuations are a greater risk to objects than steady high or lows. The environment is likely to be more steady inside a case than outside, so if your object is framed and vulnerable you could see whether it could be displayed in a case instead (even if you need to take it out of the frame). However, if the environment is unstable you may need to withdraw very sensitive items.

  If lux levels cannot be reduced until after you have left, ask for a reading to be taken and sent to the Registrar.

- **Not enough subsistence**

  Your subsistence will have been negotiated by the Registrar’s Section. Information about when you will receive your subsistence and whether the accommodation is pre-paid will be included in your Courier Briefing. We always try to ensure that
you will receive your subsistence when you arrive at the venue, however, this is not always possible. Always check that your hotel has been pre-paid in case there has been a last minute change in arrangements. If the hotel is not paid directly, ensure the amount you are given will cover accommodation.

If the subsistence seems low for what you need to spend, check what was agreed in the Loan Agreement. Even if it is the correct amount, we may be able to negotiate more for you afterwards, but you will need to supply receipts to show what you actually spent. It is likely that the borrower’s accounts department will have similar rules to our own about what is a reasonable expense.

**Summary of a Courier’s Responsibilities**

**Responsibilities to the Object(s)**

The courier’s primary responsibility is to oversee the safe shipment and arrival of the object. Security is of paramount concern.

The courier is responsible for witnessing and supervising packing, unpacking after the acclimatisation period, transportation, and examination of the object at the beginning and end of shipment.

The courier must stay with the shipment, physically and personally, or, where the physical presence of the courier is restricted, via contact with an authority in charge of the shipment (e.g. shipping agent).

The courier must do all that is necessary to keep delays or possibilities of delays to a minimum. The courier is responsible for anticipating, solving and reporting unforeseen problems.

The courier is responsible for communicating any special handling, display, packing or unpacking instructions with the object.

**Basic Skills, Knowledge and Abilities**

- The courier must know exactly where the object is going, to whom, and by what means.
- If the object is to be hand-carried, the courier must have the physical strength to do so.
- The courier must have packing skills and an understanding of packing methods and materials.
The courier must know what to do in the event of damage, including recording information which may be crucial when assessing liability.

- The courier must have an up-to-date passport and visa if necessary for the trip.
- The courier must not volunteer information to anyone. Information should only be given to individuals involved in the transit of the object and with a justified need to know.
- The courier must carefully read and understand every document or receipt before signing it and request translation when necessary.
- The courier must validate the identification of anyone taking away crated objects, before releasing the crates. The courier must obtain valid, authorised signature and date on any receipts.
- The courier should try to prevent the opening of crates in a public area.
- The courier must not take alcohol or drugs which may impair physical mobility and/or the ability to make decisions.
- The courier should leave a complete itinerary, including dates, and telephone numbers, with the Registrar’s Section if the trip is extended beyond the delivery of the object.
- The courier should know where the borrower or the borrower’s agent will meet them on arrival.

Responsibility of the Borrower

The courier must know the borrower’s requirements. The courier is representing the institution and should conduct themselves fairly and ethically. The courier should not expect to travel business class when not accompanying objects. The trip is not a vacation for the courier, until the shipment is completed and the object(s) safely installed.

The courier should not make any last minute changes of plan unless absolutely essential to the shipment, and then the borrower should be made aware and approve these changes.

There must be no arrangements that would cause unnecessary risks, complicated timetables, or unnecessary expense.

3.10 Crime – Action to be taken Following an Incident

First Steps

Establish whether the object has actually been stolen or damaged either intentionally or accidentally. In cases of suspected theft, you will need to ensure that it has not been removed from display for cleaning, renovation, study or change of exhibition without proper notification. A search of the
premises may show that the item has been removed from display and hidden to be collected later.

Any recovered or damaged items should be left where found until examined by the police, but must be protected, if necessary by closing and locking the gallery/building. Emergency precautions may be necessary to avoid further damage to the items or injury to persons.

**Conservation**

A conservator’s advice must be taken immediately to minimise any damage. Existing condition reports should be annotated to show the extent of damage, or a new report must be prepared. Photographs, with a scaled ruler alongside, should be taken of the damage, *in situ* if possible. Photographs need to pay particular attention to the area of damage and the effect of the damage both physically and visually in relation to the whole object.

No remedial conservation work should be undertaken before informing the lender and Resource (in the case of indemnified material), unless emergency action is essential to prevent further damage. If this action is taken, it must be fully documented. A copy of this report will be required if an insurance claim arises from this incident.

**Police Report**

All crimes should be reported to the police without delay whether the person responsible has been detailed or has fled the scene. Pending the arrival of the police, anything said by the person detailed should be noted. Names and addresses of all witnesses, including staff, are to be recorded and every effort made to persuade them to remain at the scene pending the arrival of the police, without personal risk being taken.

The police are to be supplied with all necessary information including a full description and photographs of stolen items. The name of the police officer and police station dealing with the incident should be recorded.

The following are to be notified giving details of the incident:

- museum management;
- owner of the stolen/damaged artefact;
- Resource Indemnity Officer (in the case of indemnified material) and Security Adviser;
- insurance company (if relevant).
Recovery of the Property

Close and early consideration must be given to seeking publicity (with the agreement of the owner) from national and local media to assist in recovering stolen items. Even if publicity is not sought a prepared statement to assist in meeting press enquiries can prove to be very useful.

Consider placing advertisements with:

- Trace Magazine
  Thesaurus Group Ltd
  Mill Court
  Furrlongs
  Newport
  Isle of Wight PO30 2AA
  Tel: 01983 826000

- Antiques Trade Gazette
  115 Shaftesbury Avenue
  London WC2H 8AD
  Tel: 020 7930 7193

- Art Loss Register
  13 Grosvenor Place
  London SW1X 7HH
  Tel: 020 7235 3393

- Salvo NEWS
  18 Ford Village
  Berwick upon Tweed TD15 2QG
  Tel: 01890 820333
  (Architectural or garden antiques)

- Any association or magazine that specialises in the particular type of object stolen, e.g. gun or coin collectors’ magazines.

If approaches are received offering to return the stolen objects for a reward, the police Investigating Officer should be contacted immediately. An offer should not be rejected immediately, but every effort made to play for time even to the extent of suggesting a meeting.

If stolen objects are recovered the police, owners, Resource and insurance company (if relevant) will need to be notified.

In the case of accidental damage, it will not be necessary to report the matter to the police nor seek publicity.
Government Indemnity Scheme

If a claim is to be made under the Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) reports must include the following details:

- date of incident or date damage/loss was detected;
- name of exhibition or long-term loan;
- title/description of item;
- condition reports before and after damage;
- details of any emergency action/conservation undertaken to prevent further damage;
- indemnified value;
- date of indemnity cover;
- nature of claim;
- date Resource originally notified;
- name and address of owner and date informed;
- confirmation that owner intends to submit claim;
- confirmation that conservation work will be commissioned following the Guidelines for the Commissioning and Undertaking of Conservation Work prepared by The Conservation Forum with the support of the former MGC;
- two independent estimates of the cost of any repairs and details of the work to be undertaken.

Damage

- Report on the cause of damage including details of security and display arrangements or environmental conditions as relevant.
- Illustrations/photographs before and after damage.
- Condition reports before and after damage.
- Details of any emergency action/conservation undertaken to prevent further damage.
- If the damage was caused during transit, the name of the carrier, details of packing and transport arrangements should be provided.
- Conservation work should be commissioned by following the Guidelines for the Commissioning and Undertaking of Conservation Work (see above).
- Only after the work has been carried out can a claim for depreciation be considered.

Loss

- Report on loss including details of security and display arrangements and police report (if available).
- If the loss was caused during transit, the name of the carrier, details of packing and transport arrangements should be provided.
Incident/Personal Description Form

Personal description form explanatory notes

1. Print your name at the top.
2. And sign.
3. And date the form.
4. The exhibit number will be filled in by the Investigating Officer (For police use only).
5. The place where the person described was seen.
6. The date where the person described was seen.
7. The time the person described was seen.
8. Hair/hat: describe in your own words. Don’t try to think of technical words. Include colour(s) (black/light or dark/blond), length, style etc.
9. Facial hair: moustache (bushy, turned up/down, thin lined, etc. If in doubt please draw it on description form); beard (full, Vandyke, goatee etc. Again, draw it).
11. Upper clothing: shirt, jumper, blouse, suit, ties, etc. Please use this description form to draw what the suspect was wearing if you cannot explain it.
12. Height: this has got to be guess-work. Pick an item in the vicinity where the height is measurable for comparison. We can always check it later.
13. Colour: White, West Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, Middle Eastern etc.
14. Age: have a good guess. Compare your estimate with a colleague of around the same age.
17. Anything that stands out which is not covered on the form. If you saw a scar, draw it. If you are describing tattoos that can be seen, indicate where they were.
18. Gloves: leather, woollen, with or without fingers. Jewellery: include identity bracelets, rings and watches.
19. Colour and type of trousers: slacks, jeans or suit trousers.
20. Shoes: lace-up, slip on, boots etc.

The exhibited personal description form must be incorporated in a statement.
<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Completed by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Signature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Place:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Time:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Diagram:**

- 8. Hair/hat
- 9. Moustache/beard
- 10. Eyes/glasses
- 11. Upper clothing
- 18. Hands/gloves/jewellery
  - 19. Lower clothing
  - 20. Footwear
- 21. Baggage

**Additional Information:**

- 12. Height
- 13. Colour
- 14. Age
- 15. Build
- 16. Accent
- 17. Marks/scars/tattoos
Crime Report Form (Crime File) for Museums, Archives and Libraries

The purpose of this form is to report security related incidents to the Resource Security Adviser. ALL incidents, including successes, and however trivial they appear, should be reported.

The completion of a Crime File will:

- assist with the identification of collections under threat because of the activities of individuals or group;
- share knowledge of the modus operandi of criminals – as a training aid and warning to all museum staff;
- identify the problems and risks posed by the use of particular display systems and/or reliance on particular security devices;
- assist with the recovery of stolen property.

Name of Institution .........................................................................................................................

Address ...........................................................................................................................................

Postcode .................................................................

Tel ................................................................. Fax .................................................................

Email .................................................................

Day/Date/Time of Incident (approximate details if exact unknown) ..........................................

Type of Incident:

Thieves ........................................... Assault .................................................................

Attempted Theft ........................................... Suspicious Person .................................................................

Vandalism ........................................... Other (give details)

Arson .................................................................

Has the incident been reported to the police?

Reported .................................................................

Not reported .................................................................

(reason: too trivial/no publicity/etc) ............................................................................................
State of institution at time of incident:

- Open
- Closed
- Open with staff present
- Perimeter alarms
- Set
- Activated

Time and nature of response to alarm

Not activated
Reason for non-activation

Not set
Not installed

Part/room of building in which the incident occurred?

- Displays
- Stores
- Reception
- Shop
- Office
- Other (give details)

Nature of incident (use separate sheet if necessary)

Give full details including any method of gaining entry to the building.
Include any physical protection defeated.

Description of stolen item(s) and approximate values (use separate sheet if necessary)

Description of any suspects (to include any detail of age, height [e.g. tall], build [e.g. slim], colour of hair, clothing and any unusual features)

Name, designation and phone number of person the Security Adviser may contact for further details

Name and designation of person completing this form

Signed ...........................................

Date .............................................
3.11 Environmental Conditions

The environment of heritage institutions is vitally important as changes in temperature and humidity can seriously affect the artefacts.

Temperature and humidity are normally measured by an instrument called a themohydrograph and can be read either weekly or monthly. Other computer-based systems can provide instantaneous feedback via radio linked sensors. All these instruments must be read and calibrated by a competent person.

The guideline ideal maintained environment is 55 per cent humidity, 20 degree C temperature with no more than a 5 per cent (10 per cent overall) fluctuation either up or down over a 12 hour period.

In such institutions there is normally one person, ideally a curator, who will collate the information however security will also be responsible for monitoring changes, especially sudden and drastic changes and inform the relevant person in good time.

3.12 Event Security

Introduction

Heritage institutions often host events, including preview exhibitions, outside events, concerts, formal dinners, conferences or weddings. An event could take place in a part of the building that is regularly used or in a venue selected for its particular merits. This could be a hotel, conference centre, or a temporary site such as marquee or open air arena.

Whatever the event or location, security arrangements must be thought through at the earliest planning stage. Invariably there will be some work involving a variety of contractors ranging from the erection of a full scale heated marquee to the delivery of the exhibition items or performers equipment. To facilitate smooth control a planning schedule should be produced so the right items and preparatory work are produced in the right order. This can be monitored by Security. Much of this activity will take place out of hours, thus increasing risk and overall vulnerability.

Security Considerations at the Planning Stage

Contractors

- Individual lists of vehicle details in advance.
- Work schedule and company contact details for referrals.
- Pass system, permit to work issued in advance where possible.
• Search policy.
• Contractors’ storage areas.
• Details of expected deliveries.
• Caravan site and arrangements for exhibitors.
• Contact lists of resident staff supplied to all contractors on site.
• Supervise contractors to make sure damage is not caused whilst manhandling their own equipment into position or pulling electrical wiring through rooms etc.

Traffic Control and Parking

• Have clear signs on site.
• AA/RAC route or diversion signs (details in telephone book).
• Car parking.
• Liaison with Police for traffic contingencies.
• Drop off and collection point for visitors, taxis etc.
• VIP reception point and drop off.
• Press and media arrangements.
• Traffic management plan supervised by marshals.
• Where possible conduct ticketing out of cars so not to impede traffic flow.
• Clearly marked routes and exits.
• Consider pre-issued A4 size tickets for display (verifiable) in windscreen with pre allocated car parking or specific for VIPs or special guests to save time on entry.
• Cars should be parked facing the exit to minimise manoeuvring at the end of the event.

Health and Safety

• First aid cover or doctor and facilities for large event.
• Location of nearest hospital, response time.
• Supervision of temporary structures for visitor safety.
• Emergency service rendezvous points, emergency access routes and escort arrangements on site.
• Arrangements for disabled.
• Adequate fire fighting equipment at fire points within event areas.
• Fire Service in attendance for fireworks displays etc.
• Proper control of vehicle movement within event public area – speed control and passes for authorised access, caterers, waste disposal contractors (time windows).
• Lighting for designated pedestrian areas and hazards (steps, gradients).
• Car parks lit and patrolled by security or stewards.
• Advice sought if using special effects such as lasers or pyrotechnics.
• Cattle grids, steps and ‘trip hazards’ eliminated or clearly marked.
• Emergency lighting and exit routes clearly marked inside buildings.
Considerations during the Event

• Ensure all staff are briefed on event, facilities, order of events and emergency evacuation plan and assembly points.
• Organise reception duties to establish a ‘presence’, take coats, remove bags and umbrellas that could be used to conceal goods or as a weapon, but more likely to cause damage or inconvenience.
• Establish alert procedures for non security staff to summon assistance. Use of radios, pagers, tannoy or even discreet visual signals.
• Avoid ‘overheating’ any incident.
• Check for paint aerosols, knives etc that can be used in an act of vandalism against art.
• Display clear photography and smoking policy.
• Display clear policy on which objects can be touched.
• Mark clearly visitors’ route, consider using distinct carpet.
• All staff to wear a form of corporate ID badge or lapel badge.
• Lock doors and seal areas not required to be open or for private use.
• Supervise contractors’ or caterers’ activity that takes place concurrent with visitors’ arrival.
• Supervise arriving coaches and ask them to switch off vehicle engines when stationary.
• Arrange for central point and facilities for coach drivers etc so they can be monitored and contacted easily.
• Have a telephone available for public use, call taxis etc. List local taxis that know the site.
• Conduct continual discreet surveillance in event areas, use CCTV if available. Uniformed Security Officers are a deterrent but ensure that they know how to deal with the public and can answer questions about the event. They should not get drawn into long discussions as this could be a ploy.
• Concentrate on priority areas. Break patrols down into zones for reactive accurate reporting and co-ordination.
• Alarm priority exhibits with temporary tamper system with audible sounder.
• Rope off areas at least arm’s length containing delicate displays. Use under-carpet alarms or similar as required. Use volunteer stewards as an alternative.
• Ensure all Security Officers and Stewards fully understand possible theft alarm procedures e.g. secure all doors and deal with situation if alarm or alert signal sounded. Also the necessity to minimise disturbance and bring the proceedings back to normal.
• Establish procedure for observed faults damage or unclean toilet areas, indeed anything that may offend the public.
After the Event

- Continue to supervise the exit of caterers and contractors to prevent damage to other exhibits through rushing whilst moving equipment.
- Supervise all contractors off the site.
- Recover all passes.
- Search all areas thoroughly for hidden personnel, note and report any damage or disturbance.
- Complete all locking up procedures, walk test alarm systems, PIRs before setting alarms.
- Note in incident book time all procedures completed and premises or site secure.

Further Reference

Managing Crowds HS (G) 154.
Guide to Health & Safety at Pop Concerts ISBN: 01 13410727
Code of Practice for Protective Barriers in and around Buildings, BS 6180.

3.13 Exhibition Security

With unusual exhibitions, there needs to be a set of security instructions prepared to cover the exhibition. These should cover the following:

The Threat

If the exhibition will be highly publicised, and contain an extremely high value collection of art/artefacts, a Risk Assessment is required for all the exhibits.

Consider

- Is it a potential target for sophisticated criminal theft, for instance, possibly targeting one or two smaller items on display and aiming for a speedy getaway, by using an accomplice or two combined to cause an apparently innocent distraction?
- An individual concealed in toilets during opening then breaking out with an exhibit during closed period or during closing down procedure.
- Likely attempt at ‘Grab and Run’ theft, whilst open.
- Likely to attempt by deceiving Night Security or other staff into gaining access into premise possibly during an evening event or when secure, then attempting a theft.
- Forced entry with firearms and threat of violence.
- Act of vandalism to cause irreparable damage by knife, paint can or blunt instrument.
- Possible damage caused by accident through carelessness.
The Risk

All staff need to:

• Be suspicious, this exhibition will be visited by a criminal or criminals who will consider if the gain for him or her is worth the risk of being caught or detained. In all probability they will not stand out from the general public.
• Be vigilant and ‘Threat Aware’ at all times.
• Beware of being overly engrossed in conversation with any person.
• Be careful not to discuss security arrangements.
• Beware of any distraction, commotion or even the Fire Alarm.
• Be wary of letting any person into the premise behind the scenes during the closed period or during open periods via the staff entrances.

Counter Measures

A range of counter measures must be applied as a matter of personal discipline and routine.

• Continual presence in exhibition areas is essential.
• CCTV monitoring with cameras continually recorded in the control room, with second independent monitor on reception for the guard to observe blind areas.
• Alarms fitted to display cases and picture frames.
• Entry and exit through one door only, either the external door or one of the passage doors – never both. Members of staff must lock the passage doors behind them.
• Number of visitors in gallery should be limited and controlled as directed by Principal Curator.
• Internal doors should be locked at all times.
• Panic attack buttons located at convenient points to allow staff to summon Police or internal response.

Reaction to an Incident

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Incident</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Object Alarm Initiated (Art Guard)</td>
<td>• Close and secure all doors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Investigate object and ascertain the cause.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Call for assistance on the radio.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Open door and resume as soon as possible, but only once situation is resolved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person behaving suspiciously</td>
<td>• Offer an explanation to the public as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Observe closely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Request assistance, use prearranged emergency procedure.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• If deemed necessary a manager should</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
approach the person and politely enquire about his behaviour.

- If required the person should be escorted from the area and all details noted in the Security Incident Book.

- Secure all doors.

- Call for assistance and intervene with the act, detain individual as per security arrest training.

- Activate PAB.

- Alert Duty Manager, call police and brief them on the situation.

- If confirmed as serious remove individual to a pre-selected room. Security should remain with person(s) until the police arrive.

- Note any witnesses to event, commence incident notes.

- As soon as possible review CCTV tapes and mark tape as evidence. If required show incident to police.

- Gallery will remain closed until the incident is resolved and nothing will be disturbed pending investigation.

- Secure doors.

- Inform Duty Manager and Principal Curator or relevant professional.

- Ask for witnesses.

- Close area and call police. Any public that demand to leave area, note their details before they leave.

- Review CCTV tapes for detail and time of incident.

- Evacuate public in normal manner.

- Implement salvage procedure when safe to do so. Art exhibits to be secured in an alternative safe area.

Speed is vital when reacting to all incidents. Use the following procedure guidelines:

**Opening Procedure**

All museums, archives and libraries need to have a documented opening procedure for the building and for opening individual galleries or areas.

- As soon as the exhibition/gallery is open to the public a security presence should be maintained.

- All keys must be kept on the person or returned to the security office.
• Two people should be present during opening and closing of galleries.
• Toilets should be locked when the building is closed.

Closing Procedure

Two staff are required for closure and every area (e.g. toilets) should be searched. All PIRs are to be tested for correct operation (Security responsibility) during locking up. Once the gallery has been secured and alarms set then the Security Control Room should be manned.

Unauthorised Access

This is not permitted into the building by any entrance during the silent hours. All ID must be verified either by pre-arrangement or by a sponsor and known to the security staff.

3.14 Fraud

Management must take fraud very seriously. Staff involved with fraud should be subject to the most serious disciplinary procedures, including prosecution if appropriate.

Definition

Fraud encompasses a wide range of irregularities and illegal acts, all of which are characterised by intentional deception. Normally fraud involves intentional distortion of financial statements, accounting or other records which is carried out to conceal the misappropriation of assets or otherwise, for gain.

Types of Fraud

• Theft of cash or equipment.
• False claims for overtime or expenses.
• Unauthorised use of property, equipment or services provided by the organisation.
• Irregularities in the tendering for, execution and pricing of supplies to the organisation by contractors.
• Corruption, for example the receipt of payment or other material advantage, as an inducement to the award of contracts to the organisation.

Responsibilities

Everyone has a responsibility for minimising the risk of fraud by adhering to procedures and policy and reporting suspected acts of fraud. All heads of department and line managers have a
responsibility to deter and detect fraud through the monitoring of procedures and the provision of guidance as and when required. Managers must continually assess areas of potential fraud and conduct spot checks to deter and counter the risk.

**Reporting**

Any acts of fraud must be reported as soon as suspected up through the management structure so to be dealt with at the highest level. Senior management has a duty to inform the police unless there is a valid reason not to.

Managers must not conduct interviews or take statements unless doing so as part of a structured investigation under the direction of senior management. Any dismissal for gross misconduct can only be instigated in line with employment law. The personnel department, a lawyer or an independent business consultant can best advise on the procedure as an Industrial Tribunal may follow if the employee(s) want to appeal.

### 3.15 Key Control and Security

**Overview**

A locked building room or storage area is only as secure as its key. If that key is lost or illicitly duplicated then the security of that particular area is reduced. More locks are compromised through careless key control than as a result of picking or being forced.

There are a number of measures that can be introduced to effect key control, from keeping a key register to highly sophisticated computer managed access control systems.

The level of control is proportional to the level of security. Even a key missing from a low security level outbuilding can still cause considerable inconvenience and result in losses or deny legitimate access and hinder operations. As a general principle a key should be kept either in the possession of the registered key holder, or in a secure key cabinet or office.

Sticking to this basic principle will help to keep track of keys. The temptation to duplicate keys for convenience should be resisted on the grounds that it will directly undermine security.

**Counter Measures**

**Issue of keys**

Keys should be issued to staff only for work-related necessity. They will only be drawn by authorised users and accounted for.
They should be issued either *permanently*, where the holder requires frequent, long-term access or *temporarily*, where the holder requires short-term, infrequent access.

An inventory of permanently issued keys should be prepared and kept up to date. Temporary keys should be logged out on a separate register and ideally returned on the same day or signed for every day. It must be emphasised that the recipient is responsible for that key at all times and the key must not be passed to a third party without permission. Spare keys and master keys must be secured in a separate safe with very limited access for nominated senior key holders.

**Lost Keys**

Any keys lost must be reported straightaway. A damage assessment must be conducted immediately to establish:

- the circumstances surrounding the loss and the likelihood of recovery;
- the threat posed to the establishment should the key(s) be unrecoverable or presumed stolen;
- in most instances locks will need to be changed, and this can be expensive. An interim security procedure may have to be adopted or additional physical security introduced to cover the period of compromise.

**Key Suiting**

A common problem often affecting key control is the large number of keys in circulation, particularly if there is a multiplicity of different locks in a building. One way round this is to introduce a master key suited system. This is usually arranged in hierarchical ‘family tree’ fashion with a grandmaster key, below which are developed a number of master suites, below which may be a number of sub-master suites (depending on the size and complexity of the building), below which are a number of single keys which give access either to specific doors or to a number of common doors. The master suites might relate to specific functional areas of a building, thus there might be one master suite for office and ordinary storage areas, a second for collection storage areas, a third for engineering plant areas.

Keys can be ‘cross-suited’ so that someone with authority to enter areas covered by two or more master suites can still carry one key instead of a bunch. The key suitting plan would normally be worked out by the lock supplier following a specification of requirements by the institution.
The advantages of a master-suited system are that it:

- enables all doors to be linked together in a common system leading to improved key control;
- means that individuals carry fewer keys around with them which normally helps to reduce losses;
- provides easier access for security staff when responding to emergencies.

The main disadvantage of a key suited system is that the security of the system will be seriously compromised if a master or possibly even a sub-master key is lost. All the cylinders operable by that key might then have to be replaced. There is also the expense to be considered of installing new lock barrels in doors when the system is first installed. However, once the system is in place, the cost of replacement barrels can be reduced by using suited ‘inserts’.

The greatest threat to the security of a suited system comes from the loss or theft of the grandmaster key. Although a grandmaster needs to exist in theory so that the lock company can devise the suiting system, an actual grandmaster need not be cut.

Key Tracking

A simple visual method of controlling keys is by use of key tabs or access pegs, which are held in a cabinet on numbered colour coded pegs. Individuals are given a plastic tab or peg to trade for the key. Commercially available systems will not release the key unless the access peg is in position. This gives an instantaneous visual record of keys on issue and may prevent keys leaving the establishment. The system will be further enhanced if the access peg has an access control card, ID card, or vehicle keys attached thus ensuring the individual returns the keys at the end of the working day.

The more sophisticated systems are computer controlled and maintain a record of all transactions only releasing keys to personnel with a pin number or electronic tab. These systems can be utilised for single keys or bunches.

Key Audits

Regular key audits must be conducted to confirm the whereabouts of each key. It is essential to maintain tight control of keys issued and every effort must be made to recover keys from departing personnel for issue to new members of staff.
Replacing locks can be very expensive and inconvenient. Key issuing is part of the staff induction process.

When not required, keys must be secure in a cabinet or office preferably under direct supervision. Cleaners or out of hours workers should not as a general principle hold any keys instead be supervised by security staff or a caretaker. They should also be instructed not to block open access doors or fire doors as these often get left in the open position. Keys on issue are best secured to the person. Retractable chains that are unobtrusive and clip to a belt are now available from high street stores.

**Access Control Systems**

These involve replacing standard locks and keys with an electronically programmable means of regulating entry and exit to doors, barriers, turnstiles or gates. Access is gained by an electronic access control card with a magnetic, watermark magnetic, barcode stripe or chip or key fob using magnetic, infra-red, bar code or proximity technology which operates electronic locks. Systems are being developed to work on biometrics e.g. fingerprints, retinal patterns etc.

**Key Security**

A number of lock manufacturers have registration schemes whereby additional or duplicate keys can only be issued by themselves on the registered user’s authority.

Changes to copyright legislation effective from August 1999 can be interpreted to mean that unless key systems are currently patent-protected they will not be legally protected from copying. In theory, these systems can be legally copied and key blanks cut by any locksmith or person with the necessary equipment. Although, of course, patent law will not stop a criminal from manufacturing a key blank and cutting a duplicate key should they have access to the owner’s key and the equipment necessary to perform the task.

The following points should be considered when specifying a new lock/key system or upgrading an existing system:

- patents apply for only 21 years from the date they are taken out, but many lock/key systems will still be in use long afterwards;
- for high security locks, a patent is not as important to protect them from the copying due to the specialist engineering skills required to make the lock/key;
• lock and key selection should be considered carefully especially if the full benefit of high security keys is to be achieved;
• a key can only be duplicated if the original key or an impression of the key profile is made available which makes the distribution and care of keys so important.

Guidance

Generally, locks/keys that are fitted to external doors and high risk areas such as stores need to be specified as high as possible with patented systems and restricted key distribution. A mix of lock/key types on each door from different manufacturers will go some way to reducing any risk. Close control of keys is essential, especially master keys. Vulnerable doors need to be connected to the intruder detection system.

There are, of course, many ways to secure an area without using patented locking devices, and many unpatented lock/key systems on the market are of high quality and distributed by reputable manufacturers.

3.16 The Law

Introduction

Under the law, the staff and management of a museum, archive or library have no additional powers from a member of the general public but they can still uphold the law and make a citizen’s arrest.

However, it is important that staff likely to be faced with the possibility of making a citizen’s arrest receive training in the procedures and it must be recognised that the individual or his employer may be liable to a charge of false imprisonment if it is later discovered that no offence has been committed.

Use of Force

“Any person may use such force as is reasonable in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of a suspected offender.”

_Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984_

Powers of Arrest

Section 24 of the police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 defines arrestable offences as:

• an offence for which the sentence is fixed by law, e.g. murder;
• an offence for which a person 21 years or over may on first conviction be sentenced to five years’ imprisonment or more.
Certain offences for which the penalty on first conviction is less than five years imprisonment e.g. going equipped to steal, taking a conveyance without authority.

Section 24(4) –
Any person may arrest without a warrant:

- anyone who is in the act of committing an arrestable offence;
- anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing such an offence.

Section 24(5) –
Where an arrestable offence has been committed, any person may arrest without warrant:

- anyone who is guilty of the offence;
- anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it.

It is important to observe from the above two subsections that:

- it will always be a lawful arrest where any person reasonably suspects the ‘defendants’ (D) to be in the act of committing the offence, whether or not D is committing the arrestable offence;

BUT

- where any person reasonably suspects D has committed an arrestable offence. THE ARREST IS UNLAWFUL IF THE ARRESTABLE OFFENCE HAS NOT BEEN COMMITTED.

The common-law power of arrest in relation to breach of the peace – e.g. fighting or creating a serious disturbance still exists and in such circumstances, any person may arrest any person guilty of a breach of the peace anywhere.

Making an Arrest

Force – an arrest is technically an act of force as you are detaining a person or depriving him of his liberty. No more force than is necessary or reasonable under the circumstances should be used to prevent persons committing crimes or in the effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders, suspected offenders or persons unlawfully at large (Criminal Law Act 1967, Section 3).

Police – as soon as practicable after an arrest, the police must be called and the arrested person handed over into their custody. In some cases where suspects are seen it may be
possible to call the police before the arrest is made, by observing the suspects until they arrive, and being ready to make arrests if the suspects attempt to escape.

**Assistance/Witness** – whenever possible obtain assistance before making an arrest, unless this means a thief escaping, or further injury or damage being caused. If a complaint of a crime you have not witnessed yourself is made to you, it is essential that details of the witness are obtained before arrests are made. This can be done by obtaining help from other museum employees and security staff if possible. It is best for the witness to point out the alleged criminal to you directly than to arrest merely on a physical description.

**Direction** – be discreet, make the arrest as quickly and quietly as possible and take the arrested person to some private part of the museum, taking care that they do not dispose of stolen property en route, or escape. They must be told at the time of the arrest that they are being arrested and what for, e.g. “I am arresting you for stealing that purse.”

**Searching** – security staff have no statutory power to stop and search a person, vehicle or goods, or conduct an intimate search of anyone without their consent. Only the police have these powers of search. If a person withdraws their consent during a search then the search must stop.

**Common Law Powers of Search**

A Security Officer does, however, have a common law power of search in respect of a person, but only where he has lawfully arrested that person.

The power of search can be exercised where it is necessary to take from that person any weapon, instrument, poison, matches or other articles which may be used to injure himself or other persons, to damage property or aid his escape.

When a person has been arrested, it is proper for the Security Officer to take possession of articles which are the ‘fruit’ of the offence, any instrument by which it was committed or material evidence to prove the commission of the offence. All other forms of search must be left to the police.

**Search of Employees/Contractors/Visitors**

A clause should be included in their contract that they may be subject to be searched, but employees and contractors can
withdraw that consent at any time. Where visitors have been warned of possible searches, they have the same rights as employees. Trespassers can refuse consent to a search.

**Caution** – it is not necessary to administer a caution after arrest, but any statement made by the arrested person should be carefully noted. If it is necessary to question the suspect after an arrest a caution must be given. However, such questioning is best left to the police.

**Notes** – it may be necessary to give evidence in a Court of Law and it will certainly be necessary to make out a full report of any arrest. It is essential therefore to make careful notes of the incident. Everything that happens should be fully described and any conversation you had with the arrested person should be recorded exactly as it was said. Full details – names and addresses of anyone who saw, what had happened, or who can assist in any way – should be obtained. You should also note the date and time you made the notes as this will be relevant if a court case results.

**Theft**

**Definition**

“A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it.”

*Section 1(1) Theft Act 1968*

The maximum sentence for this offence is seven years imprisonment, it is an arrestable offence.

The most likely ways in which thefts may be committed within heritage institutions are from:

- the collections;
- visitors – pickpockets and bag snatchers;
- display counters and shops;
- stores and equipment.

**Five Elements to Prove Theft**

- Property was in existence.
- It belonged to another.
- It was appropriated.
- The appropriation was dishonest.
- There was an intention to permanently deprive the owner of it.
Be aware that there are some people who mislay an item of property and allege it has been stolen. A thorough search of the area where the property may have been prior to its disappearance is essential in the investigation. Could someone have borrowed or innocently moved it elsewhere?

More serious forms of theft are called by different names – i.e. robbery – where a person steals and in doing so uses force or puts the person robbed in fear of force. Burglary – where a person enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser with intent to commit theft or other offence. It is not necessary for you to know these differences in detail – all are thefts and are arrestable offences – the police and the Crown Prosecution Service will decide the appropriate charge after the arrest is made depending on the evidence available.

A similar offence to theft which you might come across within the institution is ‘going equipped for stealing’. This offence is committed by a person who is not in his usual abode, has with him any article for use in the course of, or in connection with, any burglary or theft. Examples of this would be a person carrying a jemmy with intent to break open a showcase or a glass cutter to cut a hole in a showcase.

**Criminal Damage**

**Definition**

“A person who, without lawful excuse, destroys or damages any property belonging to another, intending to destroy or damage any such property or being reckless as to whether such property would be destroyed or damaged shall be guilty of an offence.” *Criminal Damage Act 1971, Section 1(1)*

All offences under this Act are arrestable, but where the damage is of a minor nature the police may decide to proceed by summons. However, you would make a lawful arrest if you saw someone committing minor damage and detained the person responsible, although later the police decided to proceed by summons or take no further action.

An example of criminal damage is vandalism – scratching initials on a statue with a nail or other sharp implement, spraying items with corrosive substance, spraying slogans with aerosol cans, arson or smashing cases to steal objects – which might occur in museums, archives and libraries.

Criminal damage may also be caused or occasioned as part of a theft or attempted theft, and it is possible to commit two or more offences in one act.
Assault

Definition

“An assault is the intentional application of force or the threat of such force to the person of another without his or her consent.’’ [Common Law]

Common Assault

Where the assault is of a minor nature and there is no bodily harm, when someone pushes another, it is not an arrestable offence. In such cases, your action should be confined to separating the parties and ensuring that there is no repetition, exchanging names and addresses and allowing each party to take such action as they see fit. You may consider that you should exercise your powers under the institutions regulations and have both parties escorted from the building.

Actual Bodily Harm/Grievous Bodily Harm

More serious assaults might result in Actual Bodily Harm (ABH). This is when bruises or cuts are inflicted and blood flows. In still more serious cases where bones are broken and serious physical injuries result such assaults are known as Grievous Bodily Harm (GBH). In each case your action should be the same – prevent further assaults by separating the combatants, secure medical aid for the injured and arrest the guilty parties. Full reports of such incidents are essential, so obtain details from as many witnesses as possible.

Indecent Assault

In public places, indecent assaults are frequently carried out in crowded areas and are an arrestable offence. Should you witness an assault or if a person complains, you have the power of arrest and should detail the perpetrator and call the police. Great care must be taken when investigating such offences – it is essential to obtain the assistance of a person the same sex as the person assaulted, to provide first aid and comfort to the victim whilst establishing the facts of the incident. In cases involving children, the full co-operation of the parent or guardian must be established as early as possible.

3.17 Pass Systems

Pass systems are invaluable for maintaining control of visitors, contractors, vehicles and staff. They can be purpose designed or electronically controlled systems.
Car Passes

A clear parking policy will save much debate and improve access to and from buildings. Passes should clearly differentiate authorisation to areas; a simple colour code is often used.

A vehicle pass should show the vehicle registration number and a serial number which can be checked by security patrolman against a centrally held list. A member of staff without a car pass should apply to park using a standard form. On arrival at the gate a separate windscreen pass should then be placed on the windscreen shelf and the details of the car/vehicle recorded. Permanent staff with a car parking pass must display it on the windscreen.

Visitor Passes

A simple pass system will save time in identifying unfamiliar people who might not have paid admission. Anyone without a pass should be approached politely by any member of staff and asked their business.

Contractor Passes

These can cause more problems than any other. Regular ‘approved’ contractors can have a formal contractor’s ID card, but it should be clearly identifiable from other passes and prior to issue should undergo vetting checks.

Short-term contractors should have a temporary pass and have completed details of their agreed schedule of work and sign a Permit to Work, where Hot Work is involved. It is most likely that they will have to be escorted or supervised. They should display their pass at all times and hand it in when they go.

3.18 Police Response to Automatic Intruder Detection Systems

In November 2000, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) published a new policy on police response to intruder detection systems for England and Wales. This replaces the 1995 policy and is far less tolerant of false calls and introduces new restrictions. There are indications that the majority of police forces are likely to follow the new policy, but many are phasing in implementation over differing periods.

The previous policy was not universally applied in Scotland, but it seems highly likely that ACPOS is likely to follow this time with a similar policy for Scotland.
Aim of the Policy

The aim of the policy is to enable the police to provide an effective response to genuine intruder alarm calls, thereby leading to the arrest of offenders and a reduction of losses by improving the effectiveness of alarm systems and reducing the number of false calls.

Standard and Unique Reference Number (URN)

The policy lays down standards for the police response, the installation and maintenance of systems and for Alarm Receiving Centres (ARCs). The alarms have to be registered with the police and are given a Unique Reference Number (URN).

Response

Under the policy there are three levels of police intervention:

- **Level 1**: Immediate
- **Level 2**: Police response is desirable but attendance may be delayed (e.g. due to resource availability)
- **Level 3**: No police attendance, key holder response only.

Following the issue of an URN the alarms will be subject to a Level 1 response. However, following two false calls in 12 months the police response will move to Level 2.

Following five false calls in 12 months Level 3 will apply and police response will be withdrawn. It may be restored following three months free of false calls and the introduction of alarm confirmation (see paragraph below).

Personal Attack Buttons (Deliberately Operated Devices)

There have been important changes in this area following the likelihood of armed police now responding to such systems and the development of portable systems.

The policy states that a personal attack alarm may be operated to summon urgent police assistance when an assailant enters a previously defined area with the obvious intention of harming or threatening any person. If the device is portable it shall contain technology to enable the exact location to be determined. These devices may not be used to summon assistance in other circumstances. Misuse to summon police attendance to non-attack incidents may result in Level 3 response.
Confirmed Alarms

There have been very important changes in this area. ‘Confirmed’ indicates that there is some form of confirmation of activity in the building made to the ARC. Premises to which the police response has been withdrawn will now be required to have a confirmed system to qualify for a police response. There is now the same requirement for new installations.

At present confirmation can be considered to be either sequential, audio or CCTV. With sequential this means the passing to the ARC a series of alarms triggered by the intruder. Audio is achieved by having microphones in the premises enabling the ARC to listen in. With CCTV, the ARC is able to view the premises.

Delay of Audible and Visual Devices

In general the policy is now for sounders and other devices not to be delayed after an alarm, but in some circumstances police may require a ten-minute delay, especially when they think it unlikely that they will be able to respond quickly enough (e.g. rural areas).

Other Aspects

There are a number of other supplementary aspects set out in the ACPO policy document (e.g. differentiating between intruder and personal attack button for assessing the number of false calls). In the interest of brevity not all these are covered in this paper which seeks to raise awareness of the fundamental issue of police response.

Advice for Museums, Archives and Libraries

An effective police response is essential if collections are to be properly protected. Indeed, the downgrading of loss of police response is likely to have an effect on any loans from nationals and under the Government Indemnity Scheme.

It is highly unlikely that many police forces will accord museums, libraries and archives privileged treatment over false calls and therefore they are advised to note these changes in policy and consult with their local Crime Prevention Officer and alarm company.

Where there is a history of false calls or consideration is being given to making changes to the intruder detection system, the
provision of confirmation could prove to be a future worthwhile investment.

Unfortunately customers do not always receive the quality of service from their alarm companies that they are entitled to expect, which in part is what has led to the police service to take an increasingly strong line. It should not be forgotten that alarm companies are contractually obliged to provide a service and any tolerance on the part of the customer could lead to that customer suffering a down-graded policy response or even its total withdrawal.

**A properly designed and installed modern intruder detection system, that takes account of the environment it has to work in, should not be unreliable.**

**Remember**

The installation and maintenance of alarm systems is a highly competitive business in which the customer has a strong negotiating position.

### 3.19 Radio Procedures

**General Description**

Radios are ideal for instant communication and there might be several licensed radios in any organisation. There are two options available, the single frequency (back to back), or the dual frequency (talk through) system.

The talk through system increases the range of communication and ensures that all radios receive all messages. When you speak into the radio everyone on this system will hear your message, whereas the single frequency operates a net.

**Remember to:**

- speak clearly at a steady, slower-than-normal pace. Use plain language that can be easily understood;
- do not gossip, discuss sensitive matters or use bad language as many other users and visitors overhear radio conversations;
- always assume someone else is listening!

**Procedure**

Remember that when using a radio, you press the ‘Press to Talk’ button (PTT), no one else can use the system as your
transmission dominates the frequency. Only one person can talk at a time. The following procedures must be adhered to:

- listen before you speak so you don’t interrupt a conversation;
- press the PTT, and pause a second to allow the Talk-Through to respond otherwise your message will be clipped short. Construct your message to be clear and concise
  – ‘Hello Wendy this is (George) OVER:
  – ‘Reply: ‘Wendy send OVER’
- when you have sent your message say OVER which means literally, I have finished and expect a reply. Release the PTT and listen.
- at the end of the message say OUT. This means the end of the transmission and I do not expect a reply. Anyone listening can now send their message, realising you have finished;
- note: There is no need to say ‘OVER AND OUT’ as this is contradictory;
- ROGER means you have received and understood the message. It is considered good practice to say ROGER OUT in order to clear the frequency and end your call;
- if you experience interference or poor reception use SAY AGAIN to receive the message or portion of message again;
- STANDBY means I will answer you as soon as I can or will call you back very soon;
- to test your radio you can use RADIO CHECK e.g.
  – ‘Hello control this is Wendy RADIO CHECK, OVER’
  – Reply: ‘Control OK, OVER, Reply: ‘Wendy OK OUT’

Incidents, Emergencies and Use of Radios

When calling for any assistance over the radio, the following factors and consequences must be borne in mind:

- there are many radios in circulation. Everyone on duty, with a radio or near a radio or anyone on the same frequency will be listening;
- members of the public, contractors and any official visitors within earshot will be listening to the broadcast also;
- assume, therefore, that all radio transmissions are directly or indirectly monitored.

Emergency

To assist with co-ordination and communication, and to ensure the appropriate response, the following procedure can be adopted.

Where there is an obvious serious situation such as: fire; loss of life; violence; serious crime; serious injury; or the imminent
threat of any of the preceding requiring the Emergency Services, the person discovering the emergency should contact the Duty Manager and state directly and clearly:

- Who is calling
- What is the emergency
- Where is the emergency

_Example_

- ‘Hello Duty Manager (or by name if known) this is Wendy, there is a FIRE, I say again FIRE in the Car Park Gift Shop, over’

Everyone else must listen but _keep off the air_, unless called, to avoid jamming the frequency.

The Duty Manager will co-ordinate, supported by security personnel who will assist as directed. If the Duty Manager is out of contact for any reason and does not answer after two calls, then the duty security person will respond and assist directly, informing the Duty Manager when practicable.

**First Aid**

When requesting First Aid it is of great help to anyone responding to be given details of the incident.

_Example:_

- ‘Hello Duty Manager this is Wendy, First Aid required at the playground, child with suspected broken arm, over’

**Non-Emergencies**

An incident such as suspected shoplifting, irate member of the public, lost child or any non-emergency or sensitive matter requiring a response should be requested by use of the code word. The use of the code word means: ‘This is not an emergency but I do require assistance’.

_Example:_

- ‘Hello Duty Manager (or security – as appropriate) this is Wendy, Bugle Boy at courtyard suite over’
- Reply: ‘Wendy this is Les, John, will be with you in 1 minute, out’

The key points with this procedure are:
• only the appropriate response is required, other support can be requested by person responding once situation has been assessed;
• the public’s interest will not be aroused unnecessarily through insecure radio messages or over reaction at the scene;
• the Duty Manager or control room must be kept informed.

Summary

The purpose of these and other procedures is to standardise and simplify the response to situations in order to reduce confusion and minimise the response time.

3.20 Reading Rooms – British Library Conditions of Use

The British Library is obliged to:

– safeguard its collections;
– ensure that its staff are able to work in an orderly and safe environment;
– maintain an environment in which Readers can effectively study its Collection;
– comply with its legal duties.

In consequence of these obligations, all Readers must comply with the following Conditions of Use. Failure to comply with any of these conditions may result in the temporary withdrawal or permanent revocation of your pass.

1. Treatment of staff

1.1 Readers must treat Library staff with courtesy and respect.
1.2 Readers must not threaten (either physically or verbally), harass, shout at or abuse staff.

2. Protecting the collection

2.1 Readers are required to take the utmost care of all material in the Library’s Collection.\(^1\)
2.2 The Library’s guidelines for the use of special collections must be observed at all times.
2.3 Readers may not bring into the Reading Rooms any item that could harm the Collection. This includes (but is not limited to) food, drink, sweets (including cough sweets), chewing gum, glue, bottles of ink, correction fluid, cleaning liquids, scissors, knives (including craft knives or razor blades), highlighter pens, scanner pens, adhesive tape, matches, umbrellas.
2.4 Readers must not:
1 Mutilation or theft of Library material is a criminal offence and will result in prosecution.

2.4.1 Eat or drink in the Reading Rooms.
2.4.2 Write on or mark any item from the Collection.
2.4.3 Use personal scanners and copying devices on any item from the Collection.
2.4.4 Handle digital collection items and sound recordings without prior permission.
2.4.5 Make ‘double page’ copies of any item from the Collection.
2.4.6 Smoke anywhere in the building
2.5 Unless given prior written permission by the Library, Readers must not:
2.5.1 Trace any item from the Collection;
2.5.2 Make rubbings of the bindings of any item from the Collection.
2.6 Readers who are permitted to consult Collection items in study carrels will be advised of, and must adhere to, specific regulations that apply to the use of these materials.

3. Security matters

3.1 Passes
3.1.1 Access to the Library will only be permitted for individuals with valid passes.
3.1.2 Passes are issued for the exclusive use of the Reader named on the pass.
3.1.3 Under no circumstances may a pass be loaned to another individual.
3.1.4 Passes must be produced or surrendered at the request of any member of Library staff.
3.1.5 The Reader’s Admission Office must be notified of any change in the Reader’s name or address.
3.1.6 Readers must take good care of their passes.
3.1.7 The Library reserves the right to withdraw any Reader’s right of admission to the Library if he or she repeatedly loses or mislays his or her pass.
3.1.8 The loss of a pass must be reported immediately to the Readers Admission Office. In the event of a pass being lost, the Library will, in appropriate circumstances, require the full co-operation of the Reader in reporting the loss to the police (this will include the Reader consenting to the disclosure of his or her personal details for the purposes of such reporting).
3.1.9 The theft of a pass must be reported immediately by the Reader both to the Readers Admission Office and the police.

3.2 Library materials
3.2.1 Readers must comply with the arrangements for issue of materials in each Reading Room. Particulars of these arrangements can be found on a printed leaflet available in each Room.
3.2.2 Before leaving the Library, readers must return all Collection items issued to them to a member of staff at the issue desk.
3.2.3 Readers are responsible for the safekeeping of materials:
   – where they are from closed collections, from the time of issue until the time of their return to a member of staff at the Issue Desk.
   – where they are from open access collections, at all times when they are in the Reader’s use and possession.
3.2.4 No Reader may pass materials issued in his or her name to another person (regardless of whether the other person is also a Reader).
3.2.5 No person may use items issued to another Reader.
3.2.6 Readers must relinquish Collection items when requested to do so by any member of Library staff.
3.2.7 Library materials must not be removed from the Reading Room from which they were issued.
3.2.8 Materials from the Library’s digital collection must not be loaded onto Readers’ personal computers.

3.3 Personal possessions
3.3.1 No bag larger than 297mm x 210mm x 100mm may be taken into the Reading Rooms.
3.3.2 The Library reserves the right to inspect bags and their contents upon entry. Readers must comply with all requests for inspection.
3.3.3 If bags or their contents pose a threat to security or to the safety of the collection or other users, the Library reserves the right to refuse to admit the reader until the item(s) which pose a threat are disposed of.
3.3.4 The Library will open and inspect Reader’s personal possessions (including bags, sealed envelopes, folders etc) as Readers leave the Reading Rooms. Readers must comply with all requests for inspection.
3.3.5 No outdoor coats may be taken into the reading rooms. This includes, but is not limited to overcoats, waterproof clothing of any length, outdoor jackets e.g. bomber, quilted, sheepskin, puffer, fleece and outdoor leather jackets, and padded bodywarmers with or without sleeves.

3.4 Computers, typewriters and recording machines (‘technical equipment’)
3.4.1 Readers’ technical equipment may only be used in the designated areas.
3.4.2 If the use of technical equipment disturbs other readers, the user may be required to stop using that equipment or to move to another desk.
3.4.3 Technical equipment belonging to Readers must not be connected to the British Library’s network.
3.4.4 Readers must not use their own disks, re-writeable CD-ROMS or software with the Library’s computers or electronic collections.
3.4.5 The Library’s electronic collections may be viewed only on the Library’s designated computers. Under no circumstances may
the Library’s electronic collections be viewed on or downloaded onto Reader’s personal computers. The Library’s computers must not be used for viewing or listening to Reader’s own material.

4. Safety matters

4.1 Readers must comply with all emergency procedures, including the evacuation of the building in the event of a fire, or for fire drills.

4.2 The Library reserves the right to undertake safety checks of Readers’ technical equipment at any time.

5. Behaviour of readers

5.1 Each Reader must be considerate towards other Readers and must behave in a way that does not disturb them. Readers should try to make as little noise as possible. In particular, talking must be kept to a minimum. Where talking is necessary, it must be done quietly.

5.2 Mobile telephones and audible pagers must be switched off, or put on silent mode, before entering the Reading Rooms and must remain off while in the Reading Rooms.

5.3 Mobile telephones must not be used for making or receiving calls whilst in the Reading Rooms.

6. Copyright matters

6.1 All copies of Library materials must be made through the Library’s Copy Service, using Library copying facilities.

6.2 Each time a Reader wishes to copy Library materials, he or she must consult the Copy Service staff.

6.3 Some items cannot be copied. The decision of the Copy Service staff as to whether an item can be copied is final.

6.4 Readers are not permitted to copy or transcribe any part or whole of any sound recording or copyright musical score without permission from the Library and the holder of the relevant copyrights.

6.5 Readers must not download any of the contents of the Library’s electronic collections onto personal computers.

6.6 Readers may not use cameras, personal copying machines, personal scanners or any other personal equipment for making copies.

7. Complaints and disclaimers

7.1 Any Complaint must be brought in accordance with the Library Complaints Procedure, which is detailed in the Code of Service for Readers and advertised in each reading room.
7.2 The Library accepts no liability for the loss of, or damage to, Readers’ personal property or equipment, howsoever caused.

Specific regulations covering the use of the Library’s special collections are available in each Reading Room and must be adhered to in the use of those collections.

The British Library
[Date]

3.21 Reporting of Incidents by Security Staff

All institutions should record incidents that constitute an actual or potential breach of security and should keep statistics of such incidents, possibly under different headings such as Theft, Criminal Damage, Loss of Keys etc. This information enables action to be taken to prevent reoccurrence. It also records the value of having security staff and security procedures and assists with investigations which are to be carried out either by security management or by the police. Over a period of time, incident statistics can contribute to security risk assessments and decisions on security resourcing.

All security staff should receive periodic training in writing incident reports. This should emphasise the need for security staff to include only relevant facts in their reports. Grammar and punctuation are not as important as legibility, comprehensibility and inclusion of relevant facts.

Training

- Use notebooks to record facts either during or immediately after the incident. Don’t rely on memory to write a report.
- The report should be addressed to a specific person (e.g. the Head of Security, the Director, the Librarian) and should be given a heading which includes the date of the incident.
- Plan the report before starting to write it.
- Only include facts – never opinions or assumptions.
- Use clear simple English.
- Include the names of everyone involved.
- Do not use jargon or abbreviations.
- Never write in pencil – black biro is preferred.
- Sign and date the report at the end and print your name.

Underpinning a security incident reporting system is a definition of what actually constitutes a security incident. A specimen definition is as follows:
“A security incident is any event which constitutes a significant breach of the museum’s security and which does, or potentially could: (i) place the lives of those using the museum’s premises in danger; (ii) lead to the theft of, damage to or loss of any material belonging to the museum’s collections; (iii) lead to the theft of, damage to or loss of the museum’s assets and property; (iv) cause deliberate harm to computerised systems providing the museum’s services; (v) constitute criminal behaviour even where there is no direct threat to persons or collections or assets.”

Common sense must be used in determining what constitutes a “significant breach of security”. Technically, a contractor may breach security by parking his van in the wrong place but this will probably not be a significant enough breach. Security staff may report incidents that do not strictly accord with a definition such as the one above but this should not be discouraged. It is better to have too many incident reports than too few.

3.22 Retail Security

Introduction

The heritage sector’s retail business encompass as a variety of enterprises from the very large to the very small, with merchandise varying from large oil paintings to coins and jewellery to pencils. It follows that the security response should vary depending on value, but in every case it is likely that loss prevention will be the main objective. However, preventing loss means identifying how and why losses arise.

In the past merchandise was generally behind the counter and therefore most losses arose from staff theft or fraud, either directly or in collusion with customers. In contrast, modern retailing methods put stock on shelving right in front of the customer. As in supermarkets there are or can be larger numbers of customers and smaller numbers of staff, the risk of theft is therefore increased. Retail loss is usually referred to as ‘shrinkage or leakage’.

Normally, responsibility for stock control, cash handling and till procedures lies with the Retail Manager. However, physical security of cash and stock responsibility lies with the Security Manager. It is therefore important that the division of responsibility is clearly understood and that written procedures for stock control, cash handling and physical security are understood and available to all staff.
Vulnerability

Make an assessment of shrinkage considering:

- **Volume** – how many items
- **Value** – how much they cost
- **Portability** – how easy are they to pick up

Strategies for Customer Theft

From the assessment of vulnerability devise a system best suited to your outlets.

Consider

- Electronic Article Surveillance (EAS)
- Check sales data
- Securing high value articles
- Glass cases
- Clear notices
- CCTV
- Monitors

Theft by Staff

Staff dishonesty is related to management control, i.e. how many opportunities arise for theft. Where staff handle goods of high value, they may be tempted or coerced into theft. The main problem areas are the handling of cash, particularly at the till, and handling of deliveries, particularly items delivered to and ordered by the store. Likewise straightforward theft should not be ignored.

Areas for consideration are:

- Cashier theft
- Direct theft
- Distribution losses
- Receiving
- Storing/Picking
- Delivery
- Receipts
- Direct deliveries
- Collusion
- Cashiers
- Merchandisers
- Cash handling
- Cash collection
- Use of surrogate shoppers

Fraud

Opportunities for fraud, both internal and external, are legion in the retail business as large volumes of merchandise mean lots of paperwork and people dealing with this paperwork.
Examples of internal fraud:

Double payments  Conversion of incoming credits
Conversion of a false accounting credit  Fictitious inventories
Ghost workers  Fictitious suppliers
Inflated contracts  Purchasing kickbacks
Parallel retailing  Incorrect data entry
Counterfeit notes  Theft of company time or resources

Examples of external fraud:

Credit card fraud  Incorrect invoicing, either
Bounced cheques  over-invoicing or
Incorrect delivery  double invoicing

Credit Card Fraud

This can take a number of forms including forged and stolen cards, over-purchasing, split sales and forged dockets. The normal security provisions on current cards are easily defeated but sales staff should stick closely to operating procedures.

Key points to remember are:

Is the card current?
Is the purchase within the approved credit limit?
Does the signature match the specimen signature?
Are the card’s security features present?
Does the cash-holder match the details on the card?

Threats against Staff

Attacks at work are rising faster than any other form of violence, although all staff should be entitled to carry out their duties without fear of assault.

Considerations

Verbal GBH – this is as bad as the real thing.

Anti-Authority Attitudes – anyone wearing a uniform has become a target for attack.

Fighting Back – provide warm, comfortable and clean customer areas.

Aftercare – ensure that any staff who suffer from attack are helped to recover and that the incident is properly reported.
Pattern of Violence

Two main factors which put employees at potential risk of assault are interaction with the public and handling money.

Assaults can come from people asking for refunds, shoplifters and general troublemakers.

Pattern of Assault

Whilst assaults of retail staff are not a major problem they do occur. Over the last few years there has been a decrease in physical violence to staff across the whole retail sector, but unfortunately this has been matched by a significant rise in threats of violence and verbal abuse.

Preventing Violence

There are four main areas:

- safer working practices;
- improved design of premises;
- training;
- counselling for victims.

Safer Working Practices

- Less risk of assault if standards of service are high, but these can be difficult to maintain.
- Dangerous times are mainly towards the end of the day when more caution is needed.
- Personal alarms can improve staff confidence and help to prevent an attack.
- The most dangerous times are when cash is being picked up or delivered. Careful planning is essential.
- Uniforms are a basic deterrent and give staff a feeling of confidence.

Design Factors Reduce Risks

- Clear lines of sight give staff the ability to see, detect and deter thieves.
- Interview rooms should have two doors and be fitted with panic buttons.
- Avoid aggressive colours – colour schemes should be pastel shades, and red should be avoided.
Training on Conflict Management

- The roots of aggression should be discussed during training sessions.
- It is important not to respond aggressively, but rather to learn to hold back until assistance arrives.
- Training replaces force – staff need to be alert to danger signs and to be able to help diffuse situations.
- It helps to have rehearsed the various scenarios which may occur.
- Awareness and personal defence training help to give women self-confidence.

Communication

- Staff need to be made aware of Management policy, procedures and types of support available.
- Aftercare procedures must be in place to help staff after an attack.
- Counselling should be available should it be necessary.
- It is important to keep records, and it is usually better if a special form is used.

Counter Action

- Anything that makes a robber’s task more difficult is a major investment in the business’s safety and improves profitability.
- Be alert and look out for unusual or suspicious activity.
- It is important for staff to be placed where they can see their surroundings clearly.
- The use of safety equipment is important – transfer excess cash – site cash tills away from entrances and exits.
- The safest method of banking cash is to use a recognised cash carrying company.
- Regular staff training in security procedures and reminders are important to maintaining awareness.

Armed Raids

These are invariably sudden, unexpected and traumatic for all those involved. The situation is extremely tense, with a highly charged criminal who may react violently to even innocent actions.

With training, the situation can be handled safely and the risks reduced. Staff can manage both situation and aftermath.
In the Event of a Robbery

Police recommend that staff:

• should not take risks;
• should avoid sudden movements or noises;
• should do exactly as they are told;
• should give raiders what they want;
• if not directly involved, should stay away;
• those who are out of sight, should stay out of sight;
• use the silent alarm, if available, and if safe to do so;
• remember as many details as follows to improve the police’s chance of catching the robbers – these include:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>age</th>
<th>height</th>
<th>build</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hair</td>
<td>clothing</td>
<td>accents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tattoos</td>
<td>scars</td>
<td>warts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blemishes</td>
<td>weapons</td>
<td>vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direction in which robbers fled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Police also recommend that:

• witnesses should be asked to wait for arrival of the police;
• the premises are closed;
• nothing is touched or moved by staff;
• a special note is made of any items touched or moved by the robbers.

Physical Security Measures

• Put high-value goods in a clearly visible part of the store away from the exit
• Use Perspex covers rather than cash-till drawers
• Use secure cash boxes to store high denomination notes away from till drawers
• Site till cash drawer away from customers’ reach
• Use security tags to discourage shoplifters
• Fit unobtrusive panic buttons
• Fit closed-circuit video cameras as deterrent and evidence

Safety during a Robbery

The key points to remember are:

• remain calm, which helps to calm the offender;
• use body language to enhance safety;
• carry out instructions from the offender slowly;
• communicate with him calmly;
• gather as much information as possible.
Action after a Robbery

The following procedures will help to ensure the safety and well-being of those present after a robber:

• assess the situation;
• calm and retain all present;
• care for the distressed;
• inform the control room and police;
• protect any evidence;
• complete your Incident Report Form. See specimen report attached.

Reducing the Risk

Pre-planning can reduce the risk of an armed hold-up.

Remember:

• Good observation
• Good access control
• Security guard presence
• Good cash handling procedures
• Emergency exercises showing speedy response

Personal Action Plans

Produce your own action plan to follow in the event of an armed robbery.

• Discuss actions
• Check security measures
• Practice gathering information
• Practice communicating
ANNEX A

INCIDENT REPORT FORM

Date ………………………… Day of week ………………………… Time …………………………

EMPLOYEE:

Name ………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Address ……………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Department …………………………………………………… Job/Grade ……………………………

What activity were you engaged in at the time of the incident?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

DETAILS OF ASSAILANT(S):

Name ………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Address ……………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Male/Female ………………………… ………………………… Age ………………………

Other details?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

DETAILS OF WITNESS(ES):

Name ………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Address ……………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Male/Female ………………………… ………………………… Age ………………………

Other details?

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
WHAT HAPPENED (Give an account of the incident, including any relevant events leading to the incident)

OUTCOME: Injury? Verbal abuse? Anti-social behaviour? Damage to personal/other property?

Time lost? Legal Action?

DETAILS OF LOCATION OF INCIDENT (If possible provide a sketch on another piece of paper)

ANY OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION? (If necessary, continue on another sheet of paper)

ANNEX B

ACTION PLAN FOR VIOLENCE TO STAFF

Staff and Employers to Work Together

Step 1
Find out if there is a problem

Step 2
Record all incidents

Step 3
Classify all incidents

Step 4
Search for preventative measures

Step 5
Decide what to do

Step 6
Put measures into practice

Step 7
Check that measures work
3.23 Security of External Scaffolding

Introduction

The erection of scaffolding can seriously compromise the security of heritage institutions. The following guidelines can assist the reduction of the risk of burglary from scaffolding, but the situation can be complicated by access afforded from adjoining buildings or by the way that the ground falls or rises around the building. It can therefore be equally important to take additional protective measures to secure apertures to the building which become more vulnerable as a consequence of the presence of the scaffolding. This can include temporary access for the contractors.

Specification

- The scaffolding needs to be fully enclosed by a plywood hoarding to a height of four metres and surmounted by barbed wire fixed to purpose made steel cranked extension arms. The facing must comprise 20mm exterior grade sheeting plywood fixed to 75mm x 100mm timbers. The timbers must be either clipped to the scaffolding by appropriate scaffold clips, or secured to a substantial stand alone timber frame complete with adequate internal bracing to prevent collapse if attacked.
- All joints of the plywood facing to be tightly butted to prevent tools being used to prise them apart and each joint to overlap a post on the timber frame by 75mm.

Fixing

- 100mm annular ring shank nails at 150mm centres to be used to fix the plywood boards to the timber frame.
- The bottom of the hoarding to follow the contour of the ground leaving no gaps between the hoarding and the ground.
- Where the hoarding abuts a building the plywood must be cut to match closely the contours of the building to prevent any gaps being formed.

Doors

- Any doors let into the hoarding to be of exterior grade solid wood type fitted in a purpose built frame. The door and frame must be flush with the exterior face of the hoarding. Heavy duty 75mm x 100mm steel butt hinges are required to hang the door, the hinge pin being burred over to prevent it being driven out.
- To provide convenient access and emergency escape during working hours a ‘Yale’ latch type lock must be fitted. However,
to secure the door when the site is no longer attended a heavy
duty locking bar is to be fitted, secured to door and frame by
bolts bolted through. The locking bar must conceal the bolt
heads. A heavy duty close shackled padlock to be used to
secure the locking bar. Depending on whether another means of
exit is available site security can be further enhanced by having
the locking bar on the inside of the door.

• The cranked steel extension arms forming a ‘V’ shaped top are
to be fitted to the top of the boarding, each side carrying three
lines of barbed wire with a barbed wire concertina
approximately one metre in diameter secured at the ‘V’ top.

**Lighting**

• The exterior of the hoarding to have floodlights (500w) angled
out and towards the ground at a height of three metres from the
ground and not more than four metres apart. These lights to be
switched by ‘PIR’ detectors during darkness and positioned as
far as possible out of reach.

• The inside of the scaffold must be adequately floodlit with
floodlights angled inwards and up through the scaffold
illuminating its entire height. These lights to be switched by
photo-electric cell for illumination at night only.

**Exterior Finish**

• The hoarding to be painted in exterior grade white matt
emulsion paint to a height of 2.5 metres with anti-climb paint
applied to the remaining section together with the statutory
‘anti-climb’ paint warning notices. The colour of the paint can
be varied at the discretion of the museum or gallery.

**Intruder Detection**

• It is possible to provide intruder detection equipment that can
sound an audible device, activate the floodlights or alert any
guards, but it cannot be connected to the institution’s intruder
detection system for a police response because of the likelihood
of false calls.

• It may also be necessary to increase detection at any aperture to
the building made more vulnerable by the scaffolding.

**Contractors’ Responsibilities**

• The requirements of this standard in no way absolves the
contractor from Health and Safety or other statutory
requirements.
3.24 Suspect Packages Received by Post

All staff who handle incoming post should be given clear guidelines on how to recognise packages or parcels that might contain explosive devices.

Warning Signs

- Visible wiring or tin foil.
- Grease marks on the envelope or wrapping.
- Unusual odours, particularly of almonds or marzipan.
- The envelope or package may feel heavy for its size.
- The weight distribution may be uneven: the contents may be rigid in a flexible envelope.
- It may have been delivered by hand from an unknown source or posted from an unusual place.
- If a package, it may have excessive wrapping.
- There may be poor handwriting, spelling or typing.
- It may be wrongly addressed; or come from an unexpected source.
- There are be too many stamps for the weight of the package.

These guidelines need to be considered in context, as some institutions which receive large volumes of post from all parts of the world may regularly receive post which bears one or more of the above features and which is quite innocuous. Any item of post that has visible wiring or tin foil, heavy grease stains or unusual odours should be treated as suspicious. The key factor with regard to post which bears any of the other signs listed above is whether that item is unusual, unexpected or out of context in that particular institution. The other factor which should be taken into account is the risk or likelihood of that institution being a target for postal bombers.

Staff should also be given guidelines on action to take if they think they have received a suspect package (see also Bomb Warnings, Cordons and Evacuation).

Guidelines

- Mentally note brief details of the package – physical description, approximate size and weight.
- Put the package down gently and walk away from it.
- Do not place the package into anything (including water) or place anything on top of it.
- Open windows if you can do so quickly and easily (to reduce any blast impact).
- Evacuate the immediate area and ring the security or emergency number for your institution.
- Deploy staff to prevent others entering the area.
Bomb-scanning equipment can be purchased for use by mail room staff. Portable scanning equipment is also available which can be taken to suspect packages which have been distributed beyond the post room. Such equipment can help to minimise disruption; however, it should be noted that its use is governed by stringent safety requirements under radiation protection legislation. This involves:

- notification to the enforcing authority (the Local Authority or the H&SE);
- carrying out a risk assessment;
- appointment of an external radiation protection advisor;
- appointment of in-house radiation protection supervisors.

Staff should also be warned of other threats which could conceivably be received in postal packages including hazardous liquids, gases, chemicals or bacteria as well as razor blades and hypodermic needles. However, this advice should be given sensitively and in relation to perceived risk in order not to cause undue alarm.

3.25 VIP Visits

**Before the Visit**

- Liaise with appropriate protection officers, Special Branch or VIP unit and local police. If it is a VIP visit (Royal, Ministerial, Head of State, etc) the Special Branch will contact the Security Manager.
- Liaise with the Press Office to control press ‘photo calls’. Invited Press should have invitations and be issued with a pass. They should be directed to pre-designated areas. They should be assigned a responsible manager to look after and supervise them before, during and after the event.
- In conjunction with above; reconnoitre all routes to be taken and evaluate time scale. Conduct this at same time of day as event will occur if feasible.
- Plan alternative and contingency routes.
- Draw up a list of all contingencies, evaluate risk to VIP:
  - Communications failure
  - Requirement for doctor or hospital
  - Natural breaks
  - Incident or protest
  - Terrorist threat
  - Unexpected crowds or fans
- Agree timings and schedule, liaise with relevant personal assistant.
- Consider premises search, possibly with dogs, and secure post search.
• Cordon off areas as required for parking, walkabouts, reception.
• Brief staff only on requisite information, just prior to visit – then deploy.

During Visit

• Monitor time schedule and keep key staff informed.
• Escort VIP as required.
• Staff key areas, entrance, lifts, rest rooms, car parks, overnight accommodation.

Post Visit

• Conduct a brief.
• Adjust procedures.
• Record all contingency plans – for next time.
4.1 Introduction

The Government Indemnity Scheme (GIS) was set up under the provisions of the National Heritage Act 1980 to widen access to objects of a scientific, technological, artistic or historic nature for the UK public benefit.

The Department for Culture, Media and Sport has issued Guidelines for the National Institutions on the Government Indemnity Scheme. Copies of these guidelines can be obtained from:

Department for Culture, Media and Sport
Cultural Property Unit,
Museums, Galleries, Libraries, Archives & Cultural Property Division
1st Floor, 2–4 Cockspur Street
London SW1Y 5DH

Separate guidelines for the Government Indemnity Scheme have been issued for local museums, galleries and other non-government bodies and these are reproduced below.

GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY SCHEME
NATIONAL HERITAGE ACT 1980

4.2 Indemnity Arrangements for Local Museums, Galleries and Other Non-Government Bodies

Introduction

This note produced by the Department for Culture, Media and Sport gives guidance on the indemnity arrangements for loans to museums, galleries or libraries maintained by local authorities, universities or library authorities, the National Trust, and private bodies or individuals approved by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, and the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales (subsequently referred to as the Secretary of State) under the National Heritage Act 1980. As from April 1985 the procedures have been administered by the Museums and Galleries Commission (now Resource: Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries). The addresses of the organisations concerned are given on page 127.

The Secretaries of State have power under the National Heritage Act 1980 to indemnify any individual owner or institution which falls within the terms of the Act for the loss of or damage to any object loaned to another such institution, subject to:
(i) the loan facilitating public access to the loaned object or contributing materially to public understanding or appreciation of it;
(ii) appropriate arrangements being made for the safety of the object while it is on loan (see Annexes B, C and D); and
(iii) the loan being made in accordance with conditions recommended by the Commission and approved by the appropriate Secretary of State.

The Power to Grant Indemnities

This note describes indemnity arrangements as they apply to lenders in England, Scotland and Wales. Indemnities in Northern Ireland are at present administered by the Northern Ireland Office and are not covered in this publication.

The location of the lender will determine the appropriate Secretary of State for the granting of an indemnity. Loans from lenders resident overseas however will normally be considered for indemnity according to the location of the borrowing institution.

The power to grant an indemnity is discretionary, subject to certain statutory requirements. Details of these requirements and the criteria used in their determination are given below. It should be emphasised that even when the Secretary of State is satisfied that the statutory requirements are met, he may still refuse to grant an indemnity if, for example, this would exceed the limit on the total liability under the scheme.

Statutory Requirements which must be Satisfied

Public Benefit

The National Heritage Act 1980 requires that the Secretary of State shall assure himself that the loan will facilitate public access to the loaned object or contribute materially to public understanding or appreciation of it. Resource, which gives advice on this aspect, may seek views from the Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts or whatever other source they think appropriate.

Public Access to the Exhibit

In assessing whether a loan will facilitate public access, Resource will take account of the location and accessibility to the public of the place where the object is to be exhibited, including hours of opening and admission charges where
appropriate. Objects which cannot be displayed (e.g. books or items requiring a special environment) should be advertised as available for viewing by special arrangement.

Public Understanding of the Exhibit

In assessing whether a loan will contribute materially to public understanding or appreciation of the object, Resource will consider whether the object is of such quality and importance that its exhibition is likely to arouse sufficient public interest to justify the indemnity.

Security Arrangements

The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the security arrangements operated by the borrower for the period of the loan (including transit to and from the place of exhibition) are sufficient to secure the reasonable safety of the item on loan (see Annexes B, C and D).

Procedure for Application

Application for indemnity cover may be made by the borrower or the lender, and should in all cases be sent to Resource. The information required includes a list of the objects for which cover is sought; the names and addresses of the owner and borrower; the duration of the loan; the security arrangements to be made, including arrangements for transit; and a current valuation at £50,000 and above, for works on paper valued at £20,000 and above, and for all other objects valued at £10,000 and above. Applications should normally be made at least three months before indemnity cover is required to enable Resource to take all the necessary steps.

Factors to Consider before an Indemnity can be Granted

Valuation

The valuation of individual objects offered for loan should be agreed before the loan is accepted. The level of cover will be determined by the Secretary of State in the light of Resource’s advice. Application for revision of any valuation must be accompanied by supporting evidence; otherwise the Secretary of State may take Resource’s advice on the level of cover required.

Arrangements may be varied by agreement for collection of books, manuscripts or bulk archive material where the computation of individual valuations is particularly onerous.
In order to avoid unnecessary administrative costs over a variety of small claims, objects valued individually at £200 or less will not be indemnified.

**Financial Limits**

The extent of the Government’s total liability requires the scheme to operate within a financial ceiling. If this is in danger of being exceeded, applications may have to be refused or restrictions imposed on the liability incurred by individual institutions.

**Period of Indemnity**

Loans are generally covered for a specific period of up to two years in the first instance, subject to review in the light of the total contingent liability within the financial ceiling and the Resource Security Adviser’s satisfaction with the continued security of the loan.

**Loans from the Royal Collection**

For reasons of constitutional principle it is not possible for the Government to provide formal indemnity under the National Heritage Act 1980 for loans from the Royal Collections. It has therefore given an undertaking to Her Majesty that in the event of loss of or damage to items on loan from the Royal Collection it would be prepared to seek Parliamentary authority for compensation comparable to that available to private lenders. The borrowing institution need not therefore take out commercial insurance to cover loans from the Royal Collections.

**Loans from Bodies Funded by Government Departments**

The Government bears its own risks when lending its property and government departments are not expected to indemnify loans between themselves or indemnify loans from bodies funded by other government departments (e.g. The Tower Armouries or the National Army Museum). It will be for the government departments concerned to decide whether to bear the risk when lending property for which they are responsible; in some cases borrowers may be required to insure such loans commercially.

**Loans to Bodies not Covered by the National Heritage Act 1980**

Objects loaned for exhibition in a commercial context (e.g. to a private gallery or an auction house) will not normally be accepted for indemnity cover under the National Heritage Act 1980.
Conditions of Indemnity Cover

In granting an indemnity to the owner, the government is relieving the borrower of the need to take out commercial insurance. It therefore requires the borrower to observe certain conditions. The lender should be given the opportunity, if he wishes, to see and approve them.

(i) As a means of encouraging continuing responsibility by borrowers in order to eliminate small claims the scheme has a minimum liability clause. The borrower is required to undertake to meet the cost of the loss of, or repairable damage to, any object on loan to him covered by Indemnity under the scheme, to a limit:

(a) £200 for objects of value up to £4,000
(b) £200 plus 1 per cent of the total value of the object or objects of value over £4,000.

It is open to the borrower to insure against the possibility of having to meet this minimum liability.

(ii) The borrower is required to adopt any special security measures stipulated by the Secretary of State (on the advice of the Resource Security Adviser) and to display the objects only in the place which has been afforded security clearance.

(iii) The objects must be made accessible to the public at the agreed times.

The Owner’s Rights to Impose Conditions on a Loan

The terms of the indemnity scheme do not affect the owner’s and/or lender’s rights to impose other reasonable conditions on the loan of the object. Nor do they affect the owner’s rights to claim compensation from the borrower where conditions imposed by the owner have been breached.

Payment of Compensation

An undertaking given by the Secretary of State provides a guarantee that Parliamentary authority will be sought for the provision of the necessary funds to recompense the owner for the loss of, or damage to, the object.

Compensation will be paid to the owner or his agent under the following terms:

(i) If the claim does not exceed the borrower’s liability, the borrower shall make the appropriate payment direct to the owner.
For larger claims the borrower shall again pay his liability directly to the owner. Where the object has been lost or irreparably damaged, payments (including the borrower's liability) will be made on the agreed valuation. In the case of damage to the object the payment will represent the costs of such reasonable repairs as may be agreed between the owner and the institution and shall not exceed the agreed valuation; in default of agreement upon the valuation, it may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by agreement between the owner and the institution. Such payment may take into account any reduction in the market value of the object after any such repairs.

Compensation will be paid subject to the provisions below:

(i) In the event of loss of, or damage to the object concerned, the borrower shall submit to Resource sufficient evidence of the circumstances in which the loss or damage took place to enable them to assess whether other conditions of the scheme were fully complied with. If the conditions have not been observed the Secretary of State reserves the right to recover from the borrower the amount paid in satisfaction of the indemnity.

(ii) The borrowing institution is responsible for providing a level of environmental control appropriate to the care of the loaned property. It is, accordingly, open to the lender to impose any conditions deemed necessary for the safety of the object as compensation will not be payable under the indemnity in respect of any deterioration in the condition of the items occasioned by their being maintained in inadequate physical or environmental conditions during the period of the loan.

(iii) Compensation for the loss of books, manuscripts or bulk archive material will be made in accordance with the valuation agreed between the owner and the borrowing institution or, in default of any agreement, to be determined by an arbitrator nominated by and mutually acceptable to the owner and the borrower.

(iv) Compensation will not be payable in respect of loss or damage caused by a deliberate act or omission by the owner or lender, his employees or agents.

(v) In the event of loss, or damage, due to the conditions not having been observed the Secretary of State shall be entitled to conduct in the name of the owner or lender the pursuit of settlement of a claim against the borrower or a third party or to prosecute in the name of the owner. The Secretary of State shall have full discretion in the conduct of any proceedings or in the settlement of any claim and the owner shall; give all such information and assistance as the Secretary of State may require.

(vi) If a lost object, which has been the subject of an indemnity payment by the Secretary of State, is subsequently recovered it
should be returned to the original owner. The owner will normally (depending on the terms under which the compensation was paid) be expected to reimburse the amount paid.

## ANNEX A – GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY SCHEME

### 4.3 Organisations Involved

#### Statutory Responsibilities

For **England**

Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport  
Cultural Property Unit  
Museums, Galleries, Libraries & Archives and Cultural Property Division  
Department for Culture, Media and Sport  
2-4 Cockspur Street  
London SW1Y 5DH  
Tel: 020 7211 6000 Fax: 020 7211 6170

For **Scotland**

Scottish Minister  
The Scottish Executive  
Education Department  
Sport, The Arts and Culture Division  
Victoria Quay  
Edinburgh EH6 6QQ  
Tel: 0131 244 0346 Fax: 0131 244 0353

For **Wales**

Secretary of State for Wales  
CSWLD Division  
Fourth Floor  
Cathays Park  
Cardiff CF1 3NQ  
Tel: 01222 825 111 Fax: No General Number

#### Administering Body

Resource: The Council for Museums, Archives and Libraries  
16 Queen Anne’s Gate  
London SW1Y 9AA  
Tel: 020 7273 1444 Fax: 020 7273 1404

#### Security Advice

Security Adviser to Resource  
(see above)

#### Environmental Advice

Indemnity Officer to Resource  
(see above)
ANNEX B – GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY SCHEME

4.4 Transport Conditions

Transport companies used to move object(s) must have experience in the transport of fragile and valuable artefacts with employees trained in the handling of such material and must be able to meet the conditions below and confirm this in writing.

When indemnified objects are sent out or brought in from abroad, the company must have ability and appropriate experience to handle consignments of valuable and fragile material. The company must be experienced in dealing with airport and seaport procedures and all necessary documentation.

1. The removal, packing, unpacking and transport of the loan material must be supervised by senior members of the transport company in consultation with the lender and/or borrower of the material.

2. Vehicles, whether owned by a transport company or the borrower or the lender, used for the transport of indemnified material must conform to the specifications detailed below.

3. Vehicles used should normally be closed vans (i.e. having solid sides and roof) with a windowless freight compartment separate from the driving cab. All vehicles to be equipped with good quality locking devices. Additional locking facilities may also be required, such as closed shackle padlocks. Any locking bars or external fittings must be secured with concealed non-return screws or welded or riveted into place.

4. Vehicles should provide appropriate protection against vibration and shock and extremes in relative humidity and temperature conditions for consignments of valuable and fragile material. Air-ride suspension and climate control equipment may be necessary in appropriate circumstances. Environmental conditions should be monitored.

5. Vehicles and crew have to be equipped with appropriate means of communications such as fixed and/or mobile radio telephones for route monitoring and emergencies.

6. Keys to the freight compartment should be kept separate from the vehicle keys.

7. Vehicles other than closed vans may be used in appropriate circumstances, e.g. the carriage of exceptionally large items which may demand the use of an open lorry with the load suitably covered. Furthermore, small consignments or single items may be carried by car, small van, taxi, train or air providing a sufficient number of couriers are in attendance.

8. All vehicles must be provided with fire-fighting equipment appropriate to the load and the crew experienced in its use.
9. Whatever method of transport is used compliance with the operating conditions in the following paragraphs apply.

10. A vehicle must carry two drivers on long journeys, or one driver and a courier on short journeys. The crew should consist of responsible persons, experienced in the handling of valuable consignments and capable of dealing effectively with an emergency situation.

11. Where space on the carrying vehicle is limited, or where deemed essential for security control, a second escorting vehicle will need to be provided and equipped with mobile radio/telephone communications.

12. The route needs to be carefully planned and the address and telephone numbers of emergency services should be carried by the crews and accompanying couriers.

13. Ideally, the journey should be completed in one haul.

14. When a stopover is necessary, arrangements should be made to lodge the vehicle and/or material in secure premises which are protected by a 24-hour intruder and fire alarm system or under continuous supervision.

15. On no account should a vehicle be left unattended by the crew, even in an emergency.

16. Special circumstances may apply to some overseas transport, but arrangements must be no less rigorous than those specified above.

17. An effective 'no smoking' policy must apply in areas containing loan material.

A. In the event of loss or damage due to the specified conditions not having been observed the Secretary of State shall be entitled to conduct in the name of the owner or lender the pursuit or settlement of a claim against the borrower or a third party or to prosecute in the name of the owner. The Secretary of State shall have full discretion in the conduct of any proceedings or in the settlement of any claim and the owner shall give all such information and assistance the Secretary of State may require.

B. These conditions are the minimum requirements of the Government Indemnity Scheme, but borrowers should be aware that some lenders impose additional conditions which the borrower will be required to meet for the loan to proceed.

ANNEX C – GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY SCHEME

4.5 Security and Environmental Conditions

The borrower shall at all times be responsible for ensuring that the greatest possible care is taken of the material which is the subject of the indemnity.
1. The indemnified material must be accommodated in a strong building which has physically well-protected windows, doors and skylights. The building must also provide appropriate environmental control for the indemnified material.

2. The whole of the building must have an automatic fire detection system fitted by a NACOSS (National Approval Council for Security Systems) approved alarm company which is serviced annually and maintained in good working condition.

3. At night, or when the building is closed or not otherwise in normal use, there needs to be either an agreed level of night guarding or modern intruder detection alarm system which covers all possible entrances to the building. This alarm system is to be fitted by a NACOSS approved alarm company, serviced annually and maintained in good working condition.

4. The intruder and fire detection systems must be connected by a monitored signalling device to an alarm-receiving centre or the emergency services unless they are monitored internally by security personnel.

5. If, as a result of false calls, the police response to the system, is downgraded or withdrawn; or if there is a failure which renders the system ineffective, or if the system cannot be re-set immediately, guarding by trained personnel must be introduced until the police response is fully restored or the system is repaired or re-set.

6. Environmental conditions must be maintained 24-hours a day, 7-days a week, throughout the loan period from the time the indemnified material arrives until it departs from the loan venue.

7. Relative humidity, temperature and light levels should be monitored throughout the loan period in the space containing the indemnified material.

8. Paintings, drawings and similar objects must be secured to walls by mirrorplates and security screws or, if this is not possible for any reason, an acceptable alternative must be agreed with the Resource Security Adviser.

9. Small pictures i.e. less than 450mm x 250mm (including frame) must not be displayed near windows, fire escapes or entrances and exits to the building.

10. Unglazed paintings, fragile or sensitive material must be protected by rope or other barriers which must be at least one metre from the exhibits or an acceptable alternative must be agreed with the Resource Security Adviser and Indemnity Officer.

11. Small portable objects must be exhibited in locked display cases which should be fitted with anti-bandit laminated glazing meeting British Standard BS5544. If the material consists of gold, silver, jewellery or items which are especially valuable, the cases must be fitted with alarm devices. The cases must be secured in a manner approved by the Resource Security Adviser.
12. All indemnified material must be displayed so that it is invigilated by trained personnel. This will normally mean at least one person to a room unless an acceptable alternative is agreed with the Resource Security Adviser.

13. Security or qualified staff must be continuously deployed in the exhibition room during the time the public is admitted and proper arrangements must be made for their relief for refreshment and other purposes. They must concentrate on the safety and security of the displayed material at all times.

14. When it is not possible to arrange for a gallery containing indemnified material to be properly invigilated it must be closed to the public.

15. There must be a form of drill with which every member of staff is familiar to cater for all emergencies.

16. An emergency plan should be drawn up and updated regularly to cope with emergencies caused by fire or flood.

17. Staff performing security duties must have access to communications equipment by which they can indicate that there is an emergency situation.

18. When meetings or other events are held in areas containing indemnified material consideration must be given as to an appropriate level of supervision.

19. Food and drink must not be allowed in the area containing the indemnified material except under arrangements approved by the Security Adviser and Indemnity Officer at Resource.

20. Smoking must not be permitted at any time.

The arrangements for formal openings and private views must comply with all the above conditions.

A. In the event of loss or damage due to the specified conditions not having been observed the Secretary of State shall be entitled to conduct in the name of the owner or lender the pursuit or settlement of a claim against the borrower or a third party or to prosecute in the name of the owner. The Secretary of State shall have full discretion in the conduct of any proceedings or in the settlement of any claim and the owner shall give all such information and assistance the Secretary of State may require.

B. These conditions are the minimum requirements of the Government Indemnity Scheme, but borrowers should be aware that some lenders impose additional conditions which the borrower will be required to meet for the loan to proceed.
ANNEX D – GOVERNMENT INDEMNITY SCHEME

4.6 Food and Drink Conditions

The general security and environmental conditions applying to exhibitions and displays covered by Government Indemnity do not allow food and drink in the area containing the indemnified material unless arrangements are approved by the Security Adviser and Indemnity Officer at Resource.

If it is not possible to serve food and drink in spaces other than those containing indemnified material at private views or other functions, the Security Adviser at Resource must be consulted and the following conditions are likely to apply:

1. A strict enforcement of the ban on smoking.
2. Food and drink is prepared and dispensed in a space not containing indemnified material. No heat or stream generating equipment can be used in the space containing indemnified material.
3. The serving of red wine in a space containing indemnified material which is unglazed or uncased must be avoided.
4. Strict attention is given to the cleaning operation to ensure removal of residue of food and drink. Appropriate checks should ensure that chemical cleaning agents or extra amounts of water do not adversely affect environmental stability or the corrosivity of the atmosphere next to indemnified material.
5. Where practicable the installation of suitable barriers is required to prevent close approach to unglazed, fragile or sensitive exhibits. Such barriers must be a minimum of one metre distant from the objects to provide a manageable sterile zone.
6. The deployment of adequate staff on invigilating duties in all exhibition spaces containing indemnified material especially where barriers cannot be installed.

If arrangements are made incorporating the above together with any additional measures required by Resource the Government Indemnity will remain valid. If, however, there are any doubts about arrangements or where it is felt that Government Indemnity may be affected or that different arrangements are sought, the Security Officer at Resource must be consulted.

4.7 Guidelines in cases of Theft, Criminal or Accidental Damage to Indemnified Material

Establish that the object has actually been stolen or intentionally...
damaged. In cases of suspected theft, search the premises as items are sometimes removed from display and hidden for later collection or removed from display for cleaning, renovation, study or change of exhibition without prior notification. Recovered or damaged items should be left where found until examined by police but must be safeguarded – e.g. close and lock the gallery/building.

Seek a conservator’s advice immediately on the steps necessary to minimise effect of damage. If conditions reports exist these should be annotated to show extent of damage. If they do not exist, they should be prepared. Photographs should be taken of the damage, *in situ* if possible. Photograph the object, paying particular attention to the area of damage and the effect of the damage, physical and visually, in relation to the whole object.

**DO NOT** undertake any remedial work without advice and without informing the lender and Resource **UNLESS** immediate action is essential to prevent further deterioration. If action is taken this must be fully documented. A copy of the report will be required if a claim arises.

Make a general written assessment of the nature of the damage and seek specialist advice from a conservator. Unless the damage is minimal, the object should be taken off display and placed in a secure store, with any fragments etc.

If a crime has been committed telephone the police and report the details. If the perpetrator was seen to commit the crime detain him/her until arrival of police noting anything said in the meantime. Meanwhile obtain names and addresses, including staff, of all witnesses and seek to persuade witnesses to remain at the scene until the police arrive.

Supply the police with all necessary information including full description and photographs of stolen items not recovered. Note name of police officer and police station dealing with the incident.

Notify the following giving details of the incident:

- the museum authorities;
- the owner of the stolen/damaged artefact;
- Resource – 020 7273 1444 (Capital Taxes and Security Adviser);
- the insurance company (if relevant).

Consider obtaining publicity (with the agreement of the owner) to recover stolen items from national and local press. Even if
publicity is not sought be prepared to answer press enquiries –
preparing a statement in advance is an advantage.

If approaches are received offering to return the stolen objects
for reward contact the police investigating officer urgently. Do
not reject offers immediately but try to play for time and arrange
a meeting.

If stolen objects are recovered notify the police, the owners, the
insurance company (if relevant) and Resource.

Unless it is clear that damage was accidental (i.e. someone
trippping over a barrier and damaging a canvas) the advice listed
above should be followed. In the case of accidental damage, the
action to be taken need not include a report to the police nor
publicity, but the actions listed above should be instituted.

If a claim is to be made under the Government Indemnity
Scheme, the following details and reports must be supplied:

• date of incident or date damage/loss was detected;
• date Resource notified;
• date owner notified;
• name and address of owner;
• confirmation that owner intends to submit claim;
• nature of claim;
• name of exhibition or long term loan;
• title/description of item;
• indemnified value;
• dates of indemnity cover.

**Damage**

• Report on cause of damage including details of security and
display arrangements or environmental conditions as relevant
• Illustrations/photographs before and after damage
• Condition reports before and after damage
• Details of any immediate action/conservation undertaken to
prevent further deterioration
• If the damage was caused during transit, name of carrier, details
of packing and transport arrangements.
• Two detailed independent professional quotations for restoration
work giving a breakdown of the likely costs and the work to be
done.
• Only after the work has been carried out can a claim for
depreciation be considered. If the owner submits a claim two
independent evaluations must be submitted.
Loss

Report on loss including details of security and display arrangements and police report (if available).

If the loss was caused during transit, name of carrier, details of packing and transport arrangements.

Advertisements to trace stolen works of art can be placed in the following:

**Antiques Trade Gazette**
17 Whitcomb Street
London WC2H 7PL
Tel: 020 7420 6600

**Invaluable Magazine**
Theasaurus Group Ltd
Mill Court
Furlongs
Newport
Isle of Wight PO30 2AA
Tel: 01983 826000

**Art Loss Magazine**
13 Grosvenor Place
London SW1X 7HH
Tel: 020 7235 3393

### 4.8 Guidance on Public Handling of Indemnified Material

Occasional permission is sought by applicants for indemnity to allow visitors to exhibitions to handle certain types of exhibits, which usually involves people with impaired vision.

Providing the material in question is suitable to be handled – curatorial and conservation advice will be necessary on this point – the following guidelines can be used to regulate the handling. The guidelines cannot cover every eventuality and should be extended, adapted or deleted according to the circumstances of the exhibition and material in question.

- Two members of museum/gallery staff should supervise each handling session.
- A locked display case to be used to house the exhibits between each handling session.
• The display case to contain only exhibits that are to be handled with not more than six to be housed in each display case.
• The display case is to be so sited that it cannot be encircled by a group particularly when it is open.
• Only one exhibit is to be removed from the display at a time and replaced before a further removal is made.

Those taking part in the handling are to be kept at least six feet away from the display case.

The handling session is to be in a space from which other members of the public are excluded during each session, using barriers if necessary to create a space.

Participants are not to be permitted to carry bags or brief cases or similar items during the session.

The contents of the display case are to be checked for correct number and authenticity of objects before and after each session, remember substitution during a session is always a possibility.

The display case to be locked at the end of each session.

Consider providing a soft floor covering to protect the exhibit if dropped.

4.9 The Use of Barrier Rails or Ropes

It is the policy of the Resource Security Adviser to advocate the use of barriers to separate the public from unglazed paintings or drawings and other fragile or touch-sensitive objects. Indeed, it is a condition for the grant of Government Indemnity that barriers are placed at least one metre from the object to be protected.

Although it is recognised that the normal type of barriers by themselves cannot prevent a determined attempt to steal or damage a painting, their use does have important benefits. They define a sterile area in front of the displayed objects which gives the alert attendant the opportunity to respond to any intrusion into that area.

Their use gives a clear indication to genuine visitors that they should not get closer to the object. Experience shows that not only are visitors successfully discouraged from touching the displayed material but accidental contact is also prevented which is particularly important in a crowded gallery.
Careful thought has to be given to the design and nature of material used for barriers otherwise accidental damage can be caused rather than prevented. Rails or ropes set low near ankle height or the use of clear materials may not be seen by a visitor and cause them to trip and damage displayed material.
5 Contingency Planning

5.1 Disaster Recovery and Crisis Management Planning

Introduction

Any organisation may at some time suffer a major disaster either as a result of natural causes – fire, flood, subsidence or earthquake or as a result of criminal or terrorist action.

Institutions have to understand that planning crisis management is difficult for any organisation because it invariably requires talent and experience outside the normal working skills of the personnel involved. Detailed written disaster recovery plans can be prepared for a number of fixed scenario problems. However the absolute rule of crisis management is that the crisis that you are actually faced with will never be the one that you have practised!

It is therefore imperative that the institution’s crisis management system sets up a management decision making process that is capable of collating and reviewing the facts of a particular problem and then making correct and rapid management decisions to commence the rebuilding process.

This procedure will therefore concentrate on how the decision-making processes can be established and managed rather than the provision of detailed checklists for any particular kind of disaster.

Concept of Crisis Management

The focal point of the management of any crisis must be the high level crisis management team which will be responsible for carrying out the initial important decisions and commencing the recovery process. The Crisis Management Team (CMT) will often be supported by other teams who will manage much more detail and specific parts of the recovery and may be based in different geographical locations. These are often called Incident Management Teams (IMTs).

Roles and Responsibilities

It is important that the roles, responsibilities and make-up of these teams are predetermined, so that they can reform quickly to begin work. The facts and circumstances they will have to consider will be totally unknown and there is never time to define the methodology of crisis management once the crisis has started.
Responsibility of the Crisis Management Team (CMT)

The CMT is the highest level group responsible for resolving the crisis and rebuilding that part of the organisation that has been destroyed or damaged. It must consist of some senior decision makers from the organisation, representing a wide range of disciplines, such as executive management, finance, human resources, press and public relations, materials and purchasing.

Key Roles of the CMT

- To develop and disseminate strategic decisions regarding the resolution of the crisis.
- To directly set the policy and handle the liaison with the press and the media for any issues affecting the organisation as a result of the crisis.
- To handle direct liaison with outside government agencies and emergency services such as the police, Fire Brigade, County Council or Government Departments.
- To issue clear instructions to each of the implementation teams to resolve specific issues of the crisis.
- To authorise finance so that the implementation teams can proceed with restoration, salvage or renovation works.

Composition of the CMT

- Institution Director/Chief Executive
- Curator
- Finance Director
- Human Resources
- Legal Representation
- Operational Management
- Material and Resources

The aim of the high level team is to issue clear strategic instructions to allow the implementation teams to carry out the works of reconstruction without being hampered by outside agencies.

Incident Management Team (IMT)

The IMT may be larger than the standard CMT as more disciplines may be required to be involved. The incident management teams may also be at different locations to the head office or the central management function.

General Role of the IMT

- To implement instructions issued by the CMT.
• To carry out the detailed work involved in reconstruction, salvage or rebuilding.
• To co-ordinate the detailed work of salvage teams, building repair teams and the repurchasing or renovation of equipment.
• To manage and brief the staff in the incident location.

Constitution of the IMT

• Operational management in the crisis area
• Financial or purchasing representative
• Personnel Manager
• IT and communications representative
• Materials Manager
• Purchasing Manager
• Curatorial staff
• Facilities Manager

Invocation of the Disaster Recovery Procedure

The decision to actually activate a recovery programme may in itself cause both cost and/or management disruption to an organisation, thus the authority to involve the crisis management procedure and to set in motion any predetermined action should be delegated to a limited number of key directors and decision-makers within the organisation.

The ability to invoke the disaster recovery plan should not be vested in one single individual because he/she might be elsewhere when the disaster occurs. Once the order to invoke the disaster recovery plan has been given, the CMT should meet at the earliest possible time at one of two predetermined locations where full sets of the disaster recovery and crisis management procedures are held.

The CMT Location

The selected location must be conveniently near existing workplaces, should be provided with sufficient desk space and meeting room space for discussions, meetings and interviews and should be well served with telephone communications, catering facilities and storage space. It is important that two specific locations are earmarked which should be sufficiently far apart (preferably at least 5km apart) in the event that one of them is actually involved in the crisis. These demands offer the opportunity for co-operation between heritage institutions in the same geographic area.
The Provision of Detailed Disaster Recovery Plans

The overview disaster recovery plan should be a relatively short (max 10pp), concise document aimed simply to provide enough information to gather together the right individuals at the right location to make the right decisions to manage the first 24 hours of the crisis. It should contain reminders and checklists to help initiate the recovery process. Useful checklists for the preparation of your plans are in the next section.

Management of Ongoing Business

At any time of crisis an organisation has a double workload. Firstly to manage the day to day business of unaffected areas and secondly to rebuild those damaged by the crisis. It is important therefore, that functional departments are not stripped of all staff to concentrate solely on the crisis. A clear line of responsibility must be drawn between those responsible for managing existing business and those involved in crisis management.

Threat Analysis

Threats will include fire, flood, structural collapse and subsidence, chemical or contamination leakage, major criminal action and terrorist activities. Detailed plans, checklists and resource lists can be established for these pre-identified threats which will assist the implementation teams in their tasks. Their needs for all their elements must be guided and modified by the facts and conditions of the particular crisis in question. These checklists can be documented in sub-procedure documents to provide more detailed guidance on specific issues relating to recovering from the crisis.

Sample Checklist

- Salvage priorities.
- Nominated salvage teams and salvage resources.
- Salvage teams task allocation.
- Human resources documentation.
- Staff list.
- Contact telephone numbers – cascade system.
- Home telephone numbers.
5.2 Disaster Planning Checklists

Action Checklist

• Appoint a crisis management team to assess the risks and devise a plan.
• Analyse the current situation, endeavour to remove or reduce risks through detection systems, security procedures and good housekeeping.
• Brainstorm all possible types of potential and relevant crisis.
• Research the experience of others, learn from their mistakes.
• Identify those organisations that will be jointly responsible for managing any situation (Fire Service, Police, and Ambulance) and record contact details.
• Communicate and implement your plan, build your list of personnel on call to include staff, emergency services, volunteers, local and specialist contractors, storage facilities, sources of transport.
• Devise a call-out system, relevant for any crisis. Nominate telephone advisers who can call out personnel from home or another office for a full scale response.
• Practise and improve your plan.

Content of Disaster Plan

Structure

• Assessment of the risk
• Alert procedures, assembly points, incident control points, collection and holding points for witnesses or people affected by any incident.
• Pre-determined levels of response, call out procedures.
• Sequence of events, co-ordinating instructions and detailed responsibilities.
• All supporting information such as priority salvage lists, ledgers, plans etc.

Contact Details

• Essential Services
• Contracted Services
• Local ‘on call’ Services
  – Plumber
  – Glazier
  – Locksmith
  – Roof Repair
  – Carpenter
  – Electrician
• Conservators
• Consultants
• Security
• Media management
• Insurers and loss adjusters
• Building surveyor

Facilities

• Emergency salvage area
• Blast, freeze and vacuum drying facilities (hire)
• Van and truck hire (local sources such as depots)
• Tea chests, crates, dustbins
• Removal firms and secure storage
• Portable generators
• Emergency lighting systems
• Heavy duty extension cables
• Hand pumps
• De-humidifiers
• Wet and dry vacuum cleaners
• General tool and plant hire
• Local council depots

Disaster Kit

• Overalls and waterproofs
• Safety boots and helmets
• Dust masks
• Protective gloves
• Polythene sheets
• Fire and salvage blankets
• Safety glasses/gasses
• Torches
• Extension leads
• Rope
• Stanley knives and blades
• Sealing kit
• First Aid kits
• Glass clamps
• Lifting straps
• Mops and buckets
• Dustpans
• Cloths, sponges, towels
• Tissue paper
• Bubblewrap
• Bin bags
• Scissors
• String
• Camera
• Pens and pencils
• Labels

**Floor Plans and Details**

• Sources of water
• Stop valves for services: water, gas, electricity etc
• Electricity cut-off and fuse box
• Telephone points
• Drains and rodding access points
• Assembly points
• Hazards such as LPG tanks, fuse boxes
• Manholes for external access
• Toilets
• Fire-fighting equipment
• Smoke vent points
• Roof and cellar access points
• Priority Salvage
  – High – important, unique, valuable
  – Medium – vulnerable or less susceptible to smoke or water
  – Low – durable or replaceable
• Stored materials stacked in order, e.g. priority nearest exit point.

**Preventative Checklist**

• Are gutters and down pipes blocked?
• Is rubbish disposed of?
• Are water pipes lagged?
• Are flat roofs in good condition?
• Are valley style gutters kept clear of debris, snow etc?
• Are storage areas prone to flooding?
• Do stop valves work?
• Are there any leaks or any signs of damp, rot or mildew?
• Are sewers clear?
• Are electrical circuits checked?
• Are portable electrical appliances checked?
• Are fire doors in place; is fire compartmentation effective?
• Are intruder and fire alarms checked and tested?
• Is all environmental monitoring equipment tested/calibrated?
• Is there an area for quarantine of animal exhibits, loan items?
• Is the fire fighting equipment tested and in correct places?
• Are all exits and escape routes clearly marked?
• Is emergency lighting tested?
• Are regular fire and evacuation drills carried out?
• Are staff trained and equipped in handling of artefacts properly?
• Are artefacts on display secured to shelves as far as possible, or out of reach against theft or accidental damage?
• Are all corridors, stairways etc clear and uncluttered – for exit?
Staff Awareness

- Alarm sounds
- Location of fire alarms and fire fighting equipment
- How to use extinguishers
- Fire and evacuation drills
- Bomb scare procedure
- Key control procedures
- Hot Work permit procedure
- Signing in procedure
- First Aid procedure

The North West Museum Service has produced *The Museums, Record Office and Historic Properties Emergency Manual* (£14.00) which provides a useful framework on which to shape an Emergency Plan for your institution. Copies can be obtained from the North West Museums Service, Griffin Lodge, Cavendish Place, Blackburn BB2 2PN.
6.1 Selecting and Recruiting

Security staff should be selected to meet the requirements of their future role. They will often be required to be multi-capable and flexible as they are required to deal with fire, health and safety, interpretation as well as security. Additionally they have to deal more and more with the public. They are often the first or lasting impression that a visitor will retain and play a major front of house role.

Staff should therefore be selected with a view to suitability after training and induction coupled with their perceived ability to interpret and implement the procedures of their appointment.

Relevant Skills and Criteria for Security Officers

- Ability and willingness to learn.
- Good health and preferably a reasonable height and physique.
- Punctual, reliable and loyal.
- Willingness to accept responsibility.
- Any objection to wearing a form of uniform and being smart must be overcome as it is essential that the person accepts their responsibility as a Security Officer.
- Be mindful of image at all times. If the Security Officer loses respect then they will be less effective and the job will be less than pleasant.
- Be able to control own temper and language.
- Be fair and polite with customers and staff at all times.
- Be an active listener and aware of the visitors’, customers’ or clients requirements and expectations.
- Communicate effectively especially with visitors, customers and clients.
- Be prepared to work shifts and unsociable hours.
- Work alone and sometimes unsupervised, at night and during holiday periods.
- Understand the importance of the role in representing the management and its policies.
- Be entirely responsible for the property under the jurisdiction and equipment entrusted to them.
- Use initiative when dealing with incidents not covered in procedures or training.
- Be capable of reporting incidents or accidents clearly, verbally and in writing.
- Understand the element of personnel risk involved.
- Deal with aggression, objection or conflict by defusing the situation through a calming confident demeanour.
- Not likely to over react to any given situation.
Security Officers – Likely Duties

- Deal with all types of emergency e.g. disaster plans, fire, evacuation of the public.
- Gatekeeper or visitor reception.
- Patrolling.
- Fire prevention and fire fighting.
- Accident prevention and public safety.
- First Aid.
- Cash or valuable artefact escort.
- Environmental monitoring.
- Alarm and surveillance equipment monitoring.
- Programming of access control systems, technical and non-technical systems (only where this is appropriate).
- Visitor and contractor escort – in a discreet manner if required.
- Process passes, permits to work and record keeping.
- Monitoring and implementation of Health and Safety policy – (Hot Work permits).

Supervising Staff – Desirable Qualities

- Honesty, health, reliability, stability, financially sound, relevant skills, efficiency.
- Have a sound working knowledge of their profession and working environment.
- Display basic leadership and management skills.
- Have a sensitive approach to each situation.
- Be able to solve problems and be creative if necessary.
- Be emotionally stable.
- Have a balanced judgement.
- Have a willingness to work hard, and listen to others.
- Understand that loyalty works downwards as well as upwards to senior managers.
- Ability to generate enthusiasm and be firm and fair to all.
- Be able to isolate a problem and decide correct action.
- Decide priority and allocation of tasks.
- Be prepared to seek advice if required.
- Be assertive if necessary.
- Divide fact from fiction when producing reports and analysing reports.
- Be concise and to the point when briefing.
- Understand the importance of regular training and monitoring of performance standards.
- Understand and relate fully to the establishment’s ethos, its goals and the expectations of senior management and above all the visitor, customer and client.
- Produce competent written reports.
Vetting

This is to ensure that employees who are selected are a low security risk to the organisation. It is normally carried out by Personnel/Human Resources and it is essential that it is done so thoroughly. In cases of doubt the security manager should be consulted. Personnel should not normally be employed until vetting has been satisfactorily completed.

Application Procedure

CV, application form, interview, references. The follow-up and investigation of these duties is absolutely vital and must be done thoroughly.

Information Required

- Full name, address, phone number
- Date of birth, age, sex
- Previous addresses, over a given period
- All other names (nee, alias, deed poll changes)
- Marital status, other domestic arrangements
- Nationality
- Recent photograph
- Full family details
- Previous employment details – dates, responsibility levels including Police, Service, etc and reason for leaving
- Employer reference and personal referees – address, phone number, position
- Qualifications, education
- Membership of unions, professional bodies and associations
- Political and religious associations
- Criminal history – drink, drugs, debt
- Financial history and current status
- Income tax and NI details
- Driving experience and licence qualifications
- Health, mental and physical
- Sport, hobbies, interests, social

Sources of Information

- Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages
- Directories: telephone, Kelly’s and Electoral Register
- Previous employers and colleagues
- Government departments: service records, tax, NI, licences
- Company doctor or service medical centre
- Credit registries
- Local newspaper cuttings
• The applicant’s own police record – applicant only can apply to the police under the Data Protection legislation (soon to change)
• Specialist investigation consultants
• The police
• Crown Court Findings Record

The Security Contract

This should be clear, concise and binding. The following example (6.2) has been approved by an independent specialist, conforms to employment law and is peculiar to security personnel. A term of probation is recommended whereby the employee will work at reduced rate or the same rate. This should be outlined in the covering letter containing the following points:

• rate of pay on probation;
• length of probation, from date of signing contract;
• notice of dismissal of only one week, without prior warning, should the employee fail to meet criteria of contract or suitability for the post, being a condition of probation;
• vetting to be completed during this period if not already done (see paragraph above).

During the probation period the line manager should conduct some informal and at least one formal interview or ‘job chat’ to ascertain progress.

6.2 Example of a Contract for a Security Officer

We wish to offer you a formal contract as a Security Officer.

Your rate of pay, standard for a Trained Security Officer, will be £XX per hour. The total amount will be credited directly to your bank or building society account on the 10th day of the month or earlier if the 10th is a weekend or public holiday.

Your place of work will be the (establishment) House and (organisation) and hours of work will be variable as decreed by roster. The normal working week will be 42 hours, broken into shifts. You may be asked to work extra hours if operational conditions dictate the requirement to do so. In such circumstances you will be given as much fair warning as possible. For hours worked over and above 42 per week then you will receive time off in lieu, which will normally be taken during the week following, as agreed with management. Exceptionally the standard rate of £XX per hour will be paid for extra hours worked over 42 per week.
You have agreed to work on a rostered basis and your hours will be variable and will inevitably encompass evenings, weekends, and bank holidays. This has been taken into account and is reflected in the hourly rate which will remain constant. Exceptionally, where the arrangement for time off in lieu is deemed impracticable by both parties then extra hours will be paid at the constant rate or exceptionally at a higher rate.

**Duties:**

- Static duty on visitors’ reception or other temporary activities.
- Duties in the control room monitoring alarms, CCTV and radio.
- Patrolling on foot and vehicle within the Park area, (organisation) grounds and (establishment) Yard Business Park.
- Occasional covert and overt observation at the retail outlets and unspecified sites within the (organisation).
- Duty during open hours at the main House, including functions.
- Other duties as directed by the Head of Security, in particular with regard to the implementation of contingency plans, security of open air events and proposed remote sites within or adjacent to the (organisation).

You will, in addition, be required to attend training days for which you will be paid.

As a Trained Security Officer you are entitled to 20 days paid holiday per year.

If you are absent from work due to illness then you are to inform your manager as soon as possible, prior to your next shift. Payment of Statutory Sick Pay (SSP) will only be made during authorised absence from work due to physical incapacity or illness. On your return to work you must complete a Self-Certification Absence Form for any period of sickness of up to seven days. If you are returning to work after a period exceeding seven days then you are to produce a Medical Certificate to your immediate superior.

A uniform and some protective clothing will also be provided as necessary for the proper execution of your duties. A pool vehicle is normally available for utilisation within the grounds. If you are required to use your own vehicle then a mileage allowance of £XX per mile (revisable) can be authorised.

You will be insured for injuries sustained directly as a result of an accident at work. You will be included in a group Death in Service insurance. We do not have a company pension scheme and we do not hold a contracting out certificate.
As you must appreciate it is a condition of your employment that you will devote the whole of your working time and attention to the business and protection of the organisation. It is also a condition of employment that you are fit, alert and of sound judgement to conduct your duties, at all times during your assigned period of duty.

It is also the policy of the (organisation) to promote a healthy smoke free environment and your cooperation to this effect will be appreciated. Alcohol is not to be consumed immediately prior to or during your period of duty.

You are expected to comply with the Security Department Code of Conduct, which is incorporated into this agreement, as follows:

- Shall not neglect or without any legitimate reason fail to diligently carry out any assigned task whilst at work and on duty.
- Shall not leave appointed place of work without reasonable cause or permission.
- Shall not knowingly make any false statement, verbal or written.
- Shall not destroy or mutilate any document, evidence or record.
- Shall not, in any circumstances, divulge any matter or information which is confidential to (establishment), its employees or clients.
- Shall not accept any bribe or inducement from any person for assistance or information.
- Shall not be uncivil or discourteous to any person in the course of duty or misuse authority as a Security Officer so to discredit (establishment).
- Shall not in any circumstances use unnecessary force and will only use force when absolutely necessary and in which case will use the absolute minimum to restrain an individual or protect oneself or a person for whom you are responsible.
- Shall not misuse (establishment) equipment or facilities, for personal benefit.
- Shall, at all times do the utmost to appear clean smart and correctly dressed so to represent (establishment) correctly.
- Shall at all times conduct oneself in a lawful manner.

Employees are required to give not less than four weeks notice. The employer is required to give four weeks notice up to five years of service and thereafter one week added for each year of service up to a maximum of 12 weeks.

Disciplinary procedure is based on following sequence. We retain discretion in respect of disciplinary procedures to take
account of your length of service and vary the procedures accordingly. If you have a short amount of service or are in your probationary period you may not receive advance warning of dismissal, being given one week's notice or a week's pay in lieu.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unsatisfactory Conduct</th>
<th>1ST OCCASION</th>
<th>2ND OCCASION</th>
<th>3RD OCCASION</th>
<th>4TH OCCASION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Verbal warning on file</td>
<td>Written warning on file</td>
<td>Final written warning on file</td>
<td>Dismissal</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Misconduct</th>
<th>Written warning on file</th>
<th>Final warning on file</th>
<th>Dismissal</th>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serious Misconduct</th>
<th>Final warning on file</th>
<th>Dismissal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Misconduct</th>
<th>Dismissal</th>
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</table>

Should you have any grievance or problems concerning your working conditions or wish to appeal against disciplinary procedure then feel free to discuss the matter informally with the Head of Security. Should you wish to raise any matter formally then please do so either verbally to the Head of Security, accompanied by a person of your choosing, or in writing to the (organisation) Director. I very much look forward to working with you at (establishment) and if you agree with the terms detailed in this letter then please sign and return one copy of the letter (retaining the copy for your own records).

Yours sincerely
(Director)
Signed ………………………………
Dated ………………………………..

6.3 Induction of New Security Staff

The style of new staff induction or orientation will vary according to the size and structure of the organisation, and the seniority and experience of the new member. The advantages of a formal planned induction are that you can show that you value the new member and that the new member is integrated more quickly and effectively.
Key Stages

- The process could take several weeks. Plan ahead and do not rush.
- Inform those involved and required for briefings so they can allocate time.
- Appoint a Mentor with similar age and seniority. Monitor to ensure that the working relationship is effective and producing the results.
- The new member should not work unsupervised until fully integrated into the organisation.
- Introduce the member to the organisation and its aims. Cover all aspects of the workplace and acquaint the member with the staff handbook, Health and Safety issues and working conditions.
- Complete all Personnel induction documentation at an early stage.
- Do not over burden with information on other departments. Stick with an outline brief, initially.
- Emphasise the importance of operational procedures.
- Be consistent with the input of information and be prepared to support any staff that are not experienced trainers.
- Use regular feedback sessions to assess progress.
- Clarify performance standards and management expectations.

Remember

- Starting a new job is stressful.
- Do not give out too much information at once.
- Do not make assumptions about the new members learning and integration.
- An induction lasts longer than one day or one week.
- Do monitor progress.

6.4 Example of a Job Description

Security Operative

Name ....................... Date Started: as contract ...............  
Age ....................... Title: Security Officer .......................  
Days Worked: Average 48hr per week Pay: £XX when trained, £XX on probation  
Line Manager: The Head of Security Subordinates 

..............................
## Person Specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Desirable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td>Physically mobile, in good health, able to work 12-hour shifts</td>
<td>• No history of bad health</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Smart and upright stature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circumstances</td>
<td>Able to work shift work, day and night</td>
<td>• Stable family background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attainments</td>
<td>Ability to read and write in English and have basic numeracy skills</td>
<td>• Computer literate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Able to write clear concise and accurate reports</td>
<td>• Can make rational and clear decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aptitudes</td>
<td>Able to communicate well, verbally and in writing</td>
<td>• Proven ability to work with the public</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Good telephone manner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests</td>
<td>Monitoring trends in security</td>
<td>• Security is a career, with a desire to achieve NVQ or City and Guilds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition</td>
<td>• Able to work as part of a team, self-reliant but not over confident</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Must be reliable and punctual</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

## Main Duties

- Comply with written procedures to ensure effective security.
- Ensure that the 24-hour monitoring of intruder alarms, CCTV, site access is efficient and effective.
- Operate all control room equipment and systems to support the site and concurrent activities and to co-ordinate any patrol activity or incident response.
- Be fully conversant with Disaster and Evacuation plans and prepared to put these plans into effect without supervision, should the situation dictate an immediate response.
- Ensure the effective control of keys is maintained.
• Provide day to day and night site security patrols, event static stewarding and incident reaction as directed so to ensure as far as practicable a safe environment for staff and the public.
• Ensure that as many areas within the whole site are made secure as soon as practicable when departmental staff are not in attendance to supervise buildings, state rooms and artefacts.
• Comply with Health and Safety measures as relate to the Security Department, ensuring that you are fully aware and comply with these requirements.
• Assist with security, fire prevention and awareness training for all staff as required.
• Provide routine ‘First Aid at Work’ cover for staff and visitors.
• Conduct routine security administration – e.g. the issue of car passes, ID passes, contractors’ passes, maintenance of the incident book, basic vehicle maintenance, record the issue of pass cards, radios, disaster equipment and miscellaneous security equipment etc.
• Collect and collate evidence including photography.
• Issue contractors Hot Work Permits and supervise contractors conduct and activity.
• Ensure no unnecessary careless damage is ever caused to the premises, its fixtures or contents by the public, contractors or invited guests.
• Be aware of how to handle and store valuable artefacts.
• Liaise with local police, emergency services and on-site event organisers; for example out of hours when line or event managers are off site also ensuring that follow up action is taken through the correct channels.
• Monitor the flow of public on the rights of way through the Estate and grounds.
• Maintain all security related equipment and premises to a high standard of cleanliness and serviceability and all defects are reported and actioned swiftly.
• Extending guidance, advance and assistance to the public.
• Conduct individual, bag, vehicle or document searches if directed to do so by a senior manager.
• To carry out other relevant duties which may arise occasionally in support of other departments.

6.5 Patrolling

Patrolling and observation are possibly the most important primary skills required of a Security Officer or Warden. Patrolling conducted efficiently will detect the following:

• fire, arson and the early warning of a fire;
• unsecured buildings and rooms;
• damage and vandalism;
• trespass;
• flood, weather damage;
• potential safety hazards to the public and staff and unnecessary waste of resources e.g. electricity, water, heating;
• environmental monitoring of temperature and humidity for artefact protection: thermohydrographs;
• offensive waste, refuse etc;
• faults with electrical, gas, water services e.g. leaks or breakdowns;
• contractors tools or equipment such as scaffolding and ladders that could be used to aid a break-in or vandalism;
• function and location of all fire fighting equipment, fire doors, first aid equipment and safety lighting regularly.

In a heritage environment the Security Officer will invariably become involved in assisting the public. Patrolling Security Officers must be smart, alert, and conscientious and inspire confidence. It is also likely that the presence and early detection of inappropriate behaviour will prevent unnecessary damage to artefacts by over zealous members of the public or contractors carrying out their assigned work.

**Conduct of the Patrol**

• Check what activity is scheduled within your patrol area.
• Test and take the correct equipment e.g. torch, radio, keys, notebook, pen, watch, maps
• Book out and maintain contact with control room, as appropriate.
• Leave pre-formatted ‘Security Reminders’ on any doors or buildings that were not properly secured by staff so that they are aware on their return, detailing time, what was found and officers name.
• On completion of the patrol report any faults to the relevant department for rectification.

**During the Patrol**

• Remain vigilant and in contact with control.
• Observe for hazards: loose carpeting, poorly lit areas, slippery floor, and spillages.
• Observe for specified forbidden activities such as smoking, running in the galleries, consumption of food and drink, photography, carriage of large bags that may cause damage to artefacts, unruly or suspicious groups.
Guard Tour Systems

Propriety guard tour systems are available which automatically record the checkpoints that have been visited by a patrol. It can be an additional software package on integrated alarm and access control systems and can provide a printed record of all patrol activity.

Benefits

- A record that all areas have been checked, if not for whatever reason then the next patrol can check any missed points.
- Narrow the time during which an incident may have occurred.
- Ensure that sensitive areas are checked regularly.

6.6 Rostering

When you have conducted a security risk analysis and developed a concept for your integrated security plan, you will be in a position to make a judgement about the manning levels you require for a reasonable response. Remember to discuss this with your insurers and the Crime Prevention Officer before finally deciding on the final balance of manpower and security equipment.

In deciding on the total number of persons required you need to take into account the full 24 hours and 365 days of the year and what it is you require the manpower and your security staff to do in that 24 hours. See the example below. It is immediately apparent that more staff are required when activity level is high.

People need to be fed and watered if they are to retain their effectiveness so allowance in their duties must be made for meal and comfort breaks. The result of course is to increase the number of staff that are required.

Shifts

You can now work out what shifts you will require staff to work in a day and from that how many hours a week, as well as the costs associated with these numbers and hours.

Shift Rotas

In working out your rotas, do so in a manner that suits your own requirements. There are no template solutions.
**Options**

- A static rota – where people work on the same days of each week with the same days off.
- A rotating rota – where days worked and days off move in a cycle.
- A mix of the two systems by splitting a shift into two rotas.

**Rest Periods**

You must also then add into this equation ‘days off’ which will further increase the number of staff required. The number of days off decided upon will shorten or increase the ‘working week’ and consequently has an effect on staff rest periods and productivity.

**Sample Rota**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Mon</th>
<th>Tue</th>
<th>Wed</th>
<th>Thu</th>
<th>Fri</th>
<th>Sat</th>
<th>Sun</th>
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</table>

This allows four people to work and cover all the shifts with two days off and six days on. The pattern shows three additional people are required to cover days off. The pattern can be repeated if you want to add additional people for holidays.

The process is still not complete as no account has been taken of the number of hours a person works per week. So you can now allow for that.
Supervisors

Staff generally work more effectively when properly supervised. No allowance has been made for Supervisors. There are three basic options:

- you may consider incorporating them in your main rota, but this is of course subject to what duties you require him to carry out and when;
- you may consider having a completely independent roster;
- you may consider having a semi-independent roster.

Holidays, Sickness and Training

Finally you need to consider the requirements of your staff for holidays, sickness cover and training. Holidays can be predicted from a person’s contract and when can usually be negotiated. However, sickness is unpredictable and the simplest way is to budget to allow an element of cover. Casual or existing staff can then be used to provide the sickness cover but beware staff do not use this method to achieve additional pay.

There are a number of computer software programmes available that can be used for rostering and their advantage is the time saved in drawing up the original roster and the speed that you are able to react quickly to changes in tasks/duties/sickness and in emergencies.

6.7 Volunteer Attendants

Using volunteers for invigilating rooms or galleries has certain drawbacks that management needs to overcome. Some regard must be paid to their background and trustworthiness; they must be trained to some extent, and, in particular, be briefed at fairly regular intervals.

The best results are obtained when the volunteers:

- come from an organisation such as ‘Friends of the House or Museum’;
- are well known in the local community;
- have had some training in what to expect from people who steal or damage articles;
- have been briefly regularly by the Director/Keeper/Curator.

Membership of the ‘Friends’ organisation usually means a genuine person is prepared to give commitment to the particular institution. Being well-known in the local community is a
substitute for reference or a vetting procedure. It is not foolproof, but neither are references or vetting procedures. Use can be made of the ‘Friends’ organisation to formally vet would-be members, as applicants cannot simply be taken on trust.

Training is difficult. The level of training for in-house attendants cannot normally be provided for volunteers. Indeed, the fact that in depth training is seen as necessary for full-time attendants militates against the very idea of using volunteer unpaid invigilators. Talks from local police can help to explain what they should do in the event of an incident.

Briefing by the Director/Keeper/Curator is necessary to arouse a volunteer’s interest in particular exhibitions – especially temporary ones. It is necessary to keep the volunteers abreast of any information they should know, such as descriptions of suspicious persons. It is also necessary to make them aware of changes in the premises – particularly of the displayed material.

Reference to the two following publications will also be useful:

Volunteers in Museums and Galleries, Jenny Mattingly, 1984, The Volunteer Centre, 29 Lower King Road, Berkhamstead, Herts HP4 2AB.


6.8 Contracting out Security Guarding

For some years it has been government policy to encourage the introduction where applicable of privatised services in the public sector. The provision of security for museums has mainly been exempted from compulsory tendering.

However, financial pressures on institutions and the recognised need for overall efficiency, have led many governing authorities to explore the possibility of replacing in-house warding staff with commercial guards brought in from the private sector. There are now cases of heritage institutions, both large and small that have embraced this principle in some degree. Against this background if an institution is considering contracting out, it is suggested that the following steps should be taken as a guide.

Setting up a Management Team

This is often a complex and time-consuming process which will require much effort and dedication. The process must be
properly resourced, with a team set up to oversee the process. The management team selected by the Director/Head of Gallery Services requires an input from security, finance and personnel at all stages. The approach must be thorough and meticulous if the correct solution is to be achieved.

**Establishing a Baseline of Current Costs**

A proper evaluation of the current costs of security must be made. This will involve examining the existing security system, establishing the costs of the current guarding system and reviewing existing security posts. A detailed review of each employee’s job and responsibilities is essential so that a formula can gauge current costs and be made available to use as a comparison against future tenders. This process involves much detailed work from the finance and personnel sections. It is not advisable to depend solely on job descriptions – each individual security person or group representative must be interviewed to ensure the full scope of their responsibilities are understood and included in the formula.

**Considering Contracting-Out**

Reasons for contracting-out need to be established as there is a balance to strike between cost savings and efficiency, especially in terms of in-house integrity, loyalty and workforce continuity. Previously the perceived wisdom was that contract warding was cheaper than providing it in-house, however recent examples have shown that it may well be no less expensive and if the task is complex it could even be more costly than in-house. If you wish to be rid of the responsibility of managing staff and transfer to a Facilities Management concept, then that may be worthwhile reason for doing so. However, the management resources necessary to monitor the execution of the contract should not be under-estimated.

The turnover of staff within the manned security industry must also be considered as this can average 40–60 per cent per annum. Such a turnover has serious implications regarding staff training and continuity. It is therefore absolutely essential that you are quite clear why you want to go out to contract and what you will achieve by doing so. You need to establish whether the required security levels can be met in a cost-effective way by a private contractor.

**Statement of Requirements**

If you decide to proceed, you will need to draw up a detailed Statement of Requirements (SOR). This is an extremely
important task as it defines what you are seeking the contractor to undertake and also provides the legally enforceable framework.

**SOR Key Areas**

- Contractors’ responsibilities (summary of tasks)
- Detailed tasking
- Training standards
- Management arrangements
- Pay and performance certification
- Uniform
- Discipline
- Monitoring systems
- Review of contract
- Company details
- Level of insurance
- Contract details

**Selection of Potential Contractors**

Once the SOR is agreed potential contractors can be selected. All such contractors should belong to a recognised security organisation such as the British Security Industry Association (BSIA). Having established which contractors operate in the area and have a good reputation with other customers a shortlist will need to be prepared and visits made to sites to observe contractors’ staff in action.

It is also essential to visit the firm’s regional office. It will then be possible to make an informed judgement of the quality of the security guards on the ground and their management. The regional office should supply a brief on the company including an outline scope of their operations. References from firms employing the contractors’ guards should also be obtained and visited. Having completed this process, management will be in a position to select the companies it wishes to invite to tender. It is good practice to select between six to eight companies at this stage.

**Issue of Invitation to Tender (ITT)**

This will consist of three parts:

- Notes/guidance of tenderers as a preface to the ITT or covering letter.
  - Tender due date
  - Where services are required
– Contract commencement date
– Description of the task in specific and general terms
– Contract length
– Arrange for site visit for companies invited to tender
– Clause stating obligations re. acceptance of tender and burden of costs in tender preparation – expenses to be borne by the tenderer etc.
– Arrangements for formal presentations
– Arrangements re. tender submission
• Statement of requirement in detail.
• Conditions of contract – governing the performance of a contract: suitable for the purpose they are intended and provide a legally enforceable framework within which both the museum and contractor are able to work. This should also include a termination clause.

**Briefing Meeting for Tendering Companies**

A meeting to brief the tenderers should be arranged early in the tender process. The intention is to provide as much information as possible to the tendering companies and they should have the opportunity to ask questions. All the tenderers should receive the same information. Minutes of the briefing meeting should be taken and all questions and answers recorded. Copies of these minutes must be sent to all tenderers.

**Return of Bids**

When the bids are returned the financial details should be separated in a sealed envelope. The initial assessment of compatibility with the SOR can then be made without bias from price considerations. The selection panel can then consider the individual bids by assessing them against agreed criteria, such as quality of presentation and submission, management base, training, uniform, understanding the requirements etc. The criteria for the selection process should be considered and agreed in advance of the selection panel.

When the selection panel agrees a shortlist, the tenderers that are listed are then invited to present their bid and submit to questions from the panel.

**Selection of Successful Tender**

Having heard all the presentations and all questions being answered, the selection panel can evaluate the bids in detail and make a final selection. The successful tenderer can then agree the timetable for handover.
When evaluating the tenders, the selection panel must gauge and balance quality against price. The quality of the guards required and the standards they have to meet will have been stipulated in the SOR. Care must be taken to ensure that the tenders meet these standards and then maintain them. The price quoted should reflect the standards and quality of staff that are required. Low bids must be treated with caution and may indicate that the tenderer has not recognised the quality of staff required for the task or has underbid just to secure the contract. Heritage security staff must be capable of coping with a number of tasks – fire warden, H&S aspects, crowd control, interpretation as well as security and many persons employed in the security industry fall short of this standard. Heritage security staff are increasingly being considered as ‘front of house staff’ and the impression they make on the public is important.

**Transfer of Undertakings**

**Protection of Employment Regulations 1981 (TUPE)**

It is likely that TUPE will apply. In essence the successful tenderer must offer comparable conditions. It is therefore essential during the selection procedure that terms on take-over are clearly laid down so that the existing workforce can be properly briefed. The manned security industry does not like TUPE and will often endeavour to ignore it. However, it does provide a mechanism to protect the existing workforce and it must be made to work and therefore the Trade Union side will need to be satisfied that TUPE is being properly applied. Employers have a duty to ensure that TUPE is properly applied and need to protect themselves against the possibility of future litigation. In many cases professional legal advice will be needed. If a company states they will ignore TUPE then they should be ruled out.

**Independent Security Consultant**

During the selection process it is good practice to employ an independent security consultant who has knowledge of the manned guarding industry. It is a complicated industry and contains a large number of below-par companies. The cost of a consultant capable of giving impartial advice and guidance on the tendering is a sound investment.

**Monitoring and Review**

Part of the SOR will be the agreed arrangements made to monitor the performance of the contracted guards and regular
review of the company's performance. Experience shows that managing contracts is a time consuming process and may require more effort than the supervision of in-house staff. However, such procedures are essential if you are to derive the best performance from the contracted workforce. The contracted workers must feel part of the museum if they are to be truly effective and they must be as well managed as the in-house staff.

Central Unit of Purchasing (CUP) Guidance

The Central Unit on Purchasing (CUP) of HM Treasury has produced a guidance sheet – No. 40, The Competitive Tendering Process, which gives valuable information on the tendering process and is recommended reading. This document can be obtained from HM Treasury, the Efficiency Unit on 020 7270 0168.
An integrated security system will only be effective if it is constantly reviewed and exercised and is subject to internal and external audit.

**Staff**

It is essential that all staff know their own roles in the event of an incident. This can only be ascertained by holding an exercise and having a thorough review after the exercise of the lessons learned. Plans and procedures can then be fine tuned to reflect these lessons.

Most museums, libraries and archives regularly practice fire drills but it is equally important that they carry out security exercises.

Whilst it may be convenient to exercise these procedures when the public is on the premises security incidents are an area where the action required by staff is difficult and it requires staff not only to be familiar with their roles but also to have the confidence in their ability to carry it out. Only training and practice will achieve this.

As part of this type of exercise suitable plans need to be in place to allow the public back in when the exercise is complete. On the majority of occasions the public are pleased to see institutions undertaking its responsibilities to them and to their collections.

**Management**

It is not only the staff that requires training. It is equally important to ensure that the management, from the director down, understands and is familiar with their role in an incident or crisis. The Crisis Management and Incident Management Teams require training to fulfil their tasks.

The practice of command control and communication in an incident crisis is always better achieved if the individuals concerned have received training for their tasks. Normally management training is NOT sufficient.

**Table Top Exercises**

Experience has shown that the least disruptive way of achieving this type of training is to conduct what is known as a ‘table top’ exercise. This is where a potential threat/crisis/incident is exercised on the preparation of an opening scenario and that is...
followed by a number of follow up questions. At each question stage Management either together or split up into their crisis management teams are required to indicate what they would do, when and how. The Exercise Director and his staff guide the session to ensure that plans and procedures laid down are followed and that lessons are learned by the player. Where it is clear that the plan or procedure is lacking, then the lessons learned need to be incorporated into those plans and procedures.

Institutions may require assistance in the preparation of these exercises and should seek guidance from the Resource Security Adviser, or a consultant familiar with the training needs.

**Conclusion**

Without audit most procedures and plans, particularly those required in a crisis, will fail in some area or another. A failure in a key area could result in loss or damage to collections. In the case of institutions that have admission charges or a retail interest, there can also be a serious loss of revenue.

The regular investment of time to exercise procedures and plans is a small insurance premium to pay to avoid potential disaster.

**Marking and Identification of Collection Objects**

1. All collection material must have a registration/acquisition number. Where possible the item should be marked with this number.
2. An index of all collection material to be maintained showing registration/acquisition numbers and a full written description of each item – the Getty Object ID system is recommended.
3. Photographs of all collection items should be made, each photograph marked with the item’s registration/acquisition number. One copy of the photograph to be filed in the Collection Box and a second copy in an Index of Photographs.
4. A Location Register must be maintained which will show the normal place within the museum where each item can be found. The Register entry would show the room/gallery/store and shelf/cupboard/location where the item is permanently stored. Any movement of the object from its normal location would be noted in the Register and a removal card/slip placed in its place at the location.
5. When items are removed from display or storage for examination or loan the procedure to leave a removal card must be strictly followed, and when the objects are replaced in their correct positions the cards destroyed. Some institutions may wish to
6. It is good practice to prepare an Inventory File or record for each room/gallery/store listing the items stored or displayed there. This provides a means of checking the collection in each room on a daily basis. It is essential that this record is also noted when items are added or taken from the room.

7. By reference to the Collection Index, Location Register and room inventory file it should be possible to pinpoint the location of any object in the collection at any time. Spot checks can be undertaken on a regular basis to check the system and full audits of parts or of the whole collection can be undertaken at stated intervals.

8. Collection managers should take a regular collection inventory. This should not be delayed because it is a low priority or because of the size of the task. A regular inventory should be completed every one, two or three years, depending on the size of the collection. Such checks should include all items on loan.

9. Managers should use an inventory team on a full time basis to conduct a large inventory with accuracy and consistency. The staff divide a large inventory into smaller parts conducted by qualified and trusted museum professionals. Each member of staff being assigned a specific inventory or area and be required to conduct the area inventory periodically. Managers then conduct full inventories in pairs of persons.

10. High-value items and objects that are susceptible to theft should be checked more regularly. Each member of staff being given the responsibility to check the top ten objects at risk in his area every day, the second level of vulnerable objects every week and the remainder on regular inventories.

Managers must recognise that internal theft is a tremendous threat to every institution. They must protect inventory records from external and internal manipulation. Managers should consider using an outside agency to conduct an occasional check of the inventory and the inventory system.

Object ID

When describing objects the Object ID system created by The Getty Information Institute should be used.

Object ID Checklist

Take photographs: photographs are of vital importance in identifying and recovering stolen objects. In addition to overall views, take close-ups of inscriptions, markings and any damage or repairs. If possible always include a scale or object of known size in the image.
Answer these questions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of object:</th>
<th>What kind of object is it (e.g. painting, sculpture, clock, mask)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materials and techniques:</td>
<td>What materials is the object made from (e.g. brass, wood, oil on canvas)? How was it made (e.g. carved, cast, etched)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurements: object?</td>
<td>What is the size and/or weight of the object? Specify which unit of measurement being used (e.g. cms, inches) and to which dimension the measurements refer (e.g. height, width, depth).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inscriptions and markings:</td>
<td>Are there any identifying markings, numbers, or inscriptions on the object (e.g. damage, repairs, manufacturing defects)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title:</td>
<td>Does the object have a title by which it is known and might be identified (e.g. The Scream)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject:</td>
<td>What is pictured or represented (e.g. landscape, battle, woman holding child)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date or period:</td>
<td>When was the object made (e.g. 1893, early 17th century, Late Bronze age)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maker:</td>
<td>Do you know who made the object? This may be the name of a known individual (e.g. Thomas Tompion), a company (e.g. Tiffany) or a cultural group (e.g. Hopi).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Write a short description:</td>
<td>This can include any additional information which helps to identify the object (e.g. colour and shape, where it was made).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Keep it secure; having documented the object, keep this information in a safe place.

For further information about Object ID contact:

The Art Loss Register, 12 Grosvenor Place, London SW1X 7HH
Tel: 020 7235 3393
Email: artloss@artloss.com Website: www.artloss.com
A Systematic Approach to Security Equipment Procurement

Operational Requirement

Security equipment is a vital element of a security solution. To advise on the best equipment for each task, a systematic approach is required to equipment procurement. Before equipment can be selected it is necessary to confirm your threat assessment and then go through a risk analysis exercise at the end of which it will be possible to identify the operational requirement.

The operational requirement consists of a description of:

- the area of interest;
- the problem;
- the operational response required;
- the role of the security person using the equipment;
- any miscellaneous points.

It is then possible to draw up a simple checklist for each area to be covered.

This is best done by using the following simple steps:

- Use a site plan or building drawing and shade in the area you need to detect, delay, observe and detain an intruder each in a different colour.
- Give each area and objective a unique reference code for identification and describe the area on your checklist.
- Then look at the problem as follows and discipline yourself to put this down on a piece of paper:
  - what are the likely targets of interest?
  - what target activity is of concern? (i.e. vital to the institution business)
  - list the purpose of the detection/observation.
  - list any other factors that might be needed to succeed.
  - finally any other information.
- Now look at what the institution’s operational response should be in relation to the detection/observation. Ask yourself these questions and write down the answers:
  - what result do you want to a successful response to the crisis?
  - who is to make the response?
  - what timescale is required to be able to make a successful response?
  - when is the response required?
under which conditions does the system need to be effective? 
In other words institutions open to the public closed or 
partially open etc.

You are now in a position to be able to review the role and 
actions of person/persons who intruders’ information from your 
equipment.

• What do you expect him/her to do on receipt of the alert?
• How will they know where the activity is occurring?
• How quickly do they need to act?
• Who is to be the observer and co-ordinator?
• Where should he/she be located?

Further Questions

• Who is the stakeholder?
• What priority is assigned to this task?
• What is the likelihood of the activity occurring and how often?
• How effectively does the task have to be performed?
• At the end always ask yourself “What are the benefits of doing 
the action over not doing it?”

Summary of Tasks

• Define the function to be performed.
• Define the area where it will be performed.
• Define the response time expected from the system.
• Decide how effective the system should be.
• Decide when the functions will be performed.
• Decide the worst case environmental conditions.
• Decide the worst case number of simultaneous inputs.

Statement of Requirement

Remember you are stating PROBLEMS not solutions. These are 
your requirements which need to be met. All the above 
information is put together into a detailed Statement of 
Requirement. This is a vital document and will be used by 
tenderers to quote against. If you do not get this right you will 
end up with equipment which does not meet your needs. Other 
than for simple requirements, you are advised to get 
professional help from an independent consultant since there is 
a degree of technical input needed.

The Statement of Requirement should also include:

• performance specification and evaluation standards;
• commissioning details;
• request for warranty details;
• call-out procedures required;
• maintenance needs.

Maintenance after installation is an important factor and you need to be aware of the likely costs of keeping your equipment/system in running order. There are often trade-offs for length of the maintenance contract versus the cost of spares etc.

Only now are you ready to issue your Statement of Requirement or Invitation to Tender. The selected tenderers will then respond to your Statement of Requirement and you will be able to choose a firm and equipment which meets your needs. The effort that goes into the Statement of Requirement should not be underestimated. It is a crucial document and attention to detail will be worth the work involved.

A Statement of Requirement can be set out under these headings:

Introduction

• A brief statement of the overall requirement (i.e. replace current CCTV system).

Security Concept and Strategy

• Threat Statement and Analysis.
• The security area of interest.
• The problem you want tackled.
• The relation to the overall security concept.

Plan

• An outline security plan.

Security Result/Response that you Require

• Equipment performance and specification details.
• Equipment and installation standards.
• Commissioning details.
• Conservation details.
• Warranty requirements/defects liability period.
• Callout requirements.
• Maintenance needs.
• Any personnel/procedure points regarding the system.
Miscellaneous

- Summary of equipment.
- Terms of equipment supply.
- Layout drawings.
- Manuals and training required.
- Installation constraints.

The above list is for guidance only and should not be considered as exhaustive.
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